Nickels v. Hallen

7 Citing cases

  1. Toman v. Checker Cab Co.

    10 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. 1943)   Cited 3 times

    The trial court plainly charged the jury there was no proof of permanent injury, but there was still left the question of future pain and suffering, for consideration by the jury. Mr. Justice SHARPE would also reverse because the trial court did not instruct the jury as to present worth of future pain and suffering, citing Nickels v. Hallen, 247 Mich. 291. In that case, the trial court charged the jury that the rule for determining the present worth of prospective damages was as follows: To take the sum found by the jury, multiply that sum by 1.05 to find the present worth for one year, by 1.10 for two years, by 1.15 for three years, and so on. Mr. Justice WIEST properly wrote this was an obvious error and mistake because present worth for future damages is determined by reducing the original sum annually during lifetime, not by increasing it.

  2. Duncan v. Strating

    99 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. 1959)   Cited 4 times

    That his automobile came in contact with plaintiff is not open to question. In Nickels v. Hallen, 247 Mich. 291, 295, this Court held that an instruction to the jury that "it was the duty of the defendant to have his automobile under such control as to be able to stop the same immediately, if necessary, and therefore avoid coming into collision with the plaintiff" was erroneous. In Corpron v. Skiprick, 334 Mich. 311, counsel for plaintiff requested the trial judge to charge the jury that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law because he was driving at such a rate of speed that he was not able to stop within the assured clear distance ahead and failed to see the plaintiff prior to the impact.

  3. Corpron v. Skiprick

    334 Mich. 311 (Mich. 1952)   Cited 6 times
    In Corpron v. Skiprick, 334 Mich. 311, counsel for plaintiff requested the trial judge to charge the jury that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law because he was driving at such a rate of speed that he was not able to stop within the assured clear distance ahead and failed to see the plaintiff prior to the impact.

    However, defendant was not an insurer against accidents. It may not be said that the duty rested on the defendant as a matter of law to avoid a collision with plaintiff regardless of circumstances. Nickels v. Hallen, 247 Mich. 291, 295. The request seems to have rested on the claim of plaintiff, as made in his testimony on the trial, that he was standing on the highway immediately in front of defendant's automobile as the latter approached him and that he did not, for the reason given by him, undertake to move from his position.

  4. Alley v. Klotz

    31 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 1948)   Cited 18 times

    Such charge however did not, as claimed, make defendants insurers of plaintiff's safety. It is not comparable to the charge found objectionable in Nickels v. Hallen, 247 Mich. 291, on which defendants rely. Other requests submitted by counsel for plaintiff, and included in the charge, do not require specific discussion.

  5. Morrison v. Grass

    22 N.W.2d 82 (Mich. 1946)   Cited 10 times

    "`There is no rule of law requiring a pedestrian to rivet his eyes on an approaching automobile. He should look but if, having looked, it appears safe to cross, he may proceed, and his care is not to be determined solely by the fact he was struck and was not at that second looking at the automobile.' "In the case of Nickels v. Hallen, 247 Mich. 291, the plaintiff was crossing Main street at an intersection in the nighttime and was struck by defendant's automobile. The court said:

  6. Moore v. Noorthoek

    273 N.W. 758 (Mich. 1937)   Cited 13 times
    In Moore v. Noorthoek, supra, we held in regard to contributory negligence that it did become a jury question as to whether an ordinarily prudent man would not have a right to assume that a driver of a car would observe the laws in regard to speed in a business district and particularly under the other circumstances presented.

    "There is no rule of law requiring a pedestrian to rivet his eyes on an approaching automobile. He should look but if, having looked, it appears safe to cross, he may proceed, and his care is not to be determined solely by the fact he was struck and was not at that second looking at the automobile." In the case of Nickels v. Hallen, 247 Mich. 291, the plaintiff was crossing Main street at an intersection in the night time and was struck by defendant's automobile. The court said:

  7. Palchi v. Robbins

    262 N.W. 381 (Mich. 1935)   Cited 6 times

    Court Rule No. 38, ยง 1 (1933). If the plaintiffs were, in legal effect, parties to the action brought by the receiver, its discontinuance would not bar their right to recover in this action. Shank v. Woodworth, 111 Mich. 642; Power v. Brigham, 237 Mich. 172; Nickels v. Hallen, 247 Mich. 291. Counsel also rely upon a provision in one of the orders made in the stockholders' liability suit in which the individual creditors were enjoined from bringing suits against the stockholders to enforce their rights.