West v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 142 Ga. App. 877, 879 (2) ( 237 S.E.2d 239). 3. Citing Nickerson v. Candler Building, 156 Ga. App. 396, 399 (5) ( 274 S.E.2d 582), defendant Primo's, Inc. contends the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff was entitled to recover rent which accrued between the time the complaint was filed and the partial summary judgment order was entered. This contention is without merit.
See Douglas Lomason Co. v. Hall, supra at 477 (1). See also Pope v. Read, 152 Ga. 799 (2) ( 111 S.E. 382) (1922); McLaughlin v. Maund, 55 Ga. 689 (1876); Brackett v. Cartwright, 231 Ga. App. 536, 538 (1), fn. 1 ( 499 S.E.2d 905) (1998); Nickerson v. Candler Building, 156 Ga. App. 396, 399 (5) ( 274 S.E.2d 582) (1980); Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 103 Ga. App. 225 (3) ( 119 S.E.2d 63) (1961). The commissions agreement is, therefore, a divisible installment contract.
Thus, the judgment in Case 2 cannot be res judicata as to liabilities arising after that judgment. Puett v. McCannon, 183 Ga. App. 152 (2) ( 358 S.E.2d 300) (1987); Lowenberg v. Ford Assoc., 165 Ga. App. 753 ( 302 S.E.2d 433) (1983); Nickerson v. Candler Building, 156 Ga. App. 396 (5) ( 274 S.E.2d 582) (1980). See Henderson v. Glen Oak, Inc., 256 Ga. 619 ( 351 S.E.2d 640) (1987).
See Price v. Age, Ltd., 194 Ga.App. 141, 144–145(3), 390 S.E.2d 242 (1990). Compare Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga.App. 396, 399–400(5), 274 S.E.2d 582 (1980) (concluding that default judgment for unpaid rent was properly limited to payments that were overdue at the time suit was filed). At the bench trial, JW introduced documentary evidence detailing the total amount of unpaid rent that had accrued up through July 2010, and JW's principal similarly testified that JW was seeking unpaid rent that had accrued into the summer of 2010. It was not until closing argument that Pizing's objected and raised for the first time the issue of whether JW could seek rent that had become overdue after the filing of the complaint.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga. App. 396, 399 ( 274 S.E.2d 582) (1980). "Each installment under a contract constitutes a different cause of action on which an action can be brought, even though all are provided for in the same contract."
However, "the applicability of the language in Martin to present day practice has been modified by enactment of the Civil Practice Act to the extent that a recovery of installments falling due after suit has been commenced may be sought by the filing of supplemental pleadings under [OCGA § 9-11-15 (d)]. . . ." Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga. App. 396, 399 (5) ( 274 S.E.2d 582) (1980). As noted in Martin, supra at 247, such supplemental pleadings are allowable upon motion and at the discretion of the trial court.
Accordingly, we find this enumeration of error to be without merit. Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga. App. 396, 400 ( 274 S.E.2d 582) (1980). Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P.J., and Blackburn, J., concur.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga. App. 396, 399-400 ( 274 S.E.2d 582) (1980). In order to recover rents that become due after commencement of an action seeking rents that are already past due, a plaintiff must amend his original complaint under OCGA § 9-11-15 (a), supplement his pleadings under OCGA § 9-11-15 (d), or try the additional issues with the express or implied consent of the other party in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-15 (b).
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in entering a judgment which included an award of rent and other charges which accrued in the interim between the date of the original complaint and the First Amendment to the dispossessory action. Appellant contends that such claims could only be asserted via supplemental pleading pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-15 (d) under the authority of Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga. App. 396 (5) ( 274 S.E.2d 582) (1980). This court in Nickerson held that "`"[e]ach installment under a contract [for rent] constitutes a different cause of action.
Thus, the appellants' motion for directed verdict was properly denied under the circumstances, regardless of whether the acceleration clause was enforceable. Compare Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga. App. 396 ( 274 S.E.2d 582) (5) (1980) (holding that a default judgment for unpaid rent was properly limited to payments which were past-due at time suit was filed). 2.