) While the facts alleged in Hoffman could be construed as prompted by personal animosity, that case made no distinction between malicious acts which were motivated by personal animosity and those motivated by furtherance of the employer's business. In Nikelly v. Stubing (1990), 204 Ill. App.3d 870, 562 N.E.2d 360, the court made that distinction. The plaintiff alleged intentional and unjustified interference with his employment contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress by his supervisor with the intent to coerce the plaintiff to retire.
None of these arguments overcome sovereign immunity. First, Bolanos argues that a defendant acts beyond the scope of authority when he or she acts with personal animosity toward the plaintiff; this principle appears to have originated in Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 876, 562 N.E.2d 360, 364 (4th Dist. 1990). But the cases that Bolanos cites for this general principle do not support her argument.
Illinois cases indicate that, when a government employee acts out of personal animosity toward an injured party, the employee's acts may be outside the scope of his government employment. See Id.; citing Sellers v. Rudert, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1047, 918 N.E.2d 586, 592, 335 Ill. Dec. 241 (2009); Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 876, 562 N.E.2d 360, 364, 149 Ill. Dec. 896 (1990). The plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to invoke this apparent rule.
Several Illinois cases indicate that when a government employee acts out of personal animosity toward an injured party, the employee's acts may be outside the scope of his government employment. See, e.g., Sellers v. Rudert, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1047, 918 N.E.2d 586, 592 (2009); Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 876, 562 N.E.2d 360, 364 (1990). Rappe has alleged sufficient facts to invoke this apparent rule.
To demonstrate that the defendant's actions were outside the scope of state employment, the plaintiff must produce evidence showing that the defendant acted based on personal animosity, instead of in the employer's best interest. Welch, 751 N.E.2d at 1195; Mgmt. Ass'n of Ill. v. Bd. of Regents of Northern Ill. University, 618 N.E.2d 694, 616-17 (Ill.App. 3d Dist. 1993); Nikelly v. Stubing, 562 N.E.2d 360, 364 (Ill.App. 4th Dist. 1990). In this case, Defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity.
Our reading of the [Illinois] cases leads us to conclude that the rule in Illinois is that the employer is liable for the negligent, wilful, malicious or criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed during the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer; but when the act is committed solely for the benefit of the employee, the employer is not liable to the injured third party.See also, Nikelly v. Stubing, 562 N.E.2d 360, 364-65 (Ill. App. 3d 1990) (where the court held that when the intentional infliction of emotional distress by his supervisor was alleged to have been made with the intent to coerce the plaintiff to retire, the supervisor's acts were within the scope of his authority because there were no facts alleged which showed personal animosity. Thus, the action was one against the State.
Defendant rests that argument on cases that require fact pleading. SeeManagement Ass'n of Illinois, Inc. v. Bd. Of Regents of Northern Illinois Univ., 248 Ill. App. 3d, 599, 618 N.E.3d 694, 705-06 (Ill.App. 1st dist. 1995); Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 562 N.E.2d 360, 364 (Ill.App. 4th Dist. 1990). Still, plaintiff has failed to plead even conclusions (which would satisfy federal notice pleading requirements) that Podlesak acted outside the scope of his agency.
¶ 28 In his second amended complaint, while Mr. Green Sr. repeatedly described the actions of Troopers Ehlers and McCarthy as willful and wanton and without lawful justification, he did not allege any specific facts supporting an inference that the troopers were doing something other than attempting to perform some function within the scope of their authority when the injury occurred. As the circuit court suggested in its first dismissal order, citing Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill.App.3d 870 (1990), this could have come in the form of additional allegations that defendants harbored personal animosity towards the decedent or that their actions were motivated by malice or some other improper or illicit purpose. Mr. Green Sr. included no such allegations.
Here, plaintiff alleged no facts that would support a finding that defendant's actions in confiscating the property were somehow furthering defendant's own purposes; instead, the facts alleged suggest that defendant was acting in furtherance of the State's interests. See Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 876, 562 N.E.2d 360, 364 (1990) (finding the complained-of actions within the scope of the defendants' authority because the plaintiff alleged "no specific facts which would establish that [the] defendants harbored any personal animosity toward [the plaintiff], or that they committed the acts alleged for reasons other than that they perceived them to be in the best interests of [the State]"). ¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 The Wozniak court clarified the holding in Hoffman and found "a suit was not against the [S]tate when the defendant supervisor made personal accusations that did not relate solely to the employee's job." Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 679 N.E.2d at 1259; Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 877, 562 N.E.2d 360, 364 (1990) (noting the plaintiff's allegations in Hoffman "were so egregious that it could be inferred they were actuated by personal animus toward the plaintiff, and could not have been motivated by concern for the welfare of the university"). Here, defendant's statements in the termination letter did not involve any false personal accusations not relevant to plaintiff's employment.