Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3542-14T4
05-09-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. B.H., Defendant-Appellant, and R.M. and A.D., Defendants. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.H., M.A.H., N.H. and C.H., minors.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant B.H. (John A. Salois, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Patricia O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor M.H. (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, joins in the brief of appellant). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors M.A.H. and N.H. (Lisa J. Godfrey, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor C.H. (Margo E.K. Hirsch, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Koblitz, Kennedy and Gilson. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FG-16-30-14. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant B.H. (John A. Salois, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Patricia O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor M.H. (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, joins in the brief of appellant). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors M.A.H. and N.H. (Lisa J. Godfrey, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor C.H. (Margo E.K. Hirsch, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant B.H. appeals from a final judgment terminating her parental rights to her four children. She contends that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove the four prongs of the best interest standard of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm.
I.
B.H. (Beth) is the biological mother of four children: M.H. (Millicent), born in 2002; N.H. (Neil), born in 2003; M.A.H. (Marisol), born in 2005; and C.H. (Carl), born in 2013. The identity and location of the biological father of Millicent, Neil, and Marisol is unknown. R.M. is the biological father of Carl, but Beth named A.D., her paramour, as Carl's father on his birth certificate.
To protect privacy interests and for ease of reading, we use fictitious names for the parties. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
The Division has been involved with Beth and her children since 2006. Before 2012, the Division received over fourteen referrals concerning Beth's children. Those referrals involved concerns about a lack of parental supervision, substance abuse by the adults caring for the children, unsanitary living conditions, and sexual abuse of the children. Twice, the Division substantiated Beth for neglect in allowing men to have access to her children resulting in sexual abuse of two of the children.
In 2008, the Division substantiated sexual abuse of Millicent and Neil by a registered sex offender who Beth reportedly allowed to live in her apartment with the children. During the course of a follow-up investigation, there were also concerns that the children may have been exposed to another sexual offender.
In 2011, A.D. was living with Beth and her three older children. In September of that year, Millicent reported that A.D. had sexually molested her on numerous occasions. When Millicent was interviewed by a detective from the prosecutor's office, however, she recanted her allegations.
In November 2011, Beth and A.D. brought Millicent to a hospital because Millicent had an extensive laceration inside her vagina. The attending physician reported to the Division that Millicent's injuries were consistent with being repeatedly penetrated by a penis because Millicent had no intact hymen. In a follow-up interview with an investigator from the prosecutor's office, Millicent reported that the cut had come about when she placed part of a brush inside her vagina. Later that same night, however, when separated from her mother, Millicent told hospital personnel and a Division worker that A.D. had "put his thingy in my privates."
A.D. was arrested, charged with criminal sexual assault on Millicent, and incarcerated. The prosecutor's office investigated those charges and after conducting DNA tests, the prosecutor chose not to proceed with the criminal sexual assault charges against A.D. Following a hearing, however, a Family Part judge found that A.D. had sexually abused Millicent. We affirmed that finding on an appeal filed by A.D. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.D., No. A-1710-12 (App. Div. June 6, 2014) (slip op. at 3).
In the meantime, the three older children were removed from Beth's custody in November 2011. Millicent, who suffers from psychiatric and emotional issues, was placed in inpatient treatment and then transitioned to a residential treatment home. Neil and Marisol were placed in foster care. The Division provided Beth with a variety of services including substance abuse and psychological evaluations and treatment.
In October 2012, Millicent, Neil and Marisol were returned to Beth's custody, but the Division retained care and supervision of the children. Because of Millicent's psychiatric issues, she remained in residential treatment, but was allowed to have weekend visits with Beth and her siblings.
The reunification of Beth and the children did not go smoothly. The Division had concerns about another male, R.M., living with Beth and the children. Beth later reported that R.M. used illegal drugs and had a history of domestic violence. There were also reports of Millicent acting sexually inappropriate with her siblings.
In April 2013, A.D. was released from jail and he met with Beth and the children. Millicent reported that her mother had allowed A.D. to physically interact with her and had put her on A.D.'s back for a piggyback ride. At the same time, Millicent disclosed that she had also been sexually abused by another convicted sex offender who Beth had allowed to reside in her apartment. The Division, therefore, again removed the children from Beth's care and the Family Part approved that removal. In a subsequent hearing, the Family Part found that Beth had neglected her three older children by allowing them to be exposed to A.D.
Beth continued to receive services from the Division, which included a further psychological evaluation. The psychologist reported that Beth "minimize[d] the impact [of the sexual abuse] on her children, especially with regard to [Millicent]" and that the children were at risk of further victimization because of Beth's "limited insight and judgment into the protection of her children."
The Division also had concerns about Beth's continuing relationship with A.D. Beth acknowledged to a Division worker that she was still in a relationship with A.D. and the Division received reports that A.D. was staying with Beth in her apartment.
In August 2013, Beth gave birth to Carl. A Division worker went to the hospital to check on Beth and found A.D. in the hospital room with Beth. Beth informed the worker that although A.D. was not Carl's biological father, she intended to name A.D. as the father on Carl's birth certificate because she depended on A.D. for support. The worker also witnessed Beth and A.D. agree to meet later.
The Division removed Carl from Beth's care based on Beth's ongoing relationship with A.D. Initially, the Family Part denied the Division's application for custody of Carl, but did grant the Division care and supervision of Carl. In September 2013, after finding that Beth had neglected her older children, the Family Part granted the Division custody of Carl. Thereafter, the Family Part conducted a fact-finding hearing and concluded that Beth had also neglected Carl by exposing him to A.D., which posed a substantial risk of harm to Carl. We have affirmed that finding of negligence in a separate opinion. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.H., No. A-3885-13 (App. Div. May 9, 2016).
The Division filed a guardianship complaint for all four children and a trial was conducted in early 2015. The Family Part judge heard testimony from three Division workers, two fact witnesses, including Millicent's therapist, and two expert witnesses. The judge also conducted an interview of Neil and considered documentary evidence.
Dr. Robert Miller testified as an expert witness for the Division. Miller conducted psychological and bonding evaluations and was qualified as an expert in those fields. Miller noted that Beth has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. He assessed her as a woman suffering from depression with a history of substance abuse. He noted that Beth "demonstrate[d] impulsivity, anger, [and a] propensity for manipulation." Concerning her children, Miller opined that Beth is unable to provide a safe and stable parental relationship and continues to have no concern about A.D. having contact with her children.
Discussing his bonding evaluations, Miller opined that Millicent, Neil and Marisol demonstrated insecure attachments to Beth and that Beth interacted with them as a peer. Miller also opined that reunifying Beth with her children would pose a significant risk to the children, including risks of emotional neglect and exposure to unsafe situations.
With regard to Carl, Miller testified that he showed no attachment to Beth and had a secure attachment to his foster mother. Miller opined that separating Carl from his foster mother would result in severe and enduring harm to the child. Finally, Miller opined that Beth did not demonstrate the ability to remedy her parental deficiencies and that further delay in permanency would increase the risk of emotional and developmental harm to each of the children.
Dr. James R. Reynolds testified as an expert for Beth. Reynolds conducted reviews and evaluations of both Beth and the children and was qualified as an expert. Reynolds opined that Beth possessed "adequate parenting knowledge" and, with assistance, had the skills and abilities to safely care for the children. Reynolds did not recommend immediate reunification; rather, he recommended eventual reunification, noting that Beth would need external support and assistance. Reynolds also acknowledged that any further removal of the children from Beth would cause harm to the children.
The Law Guardian presented testimony from a therapist who had been working with Millicent since October 2013. The therapist described the treatment that Millicent had received and the efforts to transition Millicent to a treatment home.
After considering the evidence presented at trial, the Family Part judge determined that the Division had proven by clear and convincing evidence the four prongs of the best interest standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law, which he read onto the record on March 19, 2015. Specifically, the judge found that the children had been harmed and would be at risk of harm if they were returned to Beth's care. He based this finding on Beth's untreated mental health condition, ongoing instability, and her "extremely poor judgment with respect to men [whom] she allow[ed]" to have access to her children. As part of this finding, the judge found that Millicent had been sexually abused by A.D. while Beth permitted him to live in her apartment. The judge also found that Beth continued to allow A.D. to reside in her home despite her knowledge that he had sexually abused one of her children.
With respect to the second prong, the judge found that Beth was unable to provide the children with a safe and stable home. In that regard, the judge found that the children were at "serious risk" because of Beth's "extreme[ly] poor judgment in relationships." The judge also found that because Beth continued to have a relationship with A.D., that association "will continue to cause significant harm to [the] children."
The judge also found that the Division had made reasonable efforts to provide services in support of reunification, but Beth "failed to benefit from [those] interventions and remain[ed] unable to care for her children." The judge also found the Division had appropriately explored and ruled out alternative relative placements.
Finally, with respect to the fourth prong, the judge found that termination of Beth's parental rights would not do more harm than good. Relying on the expert testimony of Miller, the judge found that the children "have an insecure, unhealthy attachment" to Beth and that Beth had not remedied her deficiencies as a parent. The judge also credited Miller's testimony that a failed reunification would pose significant risk to the children's future development. Further, the judge cited Miller's testimony that multiple placements and a lack of permanency for the children pose a significant risk to their development.
Accordingly, the Family Part entered an order terminating the parental rights of Beth, R.M., and A.D. R.M. did not participate in the litigation and has not appealed. A.D. has also not appealed the termination order. Instead, only Beth has appealed from the March 19, 2015 order terminating her parental rights.
II.
On this appeal, Beth argues that none of the four prongs required by the best interest test in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Law Guardian representing Millicent joins in those arguments and points out that Millicent "has strongly and consistently expressed her desire to return to [Beth's] care." The Law Guardian representing Neil and Marisol contends that the Division did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Beth's parental rights would not cause serious and enduring harm to Neil and Marisol. In opposition, both the Division and the Law Guardian representing Carl argue that each of the trial court's findings on the four prongs of the best interest test are supported by clear and convincing evidence and the judgment terminating Beth's parental rights should be affirmed.
The scope of our review in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). We uphold a trial judge's fact-findings if they are "supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." Ibid. "We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2014). We will not overturn a family court's fact-findings unless the findings "went so wide of the mark that the judge was clearly mistaken." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). We do not, however, give "special deference" to the court's "interpretation of the law." D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010)).
A parent has a constitutionally protected right "to enjoy a relationship with his or her child." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). That right, however, "is not absolute" and is limited "by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 447. A parent's interest must, at times, yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009).
When considering termination of parental rights, the court focuses on the "best interests" of the children. K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 357. Those interests are evaluated by application of the four standards contained in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), which require clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his [or her] resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.These four criteria "are neither discrete nor separate, but are interrelated and overlap." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 479 (App. Div. 2012). Together they "provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348.
A.
Beth argues that there is no evidence that she harmed her children. She contends that when she learned of the sexual assault in 2008, she called the police and the offender was arrested. She also argues that although A.D. was found to have sexually abused Millicent, he was not a "confirmed sexual offender" because the criminal charges were dropped. In particular, Beth takes issue with the trial judge's failure to expressly reject the expert opinions offered by Reynolds, contending that those opinions supported her position that she could successfully parent her children.
The first prong examines the effect of harm on a child's health and development arising from the parental relationship. Ibid. "The harm shown . . . must be one that threatens the child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects on the child." Id. at 352. Importantly, the harm "need not be inflicted by the parent personally." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 289 (2007). Instead, "[a] parent is unfit if he or she is unable or unwilling to prevent harm to the child irrespective of the source of the harm." Ibid. "Consequently, a parent's association with third-parties may be appropriate consideration if those associations harm the child." Ibid. Furthermore, if the child's health, safety or development is threatened, the Division does not have to wait "until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect" to satisfy the first prong. F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 449 (quoting In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999)).
Here, the record supports the trial court's determination that the children have been harmed and will continue to be endangered by Beth because of her "mental health issues, ongoing instability, [and] her extremely poor judgment with respect to the men she allows in her life . . . and [to whom she] directly exposes her children to." The evidence at trial included evidence that Beth had allowed a known sexual offender to reside in her apartment and he had sexually assaulted Millicent and Neil in 2008. She then later allowed another known sex offender to have access to her children. She also allowed A.D. to continue to have access to her children after he was found to have sexually assaulted Millicent in 2011.
The trial judge accepted and relied on the expert testimony of Miller, who opined that Beth had severe parenting deficiencies and was unable to provide a safe and stable home for her children. Miller found that Beth is "unable to assess risk to their safety" or "vet people that are going to be in . . . proximity to the children." Miller concluded that Beth's failure to effectively address her psychiatric issues likely had "a significant negative impact on the children's development."
Beth's arguments concerning the opinions offered by Reynolds essentially ask us to make a different credibility determination than the trial court. We decline to do so. The trial judge clearly credited Miller's opinions and relied on them in making his fact-findings. While not expressly finding Reynolds incredible, he did not rely on his testimony or his findings. This lack of reliance demonstrates that he did not credit the opinions offered by Reynolds.
In summary, the record demonstrates that Beth has allowed a succession of men into her home who pose a danger to her children. Her failure to take any reasonable precautions to protect her children from these men, coupled with her mental health issues and ongoing instability, satisfies the first prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
B.
With regard to the second prong, Beth argues that the trial court improperly presumed that because Beth continued her relationship with A.D., the children were at risk of harm. Specifically, she contends that after 2011, she separated from A.D. and has never allowed A.D. to be with the children unsupervised.
The second prong requires proof that a parent is "unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). The focus is "whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the parents can cease to inflict harm upon the children entrusted to their care." I.S., supra, 202 N.J. at 167 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 607 (1986)). The second prong may also be established by "evidence that separating the child from his [or her] resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). Children have "the right to a permanent, safe and stable placement" and "[t]he emphasis has shifted from protracted efforts for reunification with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent placement to promote the child's well- being." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 456 (2004).
The record here supports the trial court's finding that Beth had a continuing relationship with A.D. Beth's contentions that there is no proof that A.D. was living with her misses a fundamental point. Whether A.D. was living with Beth was not the critical issue. The question was whether Beth's continuing relationship with A.D. would expose the children to a substantial risk of future harm. The trial judge found that evidence clearly and convincingly established that Beth was unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm she posed to the children by continuing a relationship with A.D. The judge's decision was based on Beth's unwavering commitment to A.D., her inability to perceive the risk of harm to the children caused by A.D.'s contact with them, and the expert testimony presented at trial.
In addition to the evidence relied upon in sustaining prong one, Miller's conclusion that Beth was unable to provide a safe and stable home for her children also supports the trial court's findings. In analyzing the second prong, courts are permitted to consider evidence presented pertaining to the first prong. See DMH, supra, 161 N.J. at 379 (explaining that the prongs are interrelated and "evidence that supports one informs and may support the other"). Thus, we find no basis to disturb the trial court's finding that the Division proved the second prong by clear and convincing evidence.
C.
The third prong, "contemplates efforts that focus on reunification of the parent with the child and assistance to the parent to correct and overcome those circumstances that necessitated the placement of the child into foster care." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 354 (citing DMH, supra, 161 N.J. at 386-87). This prong also requires the Division to establish that it considered alternatives to termination of parental rights. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 434-35 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 44 (2001). Here, the trial court found that the Division's efforts toward reunification were reasonable. The record is replete with evidence of services and efforts provided by the Division. Those services included therapeutic supervised visitation, parenting classes, substance abuse evaluations and treatment, housing assistance and psychological evaluations and treatment.
The trial judge also found that the Division appropriately investigated alternative relative placements, but none of those placements proved viable. Those findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and we discern no basis for disturbing those findings.
D.
Both Beth and the Law Guardian representing Millicent, Neil and Marisol challenge the finding that terminating Beth's parental rights would not do more harm than good. Particularly, Beth contends that at the time of trial Millicent was twelve-years-old and although the Division's goal for her is select home adoption, the Division has not been successful in finding a pre-adoptive home. In addition, Beth points out that Carl was only one-year-old at the time of trial, arguing that he was too young to have formed a bond with either of his foster parents.
The Law Guardian argues that Reynolds's opinion concerning bonding was the more accurate expert opinion. The Law Guardian also contends that Neil and Marisol are not securely attached to their resource parents and both desire to return to their mother's care.
"[A] child's need for permanency is an extremely important consideration" under the fourth prong. R.G., supra, 217 N.J. at 559. "The question to be addressed under [the fourth] prong is whether, after considering and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with [his or] her natural parents than from the permanent disruption of [his or] her relationship with [his or] her foster parents." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355. "Ultimately, a child has a right to live in a stable nurturing environment and to have the psychological security that his [or her] most deeply formed attachments will not be shattered." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 453; see also DMH, supra, 161 N.J. at 385 (recognizing the "strong policy considerations that underscore the need to secure permanency and stability for the child without undue delay").
Here, there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the trial judge's finding that the Division established prong four of the best interest standard as to all four children. The record clearly and convincingly established that termination of Beth's parental rights to the children would not do more harm than good. Miller testified that Carl had formed no bond with Beth and that the three older children had insecure bonds with Beth. Miller also opined that Carl was securely attached to his foster mother and that it would cause him significant and enduring harm to sever the relationship with his foster mother.
As to Neil and Marisol, Miller opined that they were "developing attachment" to their foster parents. Relying on the additional testimony from the Division caseworker, the trial court found that the foster families were fully committed to adopting Neil and Marisol. The trial judge also found that Neil and Marisol "have finally found a pre-adoptive placement where their needs are being met and they are loved or cared for." Finally, having heard the expert testimony of both Miller and Reynolds, the trial judge found Miller's testimony credible.
With regard to Millicent, the judge found that she requires further residential treatment because of the sexual abuse she suffered while in Beth's care. The judge concluded that it was in Millicent's best interest to terminate Beth's parental rights to prevent further exposure to A.D. and other inappropriate men and "so that she can continue to heal as she [] transitions to a less-restrictive placement." The judge's conclusion reflects Millicent's need for permanency and Beth's inability to care for Millicent in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the record supports the finding that greater harm is likely to befall Millicent by returning her to Beth's custody.
While we recognize that a court should hesitate to terminate parental rights "without any compensating benefit, such as adoption," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 109 (2008), we are also aware that there are "circumstances when the termination of parental rights must precede the permanency plan," A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 611. The unfortunate truth in Title Thirty cases is that termination "does not always result in permanent placement of the child." E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 109 (quoting In re Guardianship of J.C., 128 N.J. 1, 21 (1992)).
Here, the trial judge expressly noted that while Millicent is not currently in a pre-adoptive home, her placement "was not a barrier to termination of parental rights." Throughout these proceedings, Millicent has received treatment and presently remains in a treatment facility. Significantly, Millicent is receiving the highest level of care the Division can provide to a child in need of intensive psychological services and medication monitoring. Although Millicent has made progress while at the facility, she requires further treatment. According to Miller's credited testimony, damage to Millicent's psyche has already occurred and Beth is unable to provide a future parenting plan to accommodate Millicent's needs. In that regard, Beth was not able to detail Millicent's current treatment plan or progress, nor was she able to recognize and address Millicent's special needs. Furthermore, the bonding analysis conducted by Miller reported that Millicent appeared "depressed," "withdrawn," and "increasingly agitated" around Beth. Accordingly, the trial judge found Millicent had an insecure and unhealthy attachment to Beth.
Further, there was a showing that Millicent may find a permanent placement. The Division's permanency plan for Millicent is select home adoption. Although the Division is unable to begin this process until Millicent is "legally free," Millicent was provided with a child specific recruiter to assist with the plan. Accordingly, the record supports the finding that terminating Beth's parental rights to Millicent would not do more harm than good.
In summary, the trial court's determinations to terminate Beth's parental rights to all four children are adequately supported by the record.
Affirmed. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION