Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:01-CV-281-C
April 30, 2002
ORDER
Petitioner, Raymond Nieto, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed an Answer, together with relevant records, and Petitioner filed a response.
Respondent has lawful custody of Petitioner pursuant to a judgment and sentence from the 110th Judicial District Court of Floyd County, Texas. Petitioner was indicted for the felony offense of burglary of a building, with one prior conviction for burglary of a habitation alleged for enhancement of punishment. On March 26, 1991, Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the burglary charge and not true to the enhancement allegation. A jury found him guilty of the burglary of a building offense and found the enhancement conviction to be true. Punishment was assessed by the trial court on March 27, 1991, at 30 years' imprisonment.
Petitioner was subsequently released on parole on August 18, 1994. On September 25, 1997, a warrant was issued for Petitioner's arrest, and he was arrested in Pueblo County, Colorado, for violating the terms of his parole. Petitioner waived extradition, and he was returned to Texas on October 30, 2000. On November 9, 2000, Petitioner was advised of his rights with regard to the revocation process. He admitted the alleged violations and waived a preliminary revocation hearing; however, he requested a final revocation hearing. On March 22, 20012 Petitioner was again advised of the parole violations and his revocation fights, but he refused to acknowledge the allegations. On April 11, 2001, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of notice for a final revocation hearing and receipt of the evidence. A final revocation hearing was conducted on April 12, 2001, after Petitioner waived the five days' notice prior to final hearing. Petitioner's parole was revoked on April 19, 2001.
Petitioner filed a state habeas application on April 22, 2001, challenging his parole revocation. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the writ application without written order on June 27, 2001.
In his federal habeas action, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief:
(1) his due process rights were violated because his revocation hearing was held over 150 days after he signed a request for a final revocation hearing on November 9, 2000;
(2) he has been denied the restoration of good-time credit forfeited upon the revocation of his parole in violation of ex post facto; and
(3) the parole board did not follow its own rules and procedures.
Petitioner waived a preliminary hearing and admitted the alleged parole violations, thereby providing probable cause to believe that he violated the conditions of his parole. Once it is determined that probable cause exists, the State must hold a final revocation hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the facts warrant revocation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972). Petitioner claims his due process rights were violated because the final revocation hearing was not held for over 150 days after he was notified of the alleged parole violations and had admitted those violations.
"[M]ore than mere unreasonableness is required for a court to grant of (sic) habeas corpus relief to a . . . parolee whose parole was revoked. The parolee must additionally show that actual prejudice was caused by the unreasonable delay." Villareal v. United States Parole Commission, 985 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1993); Frick v. Quinlin, 631 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1980) ("In order to obtain judicial relief the parolee must show that the delay was both unreasonable and prejudicial.") ( citing Smith v. United States, 577 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1978)). Petitioner has failed to meet this standard.
Petitioner next claims that he has been denied the restoration of good-time credits which were forfeited upon the revocation of his parole in violation of ex post facto laws.
There is no inherent right to good-time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 538, 557 (1974). Whether designated "good time" or "work time" credits, these credits do not become vested. Ex parte Morris, 626 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Hamill v. Wright, 870 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1989) (there is no federal constitutional right to the award of good conduct time credits); Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 1997) (Texas legislation rendering forfeited good time credits non-restorable does not violate ex post facto laws).
Petitioner's third claim is that the parole officials violated state rules and regulations regarding the parole procedures as applied to his case. A state's interpretation of its own rules and laws does not raise a federal constitutional issue. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983). "Mere failure to accord the procedural protections called for by state law or regulation does not of itself amount to a denial of due process." Giovanni v. Lynn, 48 F.3d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1995).
To the extent that Petitioner is seeking federal habeas relief because his "street time" was forfeited on the revocation of parole, his claim is without merit. Texas law does not entitle a prisoner to credit for time spent on parole. Morrison v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1997), citing Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 42.18 § 14(a) (West 1997) ("When a person's parole, mandatory supervision . . . is revoked, that person may be required to serve the portion remaining of the sentence on which he was released, such portion remaining to be calculated without credit for the time from the date of his release to the date of revocation.") See also, Newby v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 1996) (there is no statutory right to credit for "street time" served on parole).
Any claim that the loss of street-time credits or the parole revocation proceedings violated the Double Jeopardy Clause must fail. Morrison v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 127, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1997) (loss of street-time credits does not constitute double jeopardy); Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to parole and probation revocation proceedings.").
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied and this case dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.