Opinion
No. 57900-2-I.
April 23, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Whatcom County, No. 01-2-01860-1, David A. Nichols, J., entered March 7, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Patricia Niemela appeals from the trial court's dismissal as a matter of law of her claim that she and Clarence Adderley had a meretricious relationship. We affirm. The trial court accepted Niemela's evidence as true, but determined that the evidence she submitted did not establish the existence of a meretricious relationship. We agree.
Niemela and Adderley met in 1982. They became romantically involved, and from 1987 until April 2001, they shared a house. In October 2001, Niemela filed a complaint against Adderley in which she asserted that the couple had established a meretricious relationship beginning in 1982, and that she was entitled to a fair and equitable distribution of the property acquired during the existence of the relationship.
Before the case went to trial, Adderley died. One of his daughters, Vera Kalkwarf, as personal representative of his estate, was substituted as the defendant.
To make her case, Niemela and three of her friends testified at trial. Niemela also offered, and the court admitted without objection, a declaration and interrogatory answers that Adderley completed before his death.
After Niemela rested, Kalkwarf moved for dismissal under CR 41(b)(3). The court granted Kalkwarf's motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Niemela appealed, contending that she had presented sufficient evidence of a meretricious relationship to avoid a mid-trial dismissal. This court could not discern whether the trial court granted the motion to dismiss as a matter of law or of fact and, therefore, could not determine the correct standard of review. Niemela v. Kalkwarf, noted at 126 Wn. App. 1014, 2005 Wn. App. LEXIS 368. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court to reconsider Kalkwarf's motion to dismiss while expressly considering the five factors set forth in Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995). The trial court was instructed that if it determined as a matter of law that it should dismiss the claim because no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that a meretricious relationship existed, the court did not need to enter factual findings. If, however, the trial court determined that Niemela's case failed as a matter of fact, the court was to enter findings and conclusions that resolved the factual disputes and reflected the court's consideration of the Connell factors and any other considerations necessary to determine whether Niemela and Adderley shared a marital-like relationship. Niemela, 2005 Wn. App. LEXIS 368, at *9.
Upon remand, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Niemela failed to establish a meretricious relationship and again granted Kalkwarf's CR 41(b)(3) motion to dismiss. However, the trial court also entered factual findings. In this appeal, Niemela assigns error to several of the trial court's findings and conclusions. In general, she contends that the findings are not supported by the evidence and that the court misstated or misapplied the law.
DISCUSSION
A court sitting without a jury may grant a CR 41(b)(3) motion to dismiss, either as a matter of law or of fact, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case.
When the trial court rules as a matter of law, it must treat the plaintiff's evidence as true and determine that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case. No findings of fact are necessary or required. Alternatively, when the trial court rules as a matter of fact, it may weigh the evidence in support of plaintiff's case and make "a factual determination that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case by credible evidence, or that the credible evidence establishes facts which preclude plaintiff's recovery."
Roy v. Goerz, 26 Wn. App. 807, 810, 614 P.2d 1308 (1980) (quoting N. Fiorito Co. v. State, 69 Wn.2d 616, 618, 419 P.2d 586 (1966)), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wn.2d 853, 676 P.2d 431 (1984). Upon review of a case dismissed under CR 41(b)(3) as a matter of law, this court considers whether the trial court correctly stated and applied the law. Roy, 26 Wn. App. at 810-11.
The trial court entered findings, yet concluded as a matter of law that Niemela failed to establish a meretricious relationship. In other words, the court accepted Niemela's evidence as true, but determined that Niemela failed to make a prima facie case. We agree.
Niemela asserts that the findings of fact are "mere surplusage" and, therefore, this court should disregard them. Br. of Appellant at 25. We disagree. Although findings were not required, they inform this court as to why the trial judge concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to establish a meretricious relationship.
"A meretricious relationship is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist." Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 346. Some factors to consider in deciding whether a couple had a meretricious relationship are the length of the relationship, its purpose, the parties' intentions, whether they cohabited continuously, and whether they pooled their resources and services for joint projects. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 346; In re Pennington, 142 Wn.2d 592, 601, 14 P.3d 764 (2000). If the court concludes a meretricious relationship existed, it evaluates the interest each party has in the property acquired during the relationship and makes a just and equitable distribution of that property. Soltero v. Wimer, 159 Wn.2d 428, 433, 150 P.3d 552 (2007).
Because the trial court dismissed Niemela's case as a matter of law under CR 41(b)(3), we treat Niemela's evidence as true, but review de novo whether she presented prima facie proof of a meretricious relationship. See Roy, 26 Wn. App. at 810-11; see also Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 602-03 (when reviewing whether a trial court erred in concluding the facts gave rise to a meretricious relationship, this court gives deference to the trial court's factual findings, but reviews the trial court's legal conclusions de novo).
Length of Relationship
The evidence showed that Niemela and Adderley began a romantic relationship in 1982, which continued until April 2001. Niemela, therefore, established that they had a long-term relationship. But "a long-term relationship alone does not require the equitable division of property. Other factors must also justify the need for an equitable division of property acquired by the couple during their relationship." Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 604.
Continuous Cohabitation
The trial court found that Niemela and Adderley cohabited continuously from 1989 to April 2001. Niemela assigns error to that finding. She contends they began cohabiting in 1982. But her evidence showed that until 1987, when the couple moved into the house at Birch Bay, Adderley continued to spend time at a separate residence. Moreover, even if Niemela had established that she and Adderley began living together in 1982, her admission that she continued to receive rent assistance from the government after she moved in with Adderley weakened her claim that their relationship was like a marriage.
The trial court's finding that the parties' cohabitation began in 1989 appears to be a clerical error. In its original findings, the court concluded that Niemela and Adderley began cohabiting in 1987 when Adderley purchased a house in Birch Bay.
Intent
The trial court found "that the true intent of the parties was one of mutual convenience, not a meretricious relationship." Niemela disputes this finding, but she did not present evidence showing that she and Adderley mutually intended to form a meretricious relationship. Rather, she presented only evidence that would support a finding that she had such an intention.
In fact, Adderley denied that his intent was to be in a meretricious relationship. He claimed that he and Niemela agreed that they would be roommates. He said Niemela agreed to pay the cost of the utilities, which they considered to be the equivalent of rent.
Additionally, Niemela attested that Adderley was her landlord in documents that enabled her to continue receiving rent assistance from the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The trial court found that Niemela's reference to Adderley as her landlord called into question her claim that she intended to have a marriage-like relationship. Niemela disputes that finding, arguing the only evidence to support it is hearsay found in Adderley's declaration. But Niemela submitted the declaration; she may not now complain that it was admitted. Moreover, we agree that Niemela's representations to DSHS weakened her claim that the parties mutually intended a meretricious relationship.
Purpose
Niemela contends that the purpose of their relationship was "[c]ompanionship, friendship, love, sex, mutual support and caring[.]" As proof, she submitted affectionate cards that Adderley sent her and cards from Adderley's grandchildren addressed to "Grandma Patty."
But Adderley denied that their shared purpose was to have a meretricious relationship, claiming, instead, that "[b]oth the initial and the ultimate purpose of our relationship was to provide Patricia with a relatively inexpensive place for her to reside."
Even treating Niemela's evidence as true, the evidence does not support a finding that the purpose of both Niemela and Adderley was to have a marriage-like relationship.
Pooling Resources
The trial court found that Niemela failed to establish that she and Adderley pooled their resources for their mutual benefit: "The parties did not jointly invest their time, effort or financial resources in the real property to justify the equitable division of the real property" or any other property.
Niemela disputes this finding, arguing that she and Adderley living together, being sexually intimate and monogamous, appearing together socially, and sharing household chores, is evidence that they created a community. The findings, however, relate to the absence of property jointly acquired or jointly maintained. Niemela paid some monthly utility costs, but she did not pay the down payment on the house, did not pay the mortgage, taxes, or insurance, and was not named as an owner on the deed. She also failed to contribute any money for the boat and trailer or vehicles that Adderley bought during the relationship.
Niemela and Adderley also maintained separate bank accounts. In fact, Niemela admitted that she was prohibited from commingling her assets as a condition of her receiving housing assistance.
The only significant purchases Niemela made during the relationship were some furniture and appliances, which she bought with money she received from an insurance settlement before she moved in with Adderley.
Adderley did not help to pay for that property, and Niemela took some of it with her when she moved out. She returned some of what she took to the store where she purchased it and received a credit for its value. Moreover, Niemela was offered an opportunity to collect the remainder of her furniture and appliances, but she declined the offer because she "only had a small room and an 8-by-10 storage to move into." The way Niemela exerted control over the property she acquired with her insurance proceeds is inconsistent with her assertion that she and Adderley pooled their resources.
Niemela also claimed to have contributed to the upkeep and improvements of the house, but apart from general house cleaning and yard work, which she discontinued after having knee surgery, the only joint project she mentioned was turning the carport into a family room. She testified that she contributed to that effort by helping with the clean-up and putting a sealant on the paneling.
Even if accepted as true, Niemela's evidence did not show a significant pooling of resources and services for joint projects. Furthermore, the meretricious relationship doctrine remains tied to its equitable underpinnings. Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 602. Property acquired during a meretricious relationship is subject to distribution "so that one party is not unjustly enriched at the end of such a relationship." Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 349. Niemela contributed neither resources nor services sufficient to justify the equitable division of any property.
No single Connell factor is more important than any other. Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 605. But when the factors and evidence are taken as a whole, the equitable principles in Connell are not satisfied in this case. Except for the length of the relationship and the continuity of their cohabitation, Niemela failed to show that her relationship with Adderley was like a marriage. She did not establish that she and Adderley shared the intent to live in a marriagelike relationship, that she and Adderley shared the purpose of cohabiting to establish a marriage-like relationship, or that they pooled their resources as would a married couple.
CONCLUSION
The facts of this case do not establish the existence of a meretricious relationship. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
FOR THE COURT: