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N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.D.M.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Dec 12, 2014
DOCKET NO. A-5870-12T1 (App. Div. Dec. 12, 2014)

Opinion

DOCKET NO. A-5870-12T1

12-12-2014

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. C.D.M., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF Z.A.M. and A.M.E.T., minors.

Joseph Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief; Laura T. Mastriano, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors, Z.A.M. and A.M.E.T. (David Valentin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).


RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fuentes, Ashrafi and Kennedy. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, FG-04-150-13. Joseph Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief; Laura T. Mastriano, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors, Z.A.M. and A.M.E.T. (David Valentin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). PER CURIAM

Defendant, C.D.M., (Cindy) the biological mother of eight-year-old Zara and four-year-old Abby, appeals a July 17, 2013 judgment of guardianship which terminated her parental rights to the children. On appeal, she raises the following arguments:

We refer to defendant and the children by pseudonyms to protect their identities. Also, the rights of the fathers of the children have been terminated and are not the subject of this appeal.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS BECAUSE THE DIVISION DID NOT PROVE ALL FOUR STANDARDS OF THE STATUTORY TEST, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1A, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.



A. The Standard of Review.



B. There Is Insufficient Evidence In the Record To Support The Trial Court's Conclusion That The Division Established By Clear And Convincing Evidence That It Made Reasonable Efforts To Provide Services Because It Is Undisputed That Its First Psychologist Incorrectly Recommended Outpatient Drug Treatment Early In 2012, And The Division Only Recommended And Required Outpatient Treatment Throughout The Relevant Period, When Inpatient Treatment Was Required.



C. The Court's Findings As To The Second Prong Of The Statutory Test, That Cindy Was Unwilling Or Unable To Eliminate The Harm Facing The Children, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(2), Are Not Supported By The Evidence
Because The Division's Expert's And The Expert's Conclusions Did Not Take Into Account Cindy's Efforts Upon Release.



D. The Trial Court's Reliance On Defendant's Arrests And Incarceration In Support Of The First Prong Did Not Comply With N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.A., 382 N.J. Super. 525 (App. Div. 2006).
We have considered these arguments in light of the record and the applicable law, and we affirm essentially for the reasons expressed by Judge Linda G. Baxter in her detailed, thirty-four page opinion from the bench on July 17, 2013.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's involvement with defendant, nor will we set forth the evidence and testimony offered over the course of the four-day trial that preceded the entry of judgment for guardianship. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge Baxter's thorough opinion. We add the following brief comments.

Defendant argues, among other things, that while the Division offered her outpatient treatment for her habitual use of street drugs, her testifying psychologist stated that she needed "something more intensive" to address her substance abuse. Defendant argues that she should have been offered inpatient drug treatment.

Defendant was arrested on January 18, 2012, and the arresting officers at that time sought assistance from the Division on behalf of the children. Evidence at trial revealed that not only was the home deplorably filthy, but vials of a controlled dangerous substance were found in a spot where the children could access it. Defendant tested positive for cocaine at the Dodd hearing held the next day.

Following her arrest, defendant was offered intensive outpatient treatment at a number of programs which she did not complete, and she continuously tested positive for cocaine and opiates from that point to January 2013 when she was arrested again, and subsequently indicted, for burglary and theft. Moreover, defendant was offered inpatient treatment at Newark Renaissance which she rejected.

Defendant was in possession of heroin at the time of her second arrest, which occurred when defendant showed up for one of her sporadic visitation periods with the children.
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On appeal, we are bound to accept the trial court's factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). Although we review legal conclusions by the trial judge de novo, we owe a particular deference to family court judges because of their special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 416 (1998); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Therefore, we only disturb a family court's decision if it is "'so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)). In light of these standards, we find no basis to disturb Judge Baxter's findings of fact, and those findings support her legal conclusions.

We are satisfied that the Division had met by clear and convincing evidence all of the legal requirement for a judgment of guardianship. Judge Baxter's opinion tracks the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999), New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. S.A., 382 N.J. Super. 525 (App. Div. 2006), and is supported by substantial and credible evidence in the record. F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 448-49. We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons that the judge expressed in her comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion.

Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.

CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION


Summaries of

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.D.M.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Dec 12, 2014
DOCKET NO. A-5870-12T1 (App. Div. Dec. 12, 2014)
Case details for

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.D.M.

Case Details

Full title:NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY…

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Date published: Dec 12, 2014

Citations

DOCKET NO. A-5870-12T1 (App. Div. Dec. 12, 2014)