While the original order to show cause was directed to be served upon Edward Maloney, it is not clear that such service was necessary under the statute, or that any injustice resulted by reason of his failure to appear in the proceeding. There is no doubt that Mr. Maloney could sell and assign his interest in the liquor tax certificate in question, either absolutely or in the way of security for the money advanced by the brewing company ( Niles v. Mathusa, 20 App. Div. 483), and it is not disputed that the brewing company reduced the certificate to possession under the provisions of the assignment made by Mr. Maloney for the purpose of surrendering the same and recovering the amount of the rebate allowed by law. It cannot be doubted that the liquor tax certificate conferred upon Mr. Maloney a property right ( Niles v. Mathusa, supra), and that the assignment to the brewing company, coupled with the actual possession of the certificate, gave to the appellant all of the rights of property which Mr. Maloney had in the certificate.

The plaintiff, under the facts appearing in the case, as between it and the receiver, had an equitable claim upon the certificate and any rebate thereon and the receiver took subject to such claim. ( Niles v. Mathusa, 20 App. Div. 483; Koehler v. Flebbe, 21 id. 210; Matter of Jenney, 19 Misc. Rep. 244; affd., 19 App. Div. 627.) The plaintiff did not, however, take possession of the certificate as it might have done, but allowed it to remain upon the promise of Seeney to deliver it on the thirty-first of October to be then surrendered.

The tax certificate is not a chattel but a chose in action. ( Niles v. Mathusa, 20 App. Div. 483.) The recovery of the piece of paper on which the license is written would be of no advantage to the plaintiff.