In support of his argument that article eighth, § 1, textually commits issues of educational quality to the legislature, Justice Zarella in his dissenting opinion relies on Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996), which addressed the legislature's responsibility to implement the constitutional spending cap, Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 496 U.S. 875, 105 S. Ct. 236, 83 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1984) (plurality opinion), wherein the plaintiffs sought this court to direct the appointment of additional trial judges, and Simmons v. Budds, 165 Conn. 507, 338 A.2d 479 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940, 94 S. Ct. 1943, 40 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1974), wherein a professor challenged grading regulations adopted by the University of Connecticut. In our view, Justice Zarella's reliance on these cases is inapposite because the constitutional provisions at issue therein unambiguously confer full authority over the respective subject matter to the legislature, and do not contain qualifying terms such as "appropriate legislation" that imply a judicial role in disputes arising thereunder, particularly when coupled with the word "shall," which itself implies a "constitutional duty" that is "

Existing precedents describe the uneasy line that distinguishes between cases that are justiciable and cases that are not. Because of the doctrine of separation of powers, courts do not have jurisdiction to decide cases that involve matters that textually have been reserved to the legislature, such as the implementation of a constitutional spending cap; Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 9-10, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996); or the appointment of additional judges. Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 683, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875, 105 S.Ct. 236, 83 L.Ed.2d 176 (1984); see also Nielsen v. Kezer, 232 Conn. 65, 74, 652 A.2d 1013 (1995).

Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 199 n. 13, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996). Both parties agree that a controlling case in the area of political question justiciability is Nielsen v. State of Connecticut, 236 Conn. 1, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996). There the Connecticut Supreme Court outlined the principles that underlie justiciability.

The plaintiff asserts that the complaint in this case does not raise a nonjusticiable political question, and the relief requested herein does not result in an impermissible intrusion upon the prerogatives and functions of a coordinate branch of government. Contra Pellegrino v. O'Neill, supra, 193 Conn. 678 (court lacks power to direct legislature to appoint additional judges); Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 9, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996) (court lacks power to compel legislature to define terms of state constitutional spending cap). In Pellegrino, this court scoured the complaint for a remedy that would not require legislative action but found no allegation that "even suggests that existing judicial resources have not been properly allocated."

" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 16-17, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996) (Berdon, J, concurring). To avoid unnecessary interference in the functioning of a co-equal branch of government, courts avoid opining on constitutional issues prior to the development of a full factual record.

" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 16-17, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996) ( Berdon, J., concurring). To avoid unnecessary interference in the functioning of a co-equal branch of government, courts avoid opining on constitutional issues prior to the development of a full factual record.

First, the defendants argued that intervening circumstances have rendered the plaintiff's action moot. Second, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's action involves a political question not susceptible to judicial redress without violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Due to the late timing of the oral motion to dismiss, the court asked the defendants why they waited seven and one half years before they raised the political question doctrine as a ground for dismissal. The defendants responded that they only became aware of the political question quandary after the publication of Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996). The defendants also stated that the perceived lateness of their motion to dismiss was irrelevant.

The basic elements of standing are injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-53 n. 19 (1984); Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 6-7 (1996). Under Connecticut law, a plaintiff generally does not have standing to sue a defendant in its own name if it is merely an agent and not an assignee.

Although the claim she presented was not identical to the one raised in Melahn , the defendant alleged that the servicer made erroneous written and oral representations that justified the court's exercise of jurisdiction to consider those equitable claims of accident or mistake, which, if meritorious, could have afforded the practical relief sought. See State v. Jerzy G. , 326 Conn. 206, 221, 162 A.3d 692 (2017) ("[i]t is a settled principle under both federal and Connecticut case law that, if a favorable decision necessarily could not afford the practical relief sought, the case is moot" (emphasis added)); Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc. , 263 Conn. 616, 626, 822 A.2d 196 (2003) ("[i]n deciding whether the plaintiff's complaint presents a justiciable claim, we make no determination regarding its merits"); see also Nielsen v. State , 236 Conn. 1, 6, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996). We therefore conclude that the claim raised in the defendant's motion to open was not moot but, rather, was a recognizable claim in equity and that, as a result, the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the defendant's appeal.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 6-7, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996). "In deciding whether the plaintiff's complaint presents a justiciable claim, we make no determination regarding its merits.