Opinion
CIVIL 01-1695 (JAG) (JA)
May 2, 2003
JESUS HERNANDEZ-SANCHEZ, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for Plaintiff
JOHANNA M. EMMANUELLI-HUERTAS, Ponce, Puerto Rico
JORGE MARTINEZ-LUCIANO, Ponce, Puerto Rico, for Defendant
LUIS E. PADRON-ROSADO, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for Third Party Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, Milton Nieves-Luciano, his wife and his three minor children sued the Municipality of Juana Diacute:az and Ramón Hernández-Torres, in his personal capacity and as mayor of Juana Díaz, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages, declaratory and injunctive relief. (Docket No. 1.) The complaint, filed May 25, 2001, alleges in relevant part that plaintiff's employment at the Municipality of Juana Díaz was unlawfully terminated, without a hearing, due to his affiliation with the New Progressive Party ("NPP") and in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also seek damages under article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 32 P.R. Laws Ann. § 5141, for which they invoke this court's supplemental jurisdiction.
This matter is before the court on motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. Both co-defendants claim that, as a matter of law, judgment should be entered in their favor because plaintiffs have: (1) not been deprived of any constitutionally cognizable property interest; and (2) failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination. In addition, it is defendants' contention that the defense of qualified immunity shields co-defendant Hernández-Torres from liability. After consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, and for the reasons that I explain below, defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Milton Nieves-Luciano began working at the Municipality of Juana Díaz on July 1, 1994, pursuant to a professional services contract. He is a member of the NPP. On August 14, 1997, Nieves-Luciano was appointed in the trust service Director of Data Processing. Said appointment was approved by the Municipal Assembly.
See 21 P.R. Laws Ann. § 4252 (2002).
On November 6, 2000, co-defendant Ramón Hernández-Torres, the mayoral candidate for the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), won the general election for the municipality. On April 11, 2001, shortly after entering office, co-defendant Hernández-Torres served plaintiff Nieves-Luciano with a dismissal letter. The letter only indicates that he was being removed because the position he occupied was one of trust. It is alleged by the plaintiffs that Nieves-Luciano was substituted in his position by a PDP member.
The defendants argue that as part of a reevaluation of the municipal organization, plaintiff's position was deemed unnecessary and duplicative. In addition, the position was eliminated as part of a work-force reduction induced by the need of maintaining a cost-effective personnel budget. It is also alleged by the co-defendants that since the elimination of plaintiff's position, no employee, let alone one affiliated to the PDP, has performed the duties previously performed by Nieves-Luciano.
On April 23, 2003, the defendants filed a third-party complaint against former mayor of Juana Díaz, Santiago Martínez-Irizarry. (Docket No. 19.) In it, the defendants assert that Martímez-Irizarry is liable to them in all or in part should they be found liable to plaintiffs. Their main allegation is in relevant part that because misrepresentations in his personnel practices, third-party defendant Martímez-Irizarry caused the defendants to discharge plaintiff Nieves-Luciano believing his position was one of trust and by virtue of the Puerto Rico Autonomous Municipalities Act. Such misrepresentations, defendants argue, make third-party defendant liable to them in all or in part.
Co-defendants now move for summary judgment (Docket No. 54) asserting, inter alia, that plaintiff Nieves-Luciano has not been deprived of any cognizable property interest so as to justify recovery for violation of his due process rights. By like token, the defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination. Alternatively, the co-defendants claim that even if a prima facie case has been established in this case, they have successfully proven that the decision to eliminate plaintiff's position would have been the same absent any politically motivated discriminatory animus.
Plaintiffs oppose co-defendants motion (Docket No. 60) and generally argue that there is a factual controversy as to whether plaintiffs termination was unlawfully motivated by his affiliation to the adversary political party. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that it was in their motion for summary judgment that co-defendants raised for the first time their contention that plaintiff's position was eliminated for being unnecessary.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To succeed in a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and that a trier of fact could reasonably find in its favor. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000).
The court must view the facts in light most hospitable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Patterson v. Patterson, 306 F.3d 1156, 1157 (1st Cir. 2002). "`[N]either conclusory allegations [nor] improbable inferences' are sufficient to defeat summary judgment." Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236-37 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir. 1993)). A fact is considered material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case under applicable law. Nereida-González v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir. 1993).
ANALYSIS I. Plaintiffs' Due Process Claim
Plaintiffs' complaint avers that the dismissal of Mr. Nieves-Luciano from his position as director of data processing violates their rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Among other things, the complaint states that Nieves-Luciano "had an expectancy of continued employment in the position he held prior to dismissal" and that the defendants acted "maliciously, wilfully, and in wanton and reckless disregard" for his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 18, 21, at 4.)
Defendants on the other hand contend that an essential element for maintaining a due process in employment claim is the existence of a property interest granted by virtue of state law. See Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Metivier v. Connor, 283 F.3d 391, 392 (1st Cir. 2002). In other words, the defendants argue that due process jurisprudence requires that only cognizable property interest rooted in state law enjoy due process protection. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985). Since Mr. Nieves-Luciano was hired in the trust service and held a trust position under Puerto Rico law, the defendants claim that he could be freely removed. Therefore, in defendants' opinion, Mr. Nieves-Luciano had no legitimate property interest and cannot maintain a due process violation claim.
While the plaintiffs do not dispute defendants' contention, they argue that not having a property interest does not dispose of the First Amendment political discrimination claim. In fact, referring to the argument that they cannot maintain a due process claim, the plaintiffs state in their opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion that: "[i]n arguendo, plaintiff accepts [sic] this argument as true." (Docket No. 60, ¶ 3, at 2.) Plaintiffs are correct that even without the requisite property interest necessary for a due process claim, a First Amendment action may still be prosecuted for political discrimination. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n. 6 (1980); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Cordero v. De Jesús-Méndez, 867 F.2d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 1989). However, as to the due process cause of action alleged in the complaint, the plaintiffs admit that there is no factual controversy. Mr. Nieves-Luciano was employed in the trust service, and therefore had no legitimate property interest in permanent or continued employment. Consequently, summary judgment is warranted as to plaintiffs' due process claim. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to that cause of action.
II. Plaintiffs' First Amendment Claim
As both plaintiffs and defendants correctly state, the fact that plaintiff does not have the requisite property interest for maintaining a due process claim does not dispose of the First Amendment political discrimination cause of action.
The defendants claim that plaintiffs' fail to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination. They argue that Mr. Nieves-Luciano's position was eliminated because it was deemed unnecessary and duplicative following a reevaluation of the municipal organization and in light of limited personnel budget. It is further contended by the defendants that the Office of Municipal Affairs Commission ("OCAM") makes system analysts available to municipalities by telephone or in person for training and support regarding the accounting system provided by the office. As such, it is claimed by the defendants that the duties performed by Mr. Nieves-Luciano were already covered by the OCAM accounting system and the services it provided. The defendants also contend that they were entitled to discharge plaintiff because he was hired in violation of municipal personnel laws.
Mr. Nieves-Luciano was originally hired under a professional services contract to implant an accounting system different than but parallel to OCAM's in Juana Díaz. The municipality was running these two separate accounting systems.
In addition, the defendants argue that even if plaintiffs have successfully established a prima facie case, they are still entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The crux of their argument is that they have discharged their burden of establishing that they would have taken the same action regardless of plaintiff's political beliefs. The defendants deny having hired PDP partisans to performed the functions previously performed by Mr. Nieves Luciano.
The plaintiffs on the other hand assert that the defendants did fill the position left open by Mr. Nieves-Luciano's termination with members of the PDP. Additionally, it is plaintiffs' contention that the accounting system created and maintained by Mr. Nieves-Luciano supplemented and improved OCAM's. Therefore, his functions were not duplicative or unnecessary. Plaintiffs further argue that a prima facie case of political discrimination has been established and that shortly after entering office, co-defendant Herández-Torres manifested his intention to "clean the house of NPP employees." Plaintiffs also deny that Mr. Nieves-Luciano was hired in violation of municipal personnel rules and regulations.
It is well settled that political discrimination restrains the freedom of belief and association, core activities protected by the First Amendment. Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodríguez, 196 F. Supp.2d 117, 122 (D.P.R. 2002) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 354 (1976)). In a trilogy of cases, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 354, Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 516, and Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990), the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of political patronage holding that non-policymaking employees are protected under the First Amendment from adverse employment decisions that are based on their political affiliations. Padilla-García v. Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). A prima facie case of political discrimination is established by demonstrating that plaintiff (1) engaged in protected conduct and (2) that such conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see also Padilla-García v. Rodríguez, 212 F.3d at 74. In other words, a plaintiff has to prove that his or her political persuasions were a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged action. Ortiz-Piero v. Rivera-Arroyo, 84 F.3d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996). Once a prima facie case has been established, then the employer is given an opportunity to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action regardless of plaintiff's political beliefs. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287.
The burden shifting-framework in Mt. Healthy goes directly to causation. Padilla-García v. Rodríguez, 212 F.3d at 74. To survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has to point to evidence in the record that would allow "a rational fact finder to conclude that the challenged personnel action occurred and stemmed from a politically based discriminatory animus." Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 1994). "Merely juxtaposing a protected characteristic — someone else's politic — with the fact that plaintiff was treated unfairly is not enough to state a constitutional claim." Correa-Martínez v. Arrillaga-Beléndez, 903 F.2d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 1990).
A review of the record indicates that there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by the jury. There are in particular, three disputed material issues of fact that must be resolved before determining whether plaintiff's political affiliations were indeed the substantial or motivating factor for his dismissal. First, there is a dispute as to whether in fact the accounting system maintained by Mr. Nieves-Luciano was parallel to that of OCAM's as to make his position duplicative and unnecessary. Plaintiffs claim that it improved and supplemented OCAM's (see Plaintiffs' Contested Issues of Fact, Docket No. 60, at 1) while the defendants argue that it provided the same service (see Defendants Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, Docket No. 54, at 3). Secondly, there is a dispute as to whether Mr. Nieves-Luciano was replaced by members of the PDP. If PDP partisans are or at some point were performing the duties previously performed by Mr. Nieves-Luciano, that would be a strong indication of political patronage. Finally, there is a factual dispute as to whether Mr. Nieves-Luciano was hired in violation of municipal personnel laws.
Moreover, the defendants argued for the first time in their motion for summary judgment that Mr. Luciano's position had become unnecessary. Such claim was not raised as a defense in the answer to the complaint. In fact, his termination letter only indicates that he was being terminated because his position was one of trust. If I review these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as I must do in this context, the record raises doubts as to whether defendants' arguments justifying the adverse employment action are nothing but a subterfuge for the political patronage complained of. But these are issues that must be resolve by the jury. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to this issue.
III. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability when they perform discretionary functions as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In defining the limits of this good-faith defense, the Supreme Court has stated that "[w]here an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, . . . a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action." Id. at 819 (footnote omitted). "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right." Acevedo-García v. Vega-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Thus the court needs to determine (1) whether the constitutional right allegedly involved is a clearly established one; and (2) whether a reasonable official in the same circumstances would have understood that his or her conduct violated that right. See Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1999). In other words, once it is determined that the alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right, the court must still determine whether an objectively reasonable official with the information that he or she possessed at the time would have believed that his or her conduct was lawful. See McBride v. Taylor, 924 F.2d 386, 389 (1st Cir. 1991).
Co-defendant Hernandez-Torres contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because having been presented with the situation of duplicative and unnecessary accounting and data processing services, it was reasonable for him to eliminate Mr. Nieves-Luciano's position. Therefore, according to co-defendant, it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that by terminating Mr. Nieves-Luciano's employment he was not violating clearly established constitutional rights.
Plaintiff's argue to the contrary claiming that terminating the employment of a non-policymaking employee by reason of his political beliefs violates the clearly established rights afforded to all public employees under the First Amendment. As such, it is plaintiffs' contention that co-defendant Hernández-Torres is not entitled to qualified immunity protection.
I have already determined that there are factual issues that need to be resolved by the trier of fact with respect to whether plaintiff's political affiliations were the substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action taken by the defendants. At the same time, said factual inquiry is key to the determination of whether defendants reasonably believed they were not violating clearly established rights. After all, this objectively reasonable inquiry is highly fact specific, Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1997), and in the context of qualified immunity, summary judgment is precluded when disputed material facts make pre-trial solution impossible. Kelley v. Laforce, 288 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002). Like in Swain, there are factual issues in this case, that must be resolved by the trier of fact. Consequently, the co-defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity is an issue that cannot now be resolved.
CONCLUSION
In view of the above, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is granted as to plaintiffs' due process claim for there is no factual dispute and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As to the First Amendment claim, defendants' motion is denied because there are factual issues that need to be resolve by the jury.
SO ORDERED