Nickell v. Commonwealth

6 Citing cases

  1. Thompson v. Louisville

    362 U.S. 199 (1960)   Cited 664 times
    Holding that it is "a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt"

    See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451. Moreover, Kentucky law itself seems to provide that if a man wrongfully arrested fails to object to the arresting officer, he waives any right to complain later that the arrest was unlawful. Nickell v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 495, 496. Thus we find no evidence whatever in the record to support these convictions.

  2. United States v. Clemmons

    390 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1968)   Cited 4 times
    In United States v. Clemmons, 390 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1968), the Tennessee arresting officer, although having probable cause to believe the suspects had committed a felony, told them that they were arrested for "investigation".

    "[U]pon fresh pursuit afterwards, notice is not necessary; because * * he must be supposed to know the cause of his arrest." See also Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S.W. 94 (1921); State v. Parker, 81 Tenn. 221 (1884); Nickell v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1955); People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 240 N.Y.S.2d 721, 191 N.E.2d 263, remittitur amended, 13 N.Y.2d 726, 241 N.Y.S.2d 856, 191 N.E.2d 910 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 916, 84 S.Ct. 671, 11 L.Ed.2d 612 (1964). Affirmed.

  3. United States v. Baxter

    361 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1966)   Cited 23 times
    In United States v. Baxter, 6 Cir., 361 F.2d 116, 119, cert. denied, Baxter v. United States, 385 U.S. 834, 87 S.Ct. 79, 17 L.Ed.2d 69, the court pointed out that cases must be distinguished involving circumstances 'where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought,' citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543.

    Under all of the circumstances of this case, the defendant obviously knew what the occasion for the "detention" was. Kentucky holds that the police statement need not be made when the party arrested obviously knows the answer. Dale v. Commonwealth, 186 Ky. 510, 217 S.W. 363 (1920); Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 190, 130 S.W.2d 31 (1939); Nickell v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1955); United States v. McGavic, 337 F.2d 317, 321 (C.A.6, 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 933, 85 S.Ct. 940, 13 L.Ed.2d 821 (1965). Further, the testimony indicates that within minutes (and at the time he was formally arrested), Reimer told him that he was being arrested for violation of the Internal Revenue laws.

  4. State v. Frink

    255 Iowa 59 (Iowa 1963)   Cited 28 times
    In State v. Frink, supra, 255 Iowa 59, 66, 120 N.W.2d 432, we said: "It is the general rule that the giving of an instruction which is abstract, or not authorized by the pleadings and evidence, is harmless error where no prejudice results to the accused."

    These provisions must, of course, be construed as requiring only substantial compliance, and do not require strict compliance where it is impractical or futile as where the person about to be arrested knows of the officer's intention and purpose or when the officer has no reasonable opportunity to inform him. See Nickell v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Ky.); State v. Phillips, supra, 118 Iowa 660, 683, 92 N.W. 876. In 6 C.J.S., Arrest, section 6(e), it is stated, "An officer must, ordinarily, make known to the person he seeks to arrest without a warrant his authority, and the object and cause of the arrest * * * although circumstances surrounding the arrest may, in a proper case, dispense with one or more of these requirements.

  5. Hayes v. Commonwealth

    458 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 6 times

    In these circumstances the arrest was valid because the arresting officers were acting in an emergency and had no opportunity to inform appellant of their intentions to arrest him for the offense of carrying a concealed deadly weapon. While KRS 431.025(1) (formerly Criminal Code of Practice, Section 39) provides that "[t]he person making an arrest shall inform the person about to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, and of the offense for which he is being arrested," nevertheless, this provision of the statute has been construed by this court as requiring only a substantial compliance, and not requiring its strict observance, where it is impractical or futile or where the officer has no reasonable opportunity to comply with it. Nickell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 495; Arthurs v. Johnson, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 504; Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 190, 130 S.W.2d 31, and Dale v. Commonwealth, 186 Ky. 510, 217 S.W. 363. We are of the opinion that appellant's arrest was fully warranted since the imprint of the concealed pistol furnished the arresting officers knowledge that appellant was committing a criminal offense in their presence.

  6. Hopkins v. Commonwealth

    301 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957)   Cited 2 times

    Reference is made to Goins v. Hudson, 246 Ky. 517, 55 S.W.2d 388; and Sizemore v. Hoskins, 314 Ky. 436, 235 S.W.2d 1011, for a proper form of instruction on the right of a peace officer in good faith to arrest one for being publicly drunk in his presence. As a predicate to the defendant's guilt of escape being dependent upon a legal or authorized arrest, the instruction may be patterned after one where the issue of legality of the search of the person was dependent upon a lawful arrest, as for public drunkenness, Nickell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 495, or legality of a search of an automobile was dependent upon a violation of a traffic law. See Barnes v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 481, 204 S.W.2d 801; Gossett v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 729, 215 S.W.2d 279; Instructions to Juries, Stanley (2d ed.), ยง 917a.