Defendant's conduct therefore constituted a violation of the statute thus construed. Accord, Walter v. State (1946), 187 Misc. 1034 ( 65 N.Y.S.2d 378); Ketzel v. Lazzini (1949), 163 Pa. Super. 513 ( 63 A.2d 369); Muhammad v. United States (CA9, 1966), 366 F.2d 298; cf. Hamilton v. Cadwell, supra; People v. Ubertini, supra; Greene v. M S Lumber Co. (1951), 108 Cal.App.2d 6 ( 238 P.2d 87); Miller v. Irby (CA10, 1955), 227 F.2d 942; Nistor v. Therkildsen (1967), 181 Neb. 817 ( 151 N.W.2d 443). Our construction is in accord, we think, with the fundamental rule of statutory interpretation.
The law is well established that a motorist approaching a highway protected by stop signs must stop before going upon the highway, must look to his left and to his right, and must permit a motor vehicle which is proceeding along the highway protected by stop signs to pass if it is at a distance and is traveling at a speed making it imprudent for the motorist to proceed into the intersection. Nichols v. McArdle, 170 Neb. 382, 102 N.W.2d 848 (1960); Nistor v. Therkildsen, 181 Neb. 817, 151 N.W.2d 443 (1967). A motorist is not only obligated to look for approaching vehicles but also must see any vehicle within the radius which denotes the limit of danger.
A motorist approaching a roadway protected by stop signs must stop before going upon the highway, must look to his left and to his right, and must permit a motor vehicle which is proceeding along the roadway protected by stop signs to pass if it is at a distance and is traveling at a speed making it imprudent for the motorist to proceed into the intersection. Hartman v. Brady, 201 Neb. 558, 270 N.W.2d 909 (1978), Nistor v. Therkildsen, 181 Neb. 817, 151 N.W.2d 443 (1967). Furthermore, the duty of a motorist to look for vehicles approaching on a roadway protected by stop signs implies the obligation to see what is in plain view. Nistor v. Therkildsen, supra; Nichols v. McArdle, 170 Neb. 382 102 N.W.2d 848 (1960).
Our court has held that a plaintiff cannot be contributorily negligent where he has no reason to anticipate the entrance onto an arterial of an automobile from an intersecting road and had no reasonable opportunity to avoid the ensuing accident. Nichols v. McArdle, supra; Colton v. Benes, supra; Fairchild v. Sorenson, 165 Neb. 667, 87 N.W.2d 235; Van Ostrand v. Beccard, 188 Neb. 326, 196 N.W.2d 385; Nistor v. Therkildsen, 181 Neb. 817, 151 N.W.2d 443. The plaintiff had the right to assume the defendant would use the highway in a lawful manner until he was given warning or notice to the contrary.
The right front of the Moeller vehicle struck the left rear of the tractor throwing the plaintiff against the windshield and injuring her. Without further recitals of the detailed evidence, the evidence in this case conclusively shows that although the view from the stop sign was obstructed, the defendant Rebecca did not stop at the right-of-way line required by the statute, section 39-724, R.R.S. 1943; Dale v. Omaha C. B. St. Ry. Co., 154 Neb. 434, 48 N.W.2d 380; or at a point where she could see the approaching car in her range of danger, Harding v. Hoffman, 158 Neb. 86, 62 N.W.2d 333. This case is controlled by our holdings in Steinberg v. Pape, 181 Neb. 806, 150 N.W.2d 912; Nistor v. Therkildsen, 181 Neb. 817, 151 N.W.2d 443; Nichols v. McArdle, 170 Neb. 382, 102 N.W.2d 848. The controlling rules of law are that the driver of an automobile entering an intersection is obligated to look for approaching automobiles and to see any vehicle within the radius which denotes the limit of danger, and if he fails to see one which is favored over him under the rules of the road, he is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. A motorist approaching a highway protected by stop signs must permit a motor vehicle which is proceeding along the highway protected by stop signs to pass if it is at a distance and is traveling at a speed making it imprudent for a motorist to proceed into the intersection.