Opinion
14-P-115
02-18-2015
NINTH RMA PARTNERS, LP, v. JAMES J. LYONS, JR.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This case involves a challenge to the Superior Court's renewal in 2013 of a judgment that issued in 1992. The defendant argues that G. L. c. 260, § 20, should be interpreted to impose a conclusive presumption that a judgment is satisfied if twenty years have passed. We affirm.
Background. A Superior Court judgment for $64,000 against James J. Lyons, Jr., was docketed on November 24, 1992. The Cadle Company, as assignee of the interest in the judgment, began supplementary process in District Court in 2012 to collect the amount. The Cadle Company then filed a motion in Superior Court seeking to "renew" the judgment by rebutting the presumption of payment under G. L. c. 260, § 20. At the hearing on the motion on May 22, 2013, counsel for Lyons acknowledged that the judgment was never paid. The judge allowed the motion. This appeal followed.
The original judgment, as it appears in the record appendix, lists "$64,000.00" as the amount of the judgment. Both parties in their briefs cite the amount of the judgment as "$66,560.00," as does one of the docket entries, without explanation for the discrepancy.
The record materials and parties' briefs do not present a detailed explanation of the underlying matter that led to the judgment against Lyons, nor does the record elaborate on why the judgment has not been paid despite the lengthy passage of time.
Statutory presumption. Lyons urges us to depart from established precedent and hold that G. L. c. 260, § 20, imposes "a conclusive rather than rebuttable" presumption that after twenty years, a judgment has been paid.
The statute states: "A judgment or decree of a court of record of the United States or of any state thereof shall be presumed to be paid and satisfied at the expiration of twenty years after it was rendered." Ibid.
Section 20 "is not an absolute bar" to enforcing a judgment after twenty years, and the presumption of payment may be rebutted. Brown v. Greenlow, 330 Mass. 88, 90 (1953), citing Fino v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 326 Mass. 277, 281 (1950). While we have some sympathy for the appellant's arguments, we are powerless to overrule what the Supreme Judicial Court has decreed. See McCoy, petitioner, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 893, 893 (1974) (leaving departure from precedent to Supreme Judicial Court or Legislature).
On occasion, opinions have referred to G. L. c. 260, § 20, as a "statute of limitations." See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Div. of Alaska v. Brenckle, 424 Mass. 214, 225 n.20 (1997); Lombardi v. Lombardi, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 407, 414 (2007). Despite this language, and as Lombardi itself noted, "[t]he statute does not create a bar to suit, but rather a rebuttable presumption that the judgment has been paid." Ibid.
Lyons's last assertion, that the order renewing the judgment should be reversed because no statute or rule authorizes the Superior Court to renew a judgment, is also without merit.
For these reasons, as well as substantially for those in the brief of the appellee, we affirm.
Order allowing motion to renew judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Cypher, Kantrowitz & Carhart, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: February 18, 2015.