Opinion
NO. 2011-CA-001565-WC
09-21-2012
FLOYD NIVISON APPELLANT v. AMERIGAS PARTNERS, LP; HON. JAMES KERR, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Roy C. Gray Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, AMERIGAS PARTNERS, LP: Jo Alice Van Nagell Lori V. Daniel Lexington, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-02-66021
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART,
AND
REMANDING
BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND LAMBERT, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Floyd Nivison seeks review of an opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) entered on July 27, 2011. The Board affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which awarded Nivison permanent partial disability benefits but denied Nivison's claims for permanent total disability benefits and for psychiatric injury. The ALJ found that Nivison was not permanently and totally disabled and that he had a pre-existing, active psychological impairment barring an award of benefits. After our review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the Board's order for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
Nivison was born in 1963 in northern California. He has an eleventh grade education and a G.E.D. While living in California, Nivison attended a substance-abuse program in 1988; he consulted a mental health professional in 1995. In 1997, he was prescribed medication by a psychiatrist for a period of several months.
Nivison moved to Kentucky in 2000 and began working for Amerigas as a truck driver delivering propane gas cylinders. While working for Amerigas, Nivison sustained two work-related injuries.
In December 2001, Nivison fell against a hand cart. His injury resulted in pain in his lower back, leg, and groin. He sought treatment from a chiropractor, and he was able to continue working. For a while, Amerigas assigned a helper to assist Nivison in lifting the propane gas cylinders. By May 2002, Nivison was again fully able to perform all job duties without assistance.
On May 6, 2002, Nivison suffered a second work-related injury. While lifting a propane gas cylinder, he felt an "awful, sharp, hot just stabbing, shooting pain" in his lower back. He did not complain of any leg or groin pain at that time. Amerigas placed him on light duty until July 2002 when he was taken off work completely.
Since his May 2002 injury, several physicians have treated and evaluated Nivison.
Nivison first sought treatment from Dr. Douglas Howell. Dr. Howell diagnosed him with lumbar disc syndrome, low back pain, and overexertion movement injury. Based on the level of pain, Dr. Howell recommended an immediate lumbar MRI. Dr. Howell then referred Nivison to a neurosurgeon, Dr. Timothy Kriss, for evaluation and pain treatment.
Dr. Kriss reviewed Nivison's lumbar MRI and reported that he had a degenerative disc disease at L5/S1 and a noncompressive L4/5 disc bulge. Dr. Kriss diagnosed Nivison's pain as resulting from inflammation of his lumbar facet or sacral-iliac joints where nerve fibers run into the buttock, thigh, and groin, producing severe pain. Dr. Kriss initially assigned Nivison a 10% impairment rating but later revised it to 6%. Dr. Kriss attributed the entire impairment to the May 2002 work injury.
Dr. Kriss referred Nivison to Dr. Gupta for pain management treatment. Dr. Gupta administered injections and performed an IDET (Intradiscal Electrothermal Therapy) procedure. Nivison testified that these procedures afforded him some relief. Dr. Gupta released Nivison to return to work in 2005. He worked for another company driving a rock truck for six weeks, but he ultimately left that job because it became too painful.
Nivison continued pain alleviation treatments with Dr. Gupta, including another IDET procedure, steroid injections, and pain medication. In a letter dated June 17, 2007, Dr. Gupta determined that Nivison had reached maximum medical improvement; assigned him a 10% to 13% Diagnosis Related Estimate (DRE) Lumbar Category III whole person impairment rating; and restricted him from repetitive bending, lifting, twisting, or jarring movements. On January 25, 2010, Dr. Gupta completed a residual functional capacity evaluation questionnaire in which he evaluated Nivison's range of activities, finding that he: can walk less than one block; can sit up to 10 minutes at a time without needing to get up; can stand up to 15 minutes without having to sit down or walk around; needs to walk for 5 minutes every 10 minutes in an 8 hour work day; needs to elevate his leg when sitting for a prolonged period and elevate it 50% of the time in a sedentary job; can occasionally lift up to 10 pounds; and can never twist, stoop, climb ladders or stairs, and rarely crouch/stoop.
At the request of his attorney, Nivison was evaluated by Dr. James Owen on July 19, 2010. Dr. Owen opined that Nivison could not lift or carry more than twenty pounds and that he should avoid recurrent/repetitive bending, squatting, and stooping. Dr. Owen also recommended Nivison not engage in jobs requiring him to sit for more than fifteen (15) minutes at a time. Dr. Owen assessed a 15% impairment rating utilizing the range of motion model; he testified that if he had used the diagnosis related estimate, he would have assessed Nivison at an 8% impairment. Dr. Owen attributed 60% of Nivison's impairment to the May 2002 injury and 40% to the December 2001 injury.
Following a hearing conducted on November 15, 2010, the ALJ issued an order finding that Nivison had an 11.5% impairment rating with a 3x multiplier, awarded Nivison permanent partial disability benefits, and attributed the entire impairment solely to the May 2002 injury. In determining Nivison's impairment rating, the ALJ found Dr. Gupta to be "in the best position to know [Nivison] and render an opinion in respect to [Nivison's] impairment." ALJ Opinion and Award, at 7. However, the ALJ rejected Nivison's claim that he was permanently totally disabled and concluded that he had a non-compensable preexisting psychological impairment that was not related to his work injury.
In determining that Nivison was permanently partially but not totally disabled, the ALJ took into consideration his educational level, excellent work record, attempt to obtain gainful employment in 2005, and testimony concerning his level of pain. The ALJ explained:
[Nivison] underwent a functional capacity evaluation by Rebecca George at ProActive Physical Therapy on January 22, 2007. At that time, [Nivison] was found to be able to work at the light demand level, but Ms. George did not believe [Nivison] was capable of sustaining the light level of work for an eight hour day.ALJ Opinion and Award, at 8-9.
[Nivison] also underwent a functional capacity evaluation at the request of [Amerigas] which was performed . . . on February 25, 2010. Mr. Pounds, the evaluator, found [Nivison] met all the requirements for
the sedentary and light demand levels and Mr. Pounds recommended a work conditioning/work hardening program as [Nivison] had been sedentary for approximately nine years and was significantly deconditioned. He believed that improved strength and conditioning would alleviate [Nivison's] pain and allow for gainful employment. Ms. George reviewed Mr. Pounds' report in a letter dated August 9, 2010 and commented that each found [Nivison] capable of the light physical demand level but [Nivison] was clearly unable to sustain the overall level of effort for an eight hour day due to positional intolerances for standing, sitting, and walking. She also commented that [Nivison] gave a consistent effort throughout the test. She also commented that the correlations between the tests indicate that [Nivison's] functional and occupational capacity has remained unchanged and has not objectively improved from 2007 until 2010. . . .
After consideration of the factors set forth in Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968), the [ALJ] finds [Nivison] is not totally occupationally disabled. In so concluding, the [ALJ] notes [Nivison] continues to take a significant amount of medications, but the 2010 functional capacity evaluation of Mr. Pounds indicates objectively that [Nivison] can work in the light physical demand level. The [ALJ] believes that Mr. Pounds is correct that [Nivison] may need work hardening to return to work but the credible medical evidence at this time is that [Nivison] is not totally occupationally disabled.
With respect to Nivison's psychological condition, the ALJ considered evaluations conducted by Dr. Christopher Allen and Dr. Timothy Allen. Dr. Christopher Allen evaluated Nivison on February 19, 2010, at the request of his attorney. Dr. Christopher Allen found Nivison was suffering from major depression directly related to his work injury, its associated pain, and its impact on Nivison's everyday life and occupational capacity. Dr. Christopher Allen believed that Nivison had a 17% impairment as a result of depression arising from his work-related injury.
Dr. Timothy Allen performed an independent psychological evaluation for Amerigas on March 31, 2010. Although he assigned Nivison a 10% psychological impairment rating, he found none of the impairment to be compensable. Instead, he initially concluded that 5% was pre-existing and active when the injury occurred and that the remaining 5% was unrelated to his work injury. Dr. Timothy Allen subsequently modified his opinion, attributing none of Nivison's psychological impairment to his work-related injury. The ALJ found Dr. Timothy Allen to be "most [sic]credible [with] respect to the causation of [Nivison's] psychiatric issues, having done the most thorough review and given the most consideration to the totality of [Nivison's] life circumstances." ALJ Opinion and Award, at 5.
Nivison filed a petition for reconsideration, which the ALJ denied. Nivison then sought review with the Board. In an opinion entered on July 27, 2011, the Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ. This appeal followed.
In reviewing a worker's compensation case, we may "correct the Board only where the Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice." Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). If the decision of an ALJ is based on substantial evidence of probative value, we may not disturb it on appeal. Abel Verdon Const. v. Riveria, 348 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Ky. 2011); Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1986). "Substantial evidence has been defined as some evidence of substance and relevant consequence, having fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people." Riveria, 348 S.W.3d at 753.
Nivison first challenges the ALJ's determination that he is not permanently totally disabled, contending that his finding is wholly arbitrary and not supported by any -- much less substantial -- evidence. In support of this argument, Nivison cites the two functional capacity evaluations (FCE's) as demonstrating that he cannot perform or maintain any physically demanding level of work for an eight-hour day. Nivison argues, therefore, that he is totally (not partially) permanently disabled. We disagree.
A permanent partial disability refers to "an employee who, due to an injury, has a permanent disability rating but retains the ability to work." KRS 342.0011(11)(b). In contrast, a permanent total disability refers to "an employee who, due to an injury, has a permanent disability rating and has a complete and permanent inability to perform any type of work as a result of an injury[.]" Id. at 342.0011(11)(c). In Ira A. Watson Dep't Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Ky. 2000), our Supreme Court carefully analyzed the relevant statutory criteria as follows:
Analysis of the factors set forth in KRS 342.0011(11)(b), (11)(c), and (34) clearly requires an individualized determination of what the worker is and is
not able to do after recovering from the work injury.... [I]t necessarily includes a consideration of factors such as the worker's post-injury physical, emotional, intellectual, and vocational status and how those factors interact. It also includes a consideration of the likelihood that the particular worker would be able to find work consistently under normal employment conditions. A worker's ability to do so is affected by factors such as whether the individual will be able to find work consistently under normal conditions. A worker's ability to do so is affected by factors such as whether the individual will be able to work dependably and whether the worker's physical restrictions will interfere with vocational capabilities. The definition of "work" clearly contemplates that a worker is not required to be homebound in order to be found to be totally occupationally disabled.
KRS 342.285(1) designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in worker's compensation claims. In that role, the ALJ has "the sole discretion to determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence." Riveria, 348 S.W.3d at 753. It broadly permits an ALJ to interpret and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence; to choose which evidence upon which to rely; and to reject any testimony. Caudill v. Maloney's Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. 1977). As a consequence, other evidence that "would have supported a contrary conclusion is not an adequate basis for reversal on appeal." Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d at 52.
In this case, Rick Pounds, a functional capacity evaluator, conducted a vocational evaluation on February 25, 2010. Based on his evaluation, Pounds concluded that Nivison was capable of performing a full range of both sedentary and light jobs. Further, as explained in the evaluation, the ERGOS system utilized by Pounds was premised on the fact that the individual being examined would be able to perform the duties in question for eight (8) hours during a typical workday. Pounds also noted that Nivison has been off work for some time but that his physical capacity might increase once he is reconditioned to the work. Rebecca George also concluded that Nivison could perform light work with appropriate modifications. Nivison points to other evidence which could support a different outcome -- namely George's August 9, 2010 letter. However, the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's judgment. Based on the standards governing our review, we cannot conclude that the ALJ's finding of permanent, partial disability was so unreasonable that it must be set aside as erroneous as a matter of law. Western Baptist, supra.
ERGOS is a proprietary name for a work simulation system and device that assists physicians in FCE's (functional capacity evaluations).
Nivison next challenges the ALJ's finding that 5% of his total psychological impairment rating was attributable to a pre-existing, active action. He contends that the finding was not supported by substantial evidence because Dr. Timothy Allen's testimony and supporting documentation neither addressed nor supported a finding that Nivison had psychiatric symptoms or a ratable mental condition at the time of his injury in 2002. In support of his position, Nivison points to Dr. Allen's deposition in which the doctor testified that Nivison had no ratable or symptomatic psychological condition at the time of the 2002 injury. Thus, if 5% of the overall 10% impairment rating was attributed to factors unrelated to the 2002 work injury, Nivison should have nonetheless been awarded benefits for the remaining 5%, which was erroneously determined "preexisting" by the ALJ. That designation by the ALJ is not only unsupported by any evidence; it is, indeed, directly contradicted by Dr. Allen's deposition testimony.
In his brief, Nivison does not appear to contest the ALJ's conclusion that the remaining 5% of Nivison's 10% psychological impairment rating was not work-related since it was attributable to psychological stressors that developed after the injury.
As set forth by the Board, the evidence presented by Dr. Allen on this issue was as follows:
On March 31, 2010, Dr. Timothy Allen generated an independent psychiatric examination (IPE) report after examining Nivison. In the IPE report, Dr. Allen set forth the following conclusions:Board Opinion, July 27, 2011, pp. 6-9. (Emphases added.)
* * * *Attached to the March 31, 2010, IPE report is a Form 107 filled out by Dr. Timothy Allen and dated April 14, 2010. On the Form 107, Dr. Allen checked "yes" by the following question: "Plaintiff had an active psychological impairment prior to the injury." (emphasis added). There are two follow-up questions and answers indicated on the Form 107:
A. For affirmative answer, specify condition producing active impairment.
Depressive Disorder NOS
B. For affirmative answer, specify percentage of whole person impairment due to the prior active condition.
5% pre-existing, 5% due to non-work related subsequent events.Dr. Allen was deposed on April 30, 2010. . . . Dr. Allen, in what this Board recognizes as a contradiction to his March 31, 2010 IPE report and April 14, 2010 Form 107, testified as follows:
Q: Do you think that [Nivison] had a rateable [sic] psychiatric condition or psychological condition back in January of 2002?Dr. Allen also testified as follows:
A: No.
Q: No. So he didn't have any active problems?
A: Correct.
Q: All right. Just to try to get a handle on all this, and correct me if I say anything that's incorrect, but you testified up until he hurt himself in 2002, he was sound of mind and body in your opinion.
A: Right. But clearly he had a preexisting condition that was I believe probably dormant at that point.
As the Board noted, Dr. Allen's deposition testimony contradicted his IPE (independent psychiatric examination) report of March 31, 2010, and the Form 107 dated April 14, 2010. That contradiction is significant, compelling us to conclude that Nivison's psychiatric impairment clearly is a compensable injury. Finley v. DBM Technologies, 217 S.W.3d. 261 (Ky. App. 2007). The ALJ undoubtedly has the discretion to evaluate evidence, Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico, Inc., 951 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1997). Magic Coal Co. v. Fox authorizes the ALJ to "reject any testimony and believe or disbelieve various parts of the evidence[.]" 19 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Ky. 2000). However, Magic Coal does not permit the ALJ to disregard clear and unequivocal evidence - especially when this question was posed to clarify an ambiguity or contradiction in previous testimony. Therefore, we vacate that portion of the Board's order relating to Nivison's psychological impairment and direct that it enter an order finding his psychiatric injury to be compensable.
To summarize, we affirm that portion of the Board's opinion of July 2011, with respect to its finding of permanent partial disability. We vacate that portion of its opinion as to the psychiatric injury and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
LAMBERT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART, AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART, AND DISSENTING IN PART: I concur with the majority opinion to the extent it upholds the Board's affirmance of the ALJ's finding of permanent, partial disability. However, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that finds a compensable injury in Nivison's psychiatric impairment. I do so for two reasons.
First, the majority holds that Magic Coal does not grant the ALJ license to disregard Dr. Timothy Allen's "clear and unequivocal deposition testimony" regarding the dormancy of Nivison's pre-existing psychiatric condition. On the contrary, Magic Coal does precisely that, under proper circumstances. Those circumstances are present here.
The Supreme Court said in Magic Coal that "[w]here the question at issue is one which properly falls within the province of medical experts, the fact-finder may not disregard the uncontradicted conclusion of a medical expert and reach a different conclusion." Magic Coal, 19 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Mengel v. Hawaiian-Tropic Northwest and Central Distributors, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. 1981))(emphasis added). The Court also said a medical expert's conclusion "may not be disregarded by the fact-finder unless it is rebutted."Magic Coal, 19 S.W.3d at 97 (emphasis added). The negative inference to be drawn from these and other statements in the opinion is that the fact-finder has the authority to disregard contradicted conclusions of a medical expert and reach a different conclusion, as long as that different conclusion is itself supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 96 ("The fact-finder may reject any testimony and believe or disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether it comes from the same witness or the same adversary party's total proof." (citation omitted)).
When the totality of evidence presented by a single witness is comprised of contradictory yet clear and unequivocal statements, the full quantum of evidence is necessarily equivocal. Under such circumstances, Magic Coal authorizes the ALJ to disregard one of those clear and unequivocal statements in favor of the other. In this case, substantial evidence (in the form of Dr. Timothy Allen's deposition testimony) supported both sides of the question whether Nivison's pre-existing condition was dormant. Properly applying Magic Coal, the ALJ selected the substantial evidence that supported his conclusion, and disregarded the substantial evidence that supported the opposite conclusion.
That is also what the ALJ did under nearly identical circumstances in another case this Court recently reviewed, Sipe v. Harrison Memorial Hospital, No. 2009-CA-001458, 2010 WL 1405413 (Ky. App. April 9, 2010). In Sipe, a treating physician presented contradictory but unequivocal statements that the claimant both did and did not have a pre-existing condition that affected the calculation of the impairment rating - if no part of the claimant's injury had been pre-existing, the impairment rating would have been 10%; if there had been a pre-existing component to the injury, the rating would have had a 5% carve out. The ALJ in Sipe chose to rely on the evidence that supported the 10% disability rating; the Board reversed, citing the evidence that supported the 5% carve out.
I do not cite Sipe as authority under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.28(4)(c). I refer to Sipe only to demonstrate the inconsistent message we are sending to the Workers' Compensation Board. I also note that the Administrative Law Judge in this case, James L. Kerr, was also the ALJ in Sipe. And, a member of the majority in this case was also on the panel that unanimously decided Sipe.
When Sipe appealed his case to this Court, we said:
The role of weighing evidence, drawing inferences, and making determinations of credibility rests solely in the hands of the ALJ. Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88 (Ky. 2000). The Board and our Court must only question whether the evidence compels a different result. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984).Sipe, 2010 WL 1405413, at *3. We reversed the Board, compelling reinstatement of the ALJ's decision, and the Supreme Court agreed with us. Harrison Memorial Hosp. v. Sipe, No. 2010-SC-000287-WC, 2011 WL 1103884 (Ky. Mar 24, 2011).
Dr. Norelle's contradictory testimony leaves much unanswered. Her testimony provides ample support for the opinions of both the ALJ and the Board. The question before us is not which judicial entity properly construed the deposition. Instead, we must only ask whether the ALJ's opinion was supported by substantial evidence. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641 (Ky.1986). The evidence must be such that no reasonable person could have made the same conclusion as the ALJ.
Shortly after Sipe became final, Nivison's case came before Board; the Board heeded the ruling in Sipe and applied it. The Board's order includes a lengthy discussion both of this Court's and of the Supreme Court's opinions in Sipe. Board Opinion, July 27, 2011, pp. 9-13. Now, the majority here is sending to the Board the exact opposite message delivered in Sipe. While neither Sipe opinion is published and, therefore, is not precedent, Magic Coal is precedent. Interpreting this same precedent under identical circumstances - first in Sipe and now in this case - should result in consistent opinions, whether those opinions are published or not. It does not. The holding here is simply irreconcilable with Sipe.
In sum, the majority in this case has done exactly what, in Sipe, we told the Board was improper - we usurped the authority of the ALJ and weighed the evidence to our own liking. We have long known this is improper. Square D Co. v. Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ky. 1993) ("[T]he Court of Appeals usurped the role of the fact finder regarding both the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the medical evidence. The ALJ, as the finder of fact, and not the reviewing court, has the sole authority to determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence." (citation omitted)). Undoubtedly, this opinion will confound the members of the Board, for it runs so counter to established jurisprudence.
There is a second reason I disagree with the majority's holding. Dr. Allen clearly opined that none of Nivison's psychiatric impairment was work-related. This is made obvious throughout his deposition testimony. For example, this exchange is recorded at page 15 of his deposition:
Q Ultimately, Doctor, do you believe as though any of this gentleman's depressive disorder can be attributed to the two accidents he had at work . . . ?At page 25 of his deposition, Dr. Allen said:
A I do not believe they're related to his current psychiatric status.
A I realize that I wasn't as clear in my statement as it was in my Form 107, but I did say on the Form 107 that I felt he had a ten percent whole body impairment due to psychiatric causes overall.(emphasis added). At page 51, Dr. Allen responded to cross-examination:
Q And again, do you attribute any portion of that impairment rating to the work-related physical injuries or any treatment for those physical injuries.
A No.
Q [Is it] your opinion that that work injury had no relationship to any of his psychological conditions today?
A Yes.
The effect of this expert medical opinion testimony is that, even if we presume Nivison's pre-existing condition was dormant, it was not "aroused into disabling reality by a work-related injury[.]" Comair, Inc. v. Helton, 270 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Ky. App. 2008). Instead, Dr. Allen attributed Nivison's current depression to non-work-related causes such as his heart disease, sleep apnea "and other stressors in [Nivison's] life . . . including a divorce in 2007, problems with being a single parent and other issues in respect to the family." Board Opinion, July 27, 2011, pp. 3-4 (quoting ALJ's Opinion and Award, January 10, 2011). Based on such testimony, the ALJ said:
After consideration of Dr. Timothy Allen's opinions, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that [Nivison's] depression is not related to his work-related injury.So, Nivison's depression is not work-related and, therefore, is not compensable. Audi of Lexington v. Elam, 367 S.W.3d 598, 602 (Ky. 2012) ("[O]nly work-related impairment is compensable."). That conclusion is supported by substantial evidence and this Court lacks authority to reverse it. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986) (decision of ALJ based on substantial evidence may not be disturbed on appeal). While the Board did not specifically address this determination by the ALJ, it is a determination that, from my reading of the record, is unassailable, and will likely be the basis of the Board's holding on remand.
For these reasons, I would affirm the Board's Order and Opinion in its entirety. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Roy C. Gray
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
AMERIGAS PARTNERS, LP:
Jo Alice Van Nagell
Lori V. Daniel
Lexington, Kentucky