Opinion
CASE NO. 02-72380
September 8, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ann Arbor's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant replied to the response. Plaintiff also responded to Defendant's Motion for Sanctions and Defendant did not reply. The Court finds that the parties have adequately set forth the relevant law and facts, and that oral argument would not aid in the disposition of the instant motions. See E.D. MICH. LR 7.1(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the motions be decided on the briefs submitted. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
On June 10, 2002, Plaintiff Christine Nievaard filed a one count complaint with this Court alleging sexual harassment hostile environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C 2000e, et. seq. (hereinafter "Title VII"). Plaintiff alleges that she experienced a hostile work environment while employed with Defendant City of Ann Arbor. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that as the first female supervisor in her position, her gender motivated her co-workers to do the following: inappropriately comment on her style of dress, call her a "bitch," accuse her of misusing government property, damage her private property, and damage property she used for work purposes. She further claims that her gender motivated general insubordination by those she supervised.A. Plaintiff's allegations
Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant City of Ann Arbor on April 2, 2001, as a Parks Maintenance Foreperson with the Ann Arbor Parks Department. Her position required her to supervise both male and female skilled trade employees and various seasonal employees responsible for city park maintenance. She claims that verbal harassment and insubordination began almost immediately upon her April 2, 2001, date of employment.
Plaintiff alleges that on April 3, 2001, Kevin Johnston, a member of her maintenance crew, told plaintiff that the two of them would not "get along" because working for a woman conflicts with his religious beliefs. See Nievaard Dep., Vol. I at 117. Furthermore, according to Plaintiff, Johnston was generally insubordinate and called her a "bitch" a "handful of times." Id. In fact, Plaintiff asserts that she has been called a bitch on several occasions by various co-workers and subordinates. Plaintiff also cites two other instances of verbal harassment. According to Plaintiff, three seasonal employees allegedly said that they did not "appreciate" being told by Plaintiff how to mark baseball diamonds and a janitor under Plaintiff's supervision, Leeza Scott, allegedly accused Plaintiff of scrawling a racial epithet on a bathroom stall after Plaintiff notified Ms. Scott of its existence.
In total, Plaintiff alleges that at least 5 co-workers and subordinates called her a "bitch" at some point, including Kevin Johnston, Kurt Keiser, Leeza Scott, Elaine Bater, Amy Englebert and an anonymous individual who left a note under her door with the word "super-bitch" written on it. SeeNievaard Dep. Vol. I at 129, 138; Vol. II at 14-16, 17-18, 24-25.
Plaintiff also alleges that other than problems with verbal harassment and insubordination, her peers and those that she supervised often made improper references to her style of dress. For instance, Brian Clearwater, a maintenance employee not supervised by Plaintiff, and Terry Ryland, Plaintiff's direct supervisor, both suggested to Plaintiff that a more subdued style of dress might allow her to fit in and be taken more seriously by her maintenance crew. See Nievaard Dep., Vol. I at 21; Vol. II at 42-43. Other co-workers, however, were less tactful.
For instance, Leeza Scott apparently often referred to the tight fit of Plaintiff s jeans, while an individual named Daryl Cooperman allegedly told plaintiff to "slide under one of the 580's [a large lawn mower]" so that Cooperman could "release the oil and fuss [Plaintiff] up." Nievarrd Dep. Vol. n at 40. Plaintiff testified, however, that Cooperman stated that "he was joking . . . [b]ecause he said that everyone was afraid to say anything to me or to conversate [sic] with me because anyone who did was involved in the next rumor . . . [a]nd he wanted to see how I took it." Id. at 41. Another employee, Kurt Kiezer, told Plaintiff that if her shirt was "a little tighter [she could] put on a show" and complained that Plaintiffs shoes were too feminine for the workplace. Id. at 35-36. Comments about Plaintiffs open toed shoes and the fit of her jeans were also made by Dan Rinkoski. Mr. Rinkoski later asked Plaintiff if she "dressed that way to inspire them or distract them." Id. at 37-38. Garrrett Lussenden, an employee in the horticulture department, would allegedly "wolf-whistle" and "hoot" at Plaintiff. Id. at 45. Similarly, a fellow supervisor, Paul Bairley, would "flirt" with Plaintiff, including putting his arm around her on one occasion and he would, according to Plaintiff, "make comments about how sexy" Plaintiff looked. Id. at 44. Although Plaintiff alleges that comments about her clothing occurred on a daily basis, the above examples are those specifically mentioned by Plaintiff in her deposition and Plaintiff was not able to pinpoint the dates of the alleged incidents, other than that they happened in the summer of 2001. Id. at 36-39.
Plaintiff also alleges that part of the overall picture of harassment includes damage done to her personal property and to city property that she used. This includes having her office door glued shut three times and her personal and work vehicles being "keyed." The tailgate on Plaintiffs truck was also opened slightly in a manner calculated so that it would slam down when she pulled out of her parking space.
Plaintiffs claims involve more than damage to her property; she alleges damage to her reputation as well. According to Plaintiff, rumors were started about her sexual activity within the workplace. Specifically, rumors surfaced as to whether Plaintiff was engaging in sexual activity with her supervisor, Gary Pitcher, or with others within the Parks Department. See Giffen Dep. at 19. Plaintiff asserts that when Gary Pitcher retired, the new supervisor, Terry Ryland, acted hostile towards Plaintiff as a result of the rumors. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Ryland improperly altered Plaintiffs schedule, accused her of lacking integrity and accused her of misusing both the vehicle and cell phone issued to her by the Parks Department. Plaintiff alleges that by the fall of 2001, Parks Department management began investigating the situation involving Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims to have notified various individuals within the Parks Department of her allegedly continual harassment throughout the summer of 2001. See NievaardDep. Vol. n at 14, 32, 36, 41, 45; Giffen Dep. at 17-18, 89.
B. Defendant's remedial measures
On October 15, 2001, David Ferber, the Director of Human Resources at the Parks Department, allegedly sent a memorandum (hereinafter "memo" or "Ferber memo") to Ron Olson, Interim City Administrator, outlining the situation involving Plaintiff. See Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at Ex. 8. Mr. Ferber's subordinates within the human resources department, Rose Griffin and Julie Stiener, allegedly drafted the memo. Mr. Ferber signed the memo after reviewing its contents. See Ferber Dep. at 29.
Defendant relies on the memo to establish the remedial actions taken by the Parks Department in response to Plaintiffs complaints. According to the memo, human resources staff members began working to address Plaintiffs complaints on July 23, 2001. The staff met with management, supervisors, and employees working at Plaintiffs office building. After these meetings, the staff recommended "significant training" on the Parks Department discrimination and harassment policy, Policy 404, as well as "clear, consistent, and immediate responses to violations" of the policy. Id. at 2. Mr. Ferber also states that "numerous" meetings were held between the human resources staff and supervisors, management, employees, and union officials in August 2001, in an attempt to ensure compliance with Policy 404. Id. at 3.
Furthermore, according to Mr. Ferber, besides meeting with those involved in Plaintiffs alleged harassment, the human resources department also provided an outside consultant to Plaintiff for daily consultation on how to handle the various situations occurring at work, offered assistance for repairing the alleged damage to her vehicle as a result of being "keyed," and facilitated "professional support on an as-needed basis with outside consultants." Id. Human resources staff also apparently disciplined one manager and two supervisors for their involvement, though Mr. Ferber states that the discipline lacked adequate follow-up within the Parks Department. Id. Through this memo, Mr. Ferber also relayed to Mr. Olson that Ferber believed the alleged harassment Plaintiff was suffering resulted from Plaintiff being the first female maintenance supervisor in the Parks Department. Id. at 2. Mr. Ferber ultimately concluded that Plaintiff "was being subjected to a hostile work environment, due to her gender." Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that she began experiencing anxiety attacks in May 2002. Plaintiff was terminated for job abandonment in July 2002.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and pleadings combined with the affidavits in support show that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is "sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (citations omitted). In application of this summary judgment standard, the Court must view all materials supplied, including all pleadings, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment maybe granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-moving party must do more than show that there is some abstract doubt as to the material facts. It must present significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. See Moore v. Philip Morris Co., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1993).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs allegations
Plaintiff argues that she suffered harassment because of her gender and that the harassment constituted a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. To establish a hostile work environment claim, an employee must show the following: 1) the employee is a member of a protected class, 2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, 3) the harassment was based on the employee's sex, 4) the harassment created a hostile work environment, and 5) the employer failed to take reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560-61 (6th Cir. 1999).
A hostile work environment occurs "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively regard that environment as hostile or abusive. See Harris, 510 U.S. at21.
The court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a reasonable person would deem the alleged harassment severe or pervasive enough to be a hostile environment. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 562. "[T]he issue is not whether each incident of harassment standing alone is sufficient to sustain the cause of action in a hostile environment case, but whether — taken together — the reported incidents make out such a case." Id. Factors to consider when determining whether conduct is severe or pervasive "include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. "Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at `discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.'" Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998). Moreover, the "standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a `general civility code.'" Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998).
Plaintiff argues that she experienced a hostile workplace environment because of resentment stemming from the fact that she was the first female in the position of maintenance supervisor. This resentment, Plaintiff argues, then motivated every act of insubordination, name-calling, and improper comment. Defendant responds by arguing that Plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence that the alleged harassment was motivated by gender; furthermore, even if the alleged harassment was motivated by gender, it lacked the severity necessary to support a hostile environment claim. Finally, Defendant argues that individuals at the Parks Department took sufficient remedial action in response to Plaintiffs claims to satisfy Title VII The Court will address these arguments in the most logical order.
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that harassment in the workplace need not be overtly sexual to constitute sexual harassment. Non-sexual conduct may be illegally sex-based and considered in a hostile environment analysis where it can be shown that but for the employee's sex she would not have been the object of harassment. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 565 (citing Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988), and Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). The Court finds, however, that much of what Plaintiff claims to be "non-sexual" sex-based harassment is not sexual harassment under Title VII because Plaintiff has failed to offer probative evidence that "but for" her gender she would not have experienced the alleged harassment. See id.
Plaintiff has failed to show that much of what she complains stems from anything other than personal animosity or specific disagreements and misunderstandings between her and her co-workers. See Barnett v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1106, (1999) ("[P]ersonal conflict does not equate with discriminatory animus.") Many of Plaintiff s allegations amount to what are clearly discrete misunderstandings or disagreements not based on any gender discrimination. For instance, Plaintiff was allegedly called a "bitch" on various occasions. However, Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that when Kevin Keiser called her a "bitch" it was as a result of a "misunderstanding." Nievaard Dep. Vol. n at 15. Plaintiff states that she unintentionally insinuated that Mr. Keiser never did a "hard day's work" and this prompted the name-calling by Mr. Keiser. Id. The same also applies to the three subordinate employees who expressed that they did not "appreciate" Plaintiff telling them how to mark baseball diamonds. Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that the employees who chafed at her direction were "upset" because Plaintiff implied that they were marking the baseball diamond incorrectly while Plaintiff had no personal experience in marking baseball diamonds. See Nievaard Dep. Vol. II at 33.
Some of Plaintiff's are simply not harassment. For instance, a number of the comments about Plaintiffs clothes came from females and males offering their advice on how Plaintiff should dress in order to command more respect in the workplace. While Plaintiff may disagree and assert her right to dress any way she pleases within departmental guidelines, the fact that some offered unwanted advice cannot be construed as sexual harassment.
Plaintiff also claims that she was treated unfairly by Terry Ryland, her supervisor as of May, 2002. Assuming Ms. Ryland does not have a legitimate reason for, among other things, questioning Plaintiff's integrity, questioning Plaintiff's use of government property, and adjusting Plaintiff's schedule, Plaintiff has still failed to offer any evidence of an anti-female motivation. Plaintiff merely alleges that Ms. Ryland was part of some "campaign to force Plaintiff to resign her position." Plaintiffs Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Disposition, at 4. The only reference in the record to an alleged motive behind Ms. Ryland's actions comes from Plaintiffs deposition where Plaintiff stated that Ms. Ryland's actions were based on information Ms. Ryland heard about Plamtm before Ms. Ryland began her employment with the Parks Department, See Nievaard Dep. Vol. n at 60-61. Personal animus based on rumors or other information, however, is not discriminatory animus based on gender. See e.g., Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that harassing conduct by a supervisor occurring after the plaintiff had complained about the supervisor could not be considered sexual harassment because it was motivated not by the plaintiff s gender, but rather by the plaintiff s complaints about the supervisor). The Court also finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that the janitor's (Leeza Scott's) reaction to Plaintiff finding a racial epithet on a bathroom wall was based on animus towards Plaintiffs gender. It appears that Plaintiff may have even apologized for her role in the incident. See Ferber Dep. at 52.
The Court is mindful not to "disaggregate" Plaintiffs claims and rob them of their cumulative force. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 561. Merely because the Sixth Circuit held in Williams that non-sexual conduct can amount to sexual harassment does not mean, however, that every disagreement, misunderstanding, or personality conflict is to be considered part of the totality of surrounding circumstances in an allegedly hostile environment. See, e.g., Morris, 201 F.3d at 790-91. As the Sixth Circuit explained in Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456. 464 (2000):
In Williams, evidence that the plaintiff was ostracized on a myriad instances when others were not, combined with gender-specific epithets used, such as "slut" and "fucking women," was sufficient to create an inference that her gender was the motivating impulse for her co-worker's behavior and allowed the non-sexual harassment to be considered in the hostile environment analysis.
The plaintiffs complaints in Williams primarily involved one co-worker, Giovannoe, and the plaintiffs immediate supervisor, Ryan, who used the gender-specific epithets. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 559. Thus, it made sense to aggregate Giovannoe and Ryan's non-sexual, yet abusive and offensive conduct aimed at the plaintiff for purposes of determining whether a hostile environment existed because both individuals exhibited anti-female animus. In the present case, evidence of gender bias comes mainly from the conclusory and non-specific statements of members of the human resources department, such as David Ferber, who assert that Plaintiff experienced a "hostile environment, due to her gender." See Ferber Memo at 2. Contrary to this assertion, however, David Ferber recognized personal animosity between Plaintiff and her co-workers when he was asked in his deposition why he thought Plaintiff was being harassed:
There was an individual — and I don't recall his name — who was a candidate for the position. He did not get it, and he made it known to people that he felt [Plaintiff] was unworthy of the job. [Plaintiff] came on board . . . and began enforcing work rules which was foreign to employees at that facility. They pretty well had the run of the mill so to speak. [Plaintiff] would check on them when they were on the job, give out work assignments, expect them to be out of the facility by 7:10, those types of things, which employees resented very much because that's not the way it had been done in the past by previous supervisors.Ferber Dep. at 27-28. Thus, Mr. Ferber acknowledged personal animosity and resentment between Plaintiff and her co-workers despite his conclusory statement that Plaintiff experienced a "hostile work environment, due to her gender." Ferber Memo at 2. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to "aggregate" the alleged non-sexual harassment, such as glue in Plaintiffs office doorknob and scratches on her personal and work vehicles, with the alleged sexual harassment in this case where, according to the evidence presented, the conduct was as likely to have been based on personal animosity as it was on Plaintiffs gender.
Furthermore, one of Mr. Ferber's subordinates, Rose Giffen, and a co-author of the "Ferber memo," testified in her deposition that her belief that Plaintiff was being harassed because other gender stems from the following:
"the fact that she was called, you know, a bitch, which is a derogatory word used against females, because people talked about who she was sleeping with and that she was receiving preferential treatment because she was sleeping with her boss, because people talked about whether or not she wore a bra to work, about her clothing, all of those made — led me to believe that they all had to do with her — her gender."Giffen Dep. at 94. Thus, the statement in the memo that Plaintiff experienced a "hostile environment, due to her gender" may provide additional support for the argument that some of the alleged conduct was based on Plaintiffs gender because members of the human resources staff were aware of such conduct; it does not, however, automatically transform any and all employment related disputes between Plaintiff and the entire staff of the Parks Department into discriminatory sexual harassment. In sum, much of the conduct that Plaintiff claims was sexual harassment contributing to a hostile work environment cannot be considered sexual harassment under Title VII because Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that the conduct was based on Plaintiffs sex. See Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2000) ("While [the plaintiff] may have been subject to intimidation, ridicule, and mistreatment, he has not shown that he was treated in a discriminatory manner because of his gender.")
Plaintiff s remaining allegations that may be considered "because of sex" are: 1) Elaine Bater and Amy Englebert calling her a "bitch" and some unidentified individual calling her "superbitch," 2) "wolf whistling" by Garrett Lussenden, whom she saw "very rarely," 3) Tom Bairley putting his arm around Plaintiff telling her she was "sexy," and 4) Kurt Reiser's statements that if Plaintiff pulled down her shirt a little more the workers could have a "view all day" and that Plaintiffs shirt was "too tight." Id. Vol. II at 35; Vol. I at 86. While the Court is doubtful that these claims amount to either serious or pervasive harassment, the Court finds that the question need not be answered in light of Defendant's prompt and adequate remedial measures.
B. Defendant's remedial efforts
Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not adequately respond to her complaints of sexual harassment. Defendant argues that Parks Department stafftook prompt good-faith actions to remedy Plaintiffs complaints. The legal standard to apply depends on whether Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment by her supervisor or sexual harassment by her co-workers. See Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (1997) ("When the harasser is a co-worker, the standard for determining employer liability is markedly different from that applicable to supervisors. . . .") (internal quotation omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiff has only sufficiently alleged a claim for "co-worker" sexual harassment given the lack of any evidence of a discriminatory motive behind the actions of her supervisor, Terry Ryland. Thus, Plaintiffs claim is governed by the standard for establishing employer liability in the context of co-worker sexual harassment. See id.
To establish employer liability for harassment by a co-worker, a plaintiff must show that the employer "knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action." Williams, 187 F.3d at 561. An employer can only be liable under this standard if its response to a plaintiffs claim "manifests indifference or unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known." Blankenship, 123 F.3d at 873. Furthermore, as the Sixth Circuit in Blankenship noted:
Once an employer is aware of and responds to charges of sexual harassment, though, mere negligence as to the content of the response cannot be enough to make the employer liable. When an employer responds with good-jaith remedial action, we cannot say that the employer has itself committed an act of discrimination. In sum, although negligence as to the existence of harassment maybe enough, under Rabidue, for an employer to incur liability for discrimination, negligence in the fashioning of a remedy is not. When an employer implements a remedy, it can be liable for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII only if that remedy exhibits such indifference as to indicate an attitude of permissiveness that amounts to discrimination.Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, both Plaintiff and Defendant offer the Ferber memorandum to establish their respective points. Defendant offers it to show the good-faith efforts of the human resources staff in attempting to remedy Plaintiffs complaints. Plaintiff offers it to show that management at the Parks Department did not adequately carry out the recommendations of the human resources staff. Under Blankenship, an employer who responds with good faith remedial action is not liable even if that response is negligent. The Court finds that the evidence presented in this case is sufficient to meet the Blankenship good-faith standard.
For instance, Plaintiff never complained to the Parks Department about some of the conduct. She never complained about Daryl Cooperman telling her to "slide under one of the 58O's [a large lawn mower]" so that Cooperman could "release the oil and fuss [Plaintiff] up." See Nievarrd Dep Vol. II at 40, 41. She also did not complain about Tom Bairly allegedly putting his arm around her on one occasion while telling her how "sexy" she looked. Id. at 44. Nor did she complain about Elaine Bater calling her a "bitch." Id. at 17. Thus, Defendant had no notice of these claims and could not respond with discipline as to these individuals regarding these particular claims. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 567 (noting that failure to report alleged harassment may be relevant to the establishment of employer liability in co-worker harassment cases under Blankenship).
Moreover, some of Plaintiff s complaints were deemed "informal," under Policy 404, the Parks Department's anti-discrimination policy. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at Ex. J. Under Section 4.1 of Policy 404, an employee may pursue a complaint of discrimination or harassment by following either an "informal resolution process" or a "formal complaint process." Id. The informal resolution process emphasizes problem-solving and does not involve an investigation or any discipline. Id. Many of Plaintiffs complaints appear to be "informal." For instance, Plaintiff never filed a formal complaint against Kevin Johnston for either his alleged insubordination or the alleged statement that his religion would affect Plaintiffs ability to supervise him. See Nievaard Dep. Vol. I at 118. Instead, Plaintiff referred him to the human resources department. Id. An employee in the human resources department, Rose Giffen, discussed the matter with Mr. Johnston and Plaintiff testified that despite Mr. Johnston's insubordination and the offending statement, that the two were able to work together. See Nievaard Dep. Vol. I at 125. Considering that the goal of the informal resolution process is "problem-solving" and not discipline, it cannot be said that Defendant's response to Plaintiffs informal complaint regarding Kevin Johnston was unreasonable or indifferent.
Other claims, such as those involving rumors, damage to both her property and government property, her generalized complaints of harassment, and the note bearing "superbitch" that was allegedly placed under her door, never involved an identifiable person and individual punishment could not be levied upon anyone. Plaintiff was told to get estimates from repair shops for the damage done to her truck, but the truck was repossessed before any further action was taken and Plaintiff admits it became a "moot point." Nievaard Dep. Vol. II at 30. In response to the nonspecific complaints of harassment, complaints of rumors circulating among unidentified individuals, and the offending note, human resources start members held numerous meetings with employees and management in an effort to establish compliance with Policy 404 and to quell the alleged rumors. See Giffen Dep. at 68-69; see also Birone v. Indian River School, No. 97-3212, 1998 WL 199791 *4 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting the difficulty of sustaining a Title VII claim on the basis of the failure to quell rumors). Furthermore, Defendant offered the assistance of an outside consultant to help Plaintiff deal with the alleged rumors and insubordination. See Cressman Dep. at 6. As for glue being placed in her office door lock, the conduct stopped after Defendant agreed to install a security camera. Finally, some employees were disciplined for their conduct.
For example, Leeza Scott, the janitor whom Plaintiff alleges sexually harassed her through insubordination, name-calling, and an accusation that Plaintiff placed racial graffiti on a bathroom wall, was ultimately transferred to another supervisor over Plaintiff's objection. One manager and two supervisors in the Forestry Division were disciplined for their actions relating to Plaintiff. Furthermore, Amy Englebert, an employee who allegedly called Plaintiff a "bitch," was terminated due to Plaintiff's complaints in the summer of 2001. Thus, the only unremedied conduct of which Plaintiff complains are the statements of Kurt Keiser and Dan Rinkoski and the "wolf whistling" by Garrett Lussenden. The Court finds that these do not amount to a hostile environment. See Burress v. Michigan Department of Corrections, No. 99-1422, 2000 WL 799316 *3 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that the defendant adequately responded to most of the plaintiff's complaints and those complaints left unremedied were not severe enough to establish a hostile environment).
Therefore, even assuming that the conduct alleged constitutes a severe or pervasive hostile environment, Defendant's response was not so inadequate as to indicate an "attitude of permissiveness that amounts to discrimination" and Defendant cannot be liable for the alleged harassment of Plaintiff by her subordinates and co-workers. Blankenship, 123 F.3d at 873. The fact that Mr. Ferber and the human resources staff were less than satisfied with the assistance they received from Parks Department managers, as detailed in the Ferber memo, does not preclude summary judgment given the fact that the actions of the human resources staff in disciplining employees, conducting meetings and investigations, and employing an outside consultant satisfies the good-faith standard of Blankenship. See Swanson v. Livingston County, No. 02-70980, 2003 WL 21644577 *7 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("As recognized in Blankenship, a plaintiff (or another employee . . .) cannot dictate the level of discipline.") Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title VII because Defendant promptly and adequately responded to her complaints.
C. Defendant's Motion for Sanctions
Defendant served its Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11 on Plaintiff's counsel on July 30, 2003. Defendant then filed its Motion for Sanctions with the Court on August 4, 2003. Rule 11 requires Defendant to wait 21 days after serving the motion on Plaintiff before filing the motion with the Court. See Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 297 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Rule 11 sanctions are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is served on the opposing party for the full twenty-one day "safe harbor" period before it is filed with or presented to the court. . . .") Because Defendant has failed to comply with the safe harbor provision of Rule 11, its Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 11 is DENIED.IT IS SO ORDERED.