Opinion
No. 78-1092
Decided September 13, 1979. Rehearing denied October 11, 1979.
Defendant appealed judgment awarding plaintiff $2,000 based on an oral loan agreement.
Affirmed
1. CONTRACTS — Money Lent — No Interest Specified — Due Date Not Set — Finding — Existence of Contract — Not Precluded. Although plaintiff's testimony relative to oral loan agreement indicated that the money was advanced at no interest and with no specified due date, the absence of these matters did not preclude the trial court from finding that an oral contract to loan money existed.
2. Interest — Need Not Be Specified — Borrowed Money — Due Immediately — — Payable On Demand. Interest need not be a subject of a contract, nor even an incident to it, and borrowed money, absent other agreement, is due immediately and payable on demand.
3. Money Loaned — Due Date Not Specified — Fully Performed by Lender — Statute of Frauds — Not A Defense. Notwithstanding the absence of a due date for payment of money loaned, where the loan agreement was fully performed by the lender, the Statute of Frauds was unavailable to the borrower as a defense to an action to recover the loan proceeds.
Appeal from the District Court of Jefferson County, Honorable Winston W. Wolvington, Judge.
No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.
L. L. Nathenson, for defendant-appellant.
Plaintiff's suit to recover $2,000 was based on an oral loan agreement. In a trial to the court, judgment was entered for plaintiff and defendant appeals. We affirm.
[1,2] Defendant first contends there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find a contract to loan money. Defendant points to plaintiff's testimony that the money was advanced at no interest and with no specified date for repayment. We find no merit in this argument. Interest need not be a subject of the contract, nor even an incident to it, and borrowed money, absent other agreement, is due immediately and payable on demand. Hays v. Arbuckle, 72 Colo. 328, 211 P. 101 (1922).
[3] Defendant also contends, because there was no due date, that a reasonable interpretation of the oral loan agreement would require more than a year for its performance and that it is therefore void because of the Statute of Frauds. Section 38-10-112 (1)(a), C.R.S. 1973. We disagree.
The Statute of Frauds is not available to defendant because the loan agreement was fully performed by plaintiff. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 198, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968).
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE STERNBERG concur.