Moreover, it is important to note that in conducting de novo review of substantial evidence determinations, this court does not ignore the decisions of the Court of International Trade; instead, as we have stated on numerous occasions, we pay close attention to the Court of International Trade's analysis. See Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[W]e give great weight to the informed opinion of the Court of International Trade. . . . Indeed, it is nearly always the starting point of our analysis." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Although reviewing anew the ITC determination, this court will not ignore the informed opinion of the Court of International Trade. That court reviewed the record in considerable detail.
19 U.S.C. § 1516a (b)(1)(B)(i). The substantial evidence standard of review "can be translated roughly to mean `is [the determination] unreasonable?'" Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting SSIH Equip. S.A v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 381 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The agency's decision must be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, see generally Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and "must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight."
We reject the government's position because it does not provide for meaningful review of interim decisions from the Court of International Trade. That position directly conflicts with our precedent. See Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir.2006) ( Nippon (Tin Mill)); Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1117 (Fed. Cir.2004); Taiwan Semiconductors Indus. Assoc, v. Micron Tech., Inc., 266 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir.2001). In each of these cases, this court reviewed an interim decision by the Court of International Trade that either reversed findings or remanded back to the Commission for further clarification or fact finding.
“[A] party challenging the Commission's determination under the substantial evidence standard ‘has chosen a course with a high barrier to reversal.’ ” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345,1352, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2006) ( quoting Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1056, 1060 (Fed.Cir.2001)). That party “bears the burden of proving the evidence [is] inadequate.”
As long as there is an “adequate basis in support of the Commission's choice of evidentiary weight, the Court of International Trade, and [the Federal Circuit], reviewing under the substantial evidence standard, must defer to the Commission.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2006). The ITC has the “discretion to make reasonable interpretations of the evidence and to determine the overall significance of any particular factor in its analysis.”
Where an action is brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) seeking review of a final determination of the Commission under 19 U.S.C. § 1673d, “[t]he court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found ... to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1). The substantial evidence standard of review “can be translated roughly to mean ‘is [the determination] unreasonable?’ ” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (quoting SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 381 (Fed.Cir.1983)), “tak[ing] into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951).
Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") has indicated that "in the hierarchy of the four most common standards of review, substantial evidence is the second most deferential, and can be translated roughly to mean[:] is [the determination] unreasonable?" See Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
“Under the substantial evidence standard, when adequate evidence exists on both sides of an issue, assigning evidentiary weight falls exclusively within the authority of the Commission.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2006). “ ‘It is the Commission's task to evaluate the evidence it collects during its investigation,’ ” and decisions “ ‘such as the weight to be assigned to a particular piece of evidence, lie at the core of that evaluative process.’ ”
Like the Court of International Trade, this court reviews the Commission's determination for substantial evidence. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir.2006), (citing Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n. 10 (Fed. Cir.1984), and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i)). When performing a substantial evidence review, however, "we give great weight to `the informed opinion of the Court of International Trade.' Indeed, it is nearly always the starting point of our analysis."
Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United States, 322 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2003) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). Substantial evidence “can be translated roughly to mean[:] [I]s [the determination] unreasonable?” Globe Metallurgical Inc. v. United States, 32 CIT 274, 275, 547 F.Supp.2d 1371, 1374 (2008) (quoting Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2006)) (alteration in Nippon ).