Opinion
99 Civ. 10857 (WK)
May 5, 2000
Peter Ninger, New York, N Y 10014, For Plaintiff.
Roger Briton, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler Krupman, New York, N Y 10178-3898, For Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Now before us is the motion of El Al Israel Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter "defendant" or "El Al") to dismiss or for summary judgment. We hereby grant the motion and dismiss this case because plaintiff's causes of action, which sound in contract, are preempted by a comprehensive federal labor statute.
BACKGROUND
We assume that plaintiff's allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
Plaintiff Peter Ninger (hereinafter "plaintiff" or "Ninger") was employed by defendant until he resigned in early 1999. Defendant's collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the International Association of Machinists (the "Union") set the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment during such time as he was a member of the Union. He does not deny that he held membership in the Union on the day he resigned and therefore that his resignation was subject to the strictures of the CBA.
The CBA contains a provision establishing severance pay for laid-off workers and another provision expressly declining severance pay to employees who voluntarily resign. The CBA also creates a grievance procedure for employees to contest El Al's application or interpretation of the agreement. If the matter is not resolved by such procedure, then final and binding arbitration follows.
Plaintiff claims that, notwithstanding the CBA, El Al routinely paid severance to resigning employees. When the company refused to acknowledge or act upon this alleged policy, plaintiff did not use the internal grievance procedure but rather sued in the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court of the City of New York. Although plaintiff did not spell out his specific causes of action in his complaint, his opposition papers make clear that his lawsuit sounds in breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Defendant properly removed the lawsuit to this Court.
DISCUSSION
This action is preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., because resolution of plaintiff's claims necessarily requires interpretation of the CBA. Most of the RLA's provisions apply to labor relations within the airline industry. The RLA establishes a framework for the settlement of so-called "minor disputes" which by definition "may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [collective bargaining] agreement." Therefore, "it has long been the rule that when the resolution of a state-law claim . . . requires an interpretation of the CBA," the claim is preempted and must be submitted to the airline's internal dispute-resolution processes and then to arbitration rather than to the courts. See Pilkington v. United Airlines (11th Cir. 1997) 112 F.3d 1532, 1538 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris (1994) 512 U.S. 246, 114 S.Ct. 2239; Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988) 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877).
Plaintiff contends that El Al's custom or practice of granting severance pay to resigning workers supplements the CBA without requiring any reference to or analysis of the written labor contract itself. In Norris, the Supreme Court held that the RLA does not preempt claims that arise "independently" of the CBA in that they "can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself." 114 S.Ct. at 2249.
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the scope of a CBA often goes beyond the explicit terms of the contract and includes "implied terms" arising from "practice, usage and custom." Id. at 2250 n. 10 (quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n (1989) 491 U.S. 299, 311-12, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 2485) (our emphasis). Moreover,
If resolution of the claim . . . is `substantially dependent' on the terms of the union contract, or if evaluation of the state law claim is `inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract,' it is preempted. . . ."
Vacca v. Viacom Broad. of Mo., Inc. (8th Cir. 1989) 875 F.2d 1337, 1342 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 211-12, 105 S.Ct. 1904).
Hence, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have correctly ruled that breach of contract claims are preempted when they arise from supplemental agreements which allegedly modify or contradict the relevant union agreement. See Pyles v. United Air Lines, Inc. (11th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 1046, 1050 ("[The letter agreement] was, by its terms, a modification of the CBA . . .; to interpret the letter is thus to interpret a portion of the CBA."); Pilkington, 112 F.3d at 1538-39 (same); Vacca, 875 F.2d at 1342-43 (side agreement required construction of CBA; thus, claims preempted); Schuver v. MidAmerican Energy Co. (8th Cir. 1998) 154 F.3d 795, 799.
"An employee should not be permitted to avoid arbitration by recasting a routine employment dispute as a state common law contract claim involving an alleged oral contract separate and distinct from the CBA. . . . Widespread use of such a device would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness." Vacca, 875 F.2d at 1343 (citation internal quotation marks omitted).
In the case at bar, whether plaintiff seeks to vary the terms of the CBA by relying on an alleged oral commitment or on alleged inconsistent practices, the CBA itself, in its express and implied terms, necessary becomes "inextricably intertwined" in the resolution of the dispute. As noted above, his CBA explicitly demands payment of severance to fired workers and explicitly excludes resigning workers. It would be impossible for plaintiff to substantiate the existence and terms of a supplemental contract or custom without discussing the precise, de facto terms of the CBA. Under such circumstances, plaintiff's claim is clearly preempted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT defendant's motion and DISMISS the complaint with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
May 5, 2000 New York, New York