Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-0742 (NHP).
July 19, 1999.
Lawrence E. Kazmierczak, Esq., Oakland, N.J., Attorney for Plaintiff.
Anthony LaBruna, Assistant, U.S. Attorney, FAITH S. HOCHBERG, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant.
LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
Plaintiff Carmen Nieves brings this action before the Court, pursuant to §§ 205(g) and 1631(c) of the Social Security Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c), seeking to overturn the final determination of Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Carmen Nieves (hereinafter "plaintiff") was born in Puerto Rico on September 6, 1942, and came to the United States in 1958, at the age of fourteen. See Transcript of Proceedings, April 16, 1998 at page 31. Plaintiff attended school until the ninth grade, received her GED, and has worked for the last thirty years as a seamstress. (Tr. 32, 145). Prior to 1994, plaintiff began to experience nausea, dizziness, weakness and pains which forced her to quit her job. (Tr. 145). Plaintiff claims the same symptoms prevent her from returning to the workplace. (Tr. 145).On June 5, 1995, plaintiff filed applications for Social Security disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter "SSI"), alleging that her condition became "disabling" as of April 25, 1994. Plaintiff alleges disability due to a cyst on her left kidney, gall bladder stones, weakness, fatigue, loss of memory, thyroid problems, back and leg pain, bodyaches especially in the left arm and left lung, as well as, loss of sleep. See Statement of Stipulated and Disputed Facts, dated May 13, 1998 at page 1. Plaintiff's claim for benefits was initially denied, and then denied upon reconsideration. Next, the plaintiff requested a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. A hearing before the Honorable Christopher P. Lee, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") then was scheduled for March 25, 1997. On May 27, 1997, Judge Lee determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits. Judge Lee's findings contained in the May 27, 1997 decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when, on January 30, 1998, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. On appeal to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, plaintiff contends that the decision of the Commissioner denying her application for disability benefits is not based upon substantial evidence.
Hereinafter, this Court will refer to the Statement of Stipulated and Disputed Facts as "Stip."
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is made applicable to SSI cases by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
A . Standard of Review
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) establishes the limitations that this Court must adhere to in reviewing said appeals. In accordance with the statute, a court may review the factual findings of the Commissioner only to determine whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence for such findings. This Court must affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. If there is substantial evidence in the record to maintain the Commissioner's findings, they are conclusive; and as a result, the court is not empowered, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to conduct a de novo review. Instead, the court's role must be viewed as narrowly tailored, with considerable deference to the Commissioner's fact-finding. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court's inquiry must be directed to finding whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The United States Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence in a Social Security case as "more than a mere scintilla" and as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The fact that the record contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for the decision in the record. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1992). Consequently, this Court must review the record and the ALJ's findings and conclusion within the narrow confines of its limited scope of review.
B . Substantial Evidence
In reaching the findings in a disability benefits proceeding, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence, and where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusions that must be upheld. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); see also Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. Welfare, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975). However, the ALJ's ruling should clearly explain the foundation upon which it rests. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ is charged with the responsibility of analyzing all the relevant evidence and explaining why certain evidence was considered relevant while other evidence was dismissed. See Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978). Although administrative decisions are accorded a certain level of deference, it is the responsibility of this Court to closely sift through the record in order to determine whether the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence.
In order for a claimant to be deemed disabled, and thus entitled to benefits under the Act, he must comply with all relevant statutory requirements. To comply, the claimant must first meet the insured status requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) and the resource and income restrictions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) and (b) in order for SSI to be paid. Secondly, the claimant must establish that he is not "engage[d] in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months" as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(c)(3)(A). Finally, the claimant must show that he is disabled within the meaning of the statute.
An individual is determined to be under a disability "only if his physical or mental impairment(s) are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (c)(2)(B)(d) and § 1382(c)(3)(B). Thus, a claimant must have a medically determinable impairment and this impairment must cause a functional limitation which negates the claimant's ability to do any kind of work which exists in the national economy.
In this matter, the plaintiff has satisfied the first two requirements in that the plaintiff is insured and is not "engaged in substantial gainful activity." The issue before this Court is whether the ALJ's ruling denying the plaintiff "disabled" status is supported by substantial evidence.
The Social Security Act prescribes a five-step sequential analysis that must be satisfied in order for a claimant to be entitled to benefits.See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1995). First, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that he is not currently employed or engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1995); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n. 5 (1987). Second, the plaintiff must also prove that he is inflicted with a severe medical impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1995); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Third, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 (1995). Fourth, the claimant is under obligation to prove that he cannot return to the particular type of work the claimant has previously performed if the claimant's impairment does not meet the criteria set forth in the list of impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995); See also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Failure to prove this requisite will result in a denial of benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995). Fifth, if the claimant has proven that he is unable to perform prior occupational duties, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is able to work in some other occupation in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1995). If the Commissioner is unable to carry this burden, the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id.
The type of physical or mental impairment necessary to prove the existence of a disability has been defined as "[a]n impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) and 1382(a)(3)(c). Although Congress requires the Commissioner to develop a complete medical record and make every reasonable effort to obtain all medical evidence, Congress nonetheless places the burden upon a plaintiff to show his or her entitlement to disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(H) ("An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the [Commissioner] may require.").
In the present matter, this Court must look to the factual record developed at the March 25, 1997 hearing. At that time, plaintiff asserted that, in April 1994, she began to experience problems that precluded her from work. (Tr. 34). Plaintiff stated that she had problems with her kidney and that she began taking medication for her thyroid. (Tr. 34-36). Plaintiff also complained of dizziness and nausea. (Tr. 34-36).
Judge Lee employed the sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 in order to conclude that plaintiff was not disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. The ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the special insured status requirements of the Act on April 25, 1994, the date the claimant became unable to work, and continues to meet them through December 1998.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 25, 1994.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has hypothyroidism, degenerative arthritis, and mild insomnia, but does not establish medical findings which meet or equal in severity the clinical criteria of any impairment listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. While the claimant has an underlying medically determinable impairment that could reasonably cause the symptoms she alleged, her symptoms are not of such severity and intensity as to preclude all work activity.
5. The claimant's allegations of an inability to work due to her impairments are not credible nor are they consistent with the medical evidence.
6. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work-related activities as characterized by an ability to frequently lift and carry ten pounds, occasionally lift and carry twenty pounds and sit, stand and walk for six hours a day. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (1995). There are no significant nonexertional limitations.
7. The claimant's past relevant work as a sleeves setter/seamstress did not require the performance of work related activities above the light exertional level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 (1995).
8. The claimant's impairments do not prevent the claimant from performing her past relevant work.
9. The claimant was not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995).
The ALJ determined, based on the lack of any medical evidence provided by plaintiff for the period from April 25, 1994 through the date of the ALJ's decision, that plaintiff was not disabled at this time. Consequently, plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act, given her age, education, and work experience.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits under §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Act was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in his finding that the plaintiff does not have any impairments which significantly limit her ability to perform work related functions. Further, plaintiff asserts that there must be evidence to show reasonable availability of jobs which the particular claimant is capable of performing to support a denial of disability insurance benefits.
In refuting plaintiff's alleged inability to work, the ALJ found the most critical factor to be the lack of medical evidence submitted by the plaintiff for the period at issue. As the record illustrates, plaintiff has been examined by several doctors in order to diagnose her particular ailments. Most of these physicians, however, have not stated that plaintiff is physically precluded from performing occupational duties.
In a 1995 examination, Dr. Ronald Bagner reported no abnormal findings. (Tr. 141-42). Dr. Bagner found plaintiff to have no pain on the movement of multiple joints, no swelling, no localized tenderness, and a normal range of movement in cervical and lower back areas. (Tr. 141-42). There was no pain on straight leg raises, no abnormal reflexes or sensory abnormalities, and no atrophy. (Tr. 141-42). Dr. Bagner also noted that plaintiff experienced no difficulty getting on and off the examining table, nor was she uncomfortable in the seated position during the interview. (Tr. 141-42). Plaintiff did not use a cane or other assistive device. (Tr. 141-42).
1. Despite Dr. Bagner's negative findings and normal x-rays of the lumbosacral spine, a diagnosis of degenerative arthritis was set forth. However, the Commissioner notes that osteoarthritis, first appears asymptomatically in the second to third decades and becomes universal by age 70.
Similarly, Drs. Lisa and Stephen Ferraro do not support plaintiff's claim that she is unable to work. Although it was determined that she had a left kidney cyst, Dr. Lisa Ferraro stated that plaintiff's prognosis was good and that she had no physical or mental limitations. (Tr. 126). Their treatment notes do not reveal any significant positive findings. Plaintiff's hypothyroidism is noted (Tr. 123-29) and she has been seen for follow-up visits, however, it is specifically stated by the treating physician that the plaintiff is able to perform her daily living activities. (Tr. 126).
Dr. Mark Wiesen also found no remarkable findings during his examination of the plaintiff. (Tr. 135). In fact, after only three months of hormonal treatment, the doctor reduced the amount of plaintiff's thyroid hormone replacement. (Tr. 135). It is also noted in his records that plaintiff appeared well and that she did not experience any other complicating ailments. (Tr. 135). Like Dr. Lisa Ferraro, Dr. Wiesen opined that plaintiff was well and capable of most daily activities.
Moreover, treatment notes from St. Joseph's Family Health Center and the Patterson Community Health Center refer to hypothyroidism, yet plainly fail to document any restrictions on daily living and work activities resulting from this condition (Tr. 147-154, 163-167). Additionally, references are made to back and joint pain, yet no positive clinical findings are noted. (Tr. 147-154, 163-167). Essentially, plaintiff is seen on an infrequent basis to follow-up on her thyroid condition.
Finally, Dr. Hillel Glover diagnosed aliments but did not state that plaintiff would be unable to work. Dr. Glover observed that plaintiff was "well developed, oriented, coherent, and exhibited no evidence of formal thought disorder, psychomotor slowing, or agitation." (Tr. 145). Importantly, Dr. Glover's examination found that her complaints of dizziness, nausea, and weakness are not related to a psychiatric condition and that plaintiff's mental state is not at all severe enough to restrict daily, social, and living activities. (Tr. 145).
In reviewing the evidence, the ALJ properly evaluated all of the medical evidence in the record. Overall, the record clearly establishes an ability to perform work related activities from both a mental and physical viewpoint. The hypothyroidism is stable, well controlled, and exhibits no complicating features. Despite the diagnosis of degenerative arthritis, there was a normal physical examination and no motor, sensory, or reflex abnormalities. In addition, the x-rays were negative revealing no abnormalities. Also, despite her allegations of anxiety, plaintiff appeared coherent, oriented, and had good concentration.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that supports the ALJ's ruling that plaintiff does not suffer from a significant nonexertional impairment. The medical records reveal that plaintiff has the ability to perform light work-related activities. Plaintiff testified at the March 25, 1997 hearing that she is able to walk approximately five to ten blocks. (Tr. 39). Further, on her "Activities Of Daily Living Questionnaire" she indicates that she is able to complete activities of daily living, such as cooking, cleaning, washing dishes, and visiting friends and relatives. (Tr. 108). Plaintiff also reads and is involved in religious activities. (Tr. 108). While plaintiff still attests to her symptoms, she provides no objective medical evidence to establish a continuous disabling condition.
Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ did not consider her subjective complaints of pain. In considering subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ has discretion in evaluating the credibility of a claimant. Brown v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D.Pa. 1983) (citing Bolton v. Secretary of HHS, 504 F. Supp. 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)). Accordingly, the ALJ must view the complaints in light of the medical evidence in the record.Id. There must be objective medical evidence that supports the claimant's complaints of pain. In this case, the ALJ did not dismiss plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain. Rather, the ALJ properly evaluated these complaints of pain in conjunction with the objective medical evidence, pursuant to § 404.1529(c) of the Social Security Regulations and Social Security Ruling 96-7P. It was completely within the ALJ's discretion to grant less weight to subjective complaints of pain when such evidence conflicted with the objective medical evidence.
As the medical records indicate, Drs. Bagner, Lisa and Stephen Ferraro, Wiesen and Glover reported no remarkable findings during their examinations of the plaintiff. (Tr. 135, 141-42, 144-45). In addition, there is no evidence to support plaintiff's claim for disabling arthritis. Although there was some evidence of arthritis and kidney discomfort, and exertional limitations, the record lacked evidence of any serious physical deficits. Further, the plaintiff testified that she is capable of light housework, as well as walking for a few blocks. (Tr. 39, 108). The ALJ, therefore, properly evaluated the plaintiff's subjective complaints in according less weight to such complaints.
Plaintiff additionally contends that the ALJ made no effort to show or cause to be shown a reasonable availability of jobs which this particular claimant is capable of performing to support her denial of benefits. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1995), if a claimant fails to prove that he is unable to perform prior occupational duties, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is able to work in some other occupation in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1995). In the present case, Judge Lee held in his May 27, 1997 opinion that claimant was able to perform her prior occupational duties. Judge Lee found that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work activity, as defined by Appendix 2, Subpart P, Section 202.00. According to the claimant's characterization of her past work as a sleeve setter/seamstress, she was required to perform levels of exertion within her above specified residual functional capacity. Consequently, Judge Lee found that the claimant was able to perform her past relevant work. As such, Judge Lee is not required, as a matter of law, to show or cause to be shown a reasonable availability of jobs which this particular claimant is capable of performing to support her denial of benefits.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons it is the determination of this Court that the Commissioner's decision that plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.
This case is closed.