Nissalke v. State

91 Citing cases

  1. Nissalke v. Benson

    Case No. 16-cv-102 (PAM/TNL) (D. Minn. Jul. 15, 2016)

    On July 1, 2013, Petitioner "filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief raising a sentencing claim, a restitution claim, and several claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel." Nissalke v. State of Minnesota, 861 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 2015) (hereinafter, Nissalke Postconviction Appeal). The postconviction court granted relief on the sentencing claim by correcting the amount of jail credit Petitioner was entitled to, but otherwise denied relief on Petitioner's claims without holding an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 91; see also Nissalke Trial Court, Case No. 85-CR-08-1884 (Minn.

  2. Leatherberry v. State

    No. A19-1649 (Minn. Ct. App. Jul. 13, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    "To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an appellant must allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the two-prong test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)." Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 93 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Under the Strickland test, the petitioner must establish that (1) "his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

  3. Nissalke v. State

    920 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 2018)   Cited 3 times

    Later, we affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of Nissalke’s first postconviction petition. Nissalke v. State (Nissalke II ), 861 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 2015). In 2017, Nissalke again petitioned for postconviction relief, and the postconviction court summarily denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing.

  4. Carridine v. State

    867 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 2015)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that purported failures to investigate or call additional witnesses were not ineffective assistance of counsel when petitioner failed to show "anything other than cumulative and non-material evidence would have been admitted"

    We have not yet decided whether those two exceptions also apply in the context of the procedural bar in section 590.01, subdivision 1. See Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 n. 4 (Minn.2015) (discussing the Knaffla exceptions and the unresolved issues raised by the 2005 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2014)). But, even if those exceptions apply to the statutory bar, we have carefully reviewed the record and our review convinces us that Carridine's claims do not meet the exceptions.

  5. Auginaush v. State

    No. A21-0690 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Under Strickland, a convicted defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show that (1) their counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-91; see also Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015). If a petitioner fails to prove one prong, the court need not address the other.

  6. Palmer v. State

    No. A20-1406 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2021)

    This court analyzes claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (Minn. 2015) (discussing and applying Strickland). To prevail, a defendant must show two elements.

  7. Tate v. State

    No. A20-0869 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    We analyze claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (Minn. 2015). To prevail, a defendant must show that "counsel's performance was deficient" and "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."

  8. Albantov v. State

    No. A20-0399 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    An ineffective-assistance claim that "can be determined on the basis of the trial record . . . must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred." Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 93 (Minn. 2015). When the claim requires the examination of evidence outside of the record or if the postconviction court must make additional findings, the claim is not Knaffla-barred.

  9. Piah v. State

    No. A19-0835 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2020)

    Because the postconviction court determined that Piah's attorney's immigration warning did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, it did not address the second prong of Strickland. See Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (noting that a reviewing court "may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other"). Yet, as we hold that the postconviction court erred when it determined that the warning provided by Piah's attorney was sufficient, and Piah has alleged facts that, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, may support a finding that he would not have pleaded guilty but for his attorney's insufficient warning, we remand this issue with instructions for the district court to vacate Piah's sentence and hold an evidentiary hearing on the second prong of Strickland.

  10. State v. Porter

    No. A17-1348 (Minn. Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2018)

    To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show "(1) that his counsel's representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness'; and (2) 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). "A 'reasonable probability' means 'a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'"