Ninni v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines

4 Citing cases

  1. Surber v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06-cv-00273 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 21, 2006)   Cited 3 times

    Other courts have looked at similar regulations and found that the requirements must be given a reasonable interpretation in light of the situation presented. Holeman v. Greyhound Corp., 396 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tex.Civ.App. 1965); Ninni v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 97 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Mich. 1951). They have stated that the bus driver must have a reasonable time and opportunity to see whether baggage is loaded so as not to interfere with the free and ready entering or leaving of the bus. See Holeman, 396 S.W.2d at 511.

  2. Roth v. Greyhound Corporation

    149 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1957)   Cited 1 times

    From the allegations of the third-party complaint, as set out above, it is apparent that the facts set forth therein are not sufficient to give rise to a right of indemnity over against Gateway. Greyhound's allegation that the accident was "solely" the negligence of Gateway is no basis for the court to make any finding of active and passive negligence between the parties, since, if it is correct, the defendant is not even responsible for any passive negligence. The Indiana law only places on a carrier for hire the duty of exercising reasonable and ordinary care to safely transport its passengers [Swallow Coach Lines v. Cosgrove, 1938, 214 Ind. 532, 15 N.E.2d 92, 95, and Ninni v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, D.C.E.D.Mich. 1951, 97 F. Supp. 357, 359] so that, conceivably, Greyhound could claim indemnity from Gateway if it alleged slight and passive negligence on its part as against primary and active negligence on the part of Gateway. On the other hand, if the accident was caused, as alleged in the third-party complaint, solely by Gateway, then there is no basis for any indemnity claim.

  3. D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Smith

    173 A.2d 216 (D.C. 1961)   Cited 10 times
    Reversing directed verdict in favor of appellee passenger

    In the absence of any evidence as to the length of time the spots had been on the steps, there is no basis for holding that the carrier knew or should have known of their existence and was negligent in failing to remove them. Ninni v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, D.C.E.D.Mich., 97 F. Supp. 357; Casale v. Public Service Co-Ordinated Transport, 160 A. 326, 10 N.J.Misc., 611. The passenger attempts to avoid the rule requiring notice by arguing that where the "fall of a passenger on a bus results from grease, oil, or something incidental to maintenance and operation of the conveyance, the inference is that it got there more likely by the negligence of the company's employees than otherwise."

  4. Holeman v. Greyhound Corp.

    396 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    'Though it be assumed plaintiff was herself negligent in placing the bag in the rack, nevertheless she was entitled upon request to a charge that if this occurred with knowledge of the driver and he had ample opportunity thereafter to correct the situation but failed to do so (compare Williams v. New Jersey-New York Transit Co., 2 Cir., 1940, 113 F.2d 649; Merritt v. Interstate Transit Lines, 8 Cir., 1948, 171 F.2d 605), they might find there was negligence on the part of the defendant and that, if this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, she should recover if injury resulted.' This regulation was also considered in Ninni v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, D.C., 97 F. Supp. 357, where the Court said: 'These requirements must be given a reasonable interpretation in the light of the situation presented, and where, as here, the bus driver is necessarily absent from a parked bus for a few minutes, the bus company is not required to keep up a continuous inspection of the bus and of the actions of normal passengers to insure that passengers do not momentarily place luggage in the aisle.