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Nielsen v. Moore

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department
Sep 27, 1988
143 A.D.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)

Opinion

September 27, 1988

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Yates County, Dugan, J.

Present — Callahan, J.P., Denman, Boomer, Balio and Davis, JJ.


Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: As she was leaving a park owned by the Village of Penn Yan and crossing a State highway, the infant plaintiff was struck by a car. In this personal injury action, the court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claim against the village. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the village established that Route 54A is a State highway over which the village has no control. It argued that it thus had no duty to pedestrians crossing the highway. In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs contended that the village was liable for failing to provide a crosswalk, post warning signs, install signal lights, or reduce the speed limit at the site of the accident, and for failing to assign crossing guards or other supervisory personnel at the park. There is no basis for imposing liability on the village on any of those theories.

The Vehicle and Traffic Law explicitly prohibits local authorities from placing traffic-control devices at any location on a State highway for the regulation of traffic, including vehicles, bicycles, or pedestrians, traveling along or across such highway (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 152, 1684; see also, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 [a] [1], [3], [8], [11]; §§ 1641, 1643 [villages]). The term "traffic-control devices" includes all signs, signals, and markings (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 153). Given its lack of control over the highway, the village cannot be liable for failing to provide traffic-control devices (see, Ossmer v Bates, 97 A.D.2d 871, 872). Nor can it be liable for failing to deploy crossing guards or other supervisory personnel at its parks. The decision not to post crossing guards is within the municipality's discretionary authority to allocate its police resources (Florence v Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 197-198). The cases relied upon by plaintiffs which establish a municipality's duty to protect juvenile users of its parks from off-premises dangers (see, Scurti v City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 437-439, 443-446 [Breitel, Ch. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part]; Leone v City of Utica, 66 A.D.2d 463, affd for reasons stated 49 N.Y.2d 811; Lukasiewicz v City of Buffalo, 55 A.D.2d 848, lv denied 41 N.Y.2d 803) are not applicable as plaintiffs specifically disclaimed reliance on the theory that the village could be liable for failing to fence off the park from Route 54A.


Summaries of

Nielsen v. Moore

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department
Sep 27, 1988
143 A.D.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
Case details for

Nielsen v. Moore

Case Details

Full title:ROBERT H. NIELSEN et al., Individually and as Legal Guardians of Jennifer…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department

Date published: Sep 27, 1988

Citations

143 A.D.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)

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