The only purpose and effect of a superseded or stayed judgment is to prevent execution or other proceedings to enforce that decision. Hutchings v. Winsor, 92 Okla. 37, 217 P. 1044, 1045 [1923]; Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567, 569 [1928]. "Supersedeas" is different from "stay"; the former denotes a suspension of a judgment's effectiveness pursuant to an undertaking as a matter of statutory right, whereas the latter means suspension of effectiveness by a discretionary act of a trial or appellate court. Wilks v. Wilks, Okla., 632 P.2d 759, 763, n. 12 [1981].

In its order denying Carlile's motion to set "supersedeas bond" this court held that: (1) Cotton may not be compelled to suspend the effectiveness of the cancellation decree under review. State ex rel. Mose v. District Court of Marshall County, 46 Okla. 654, 149 P. 240 [1915]; McClain v. Starr, 50 Okla. 738, 150 P. 666 [1915] and Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567 [1928], (2) the trial court's decree is not subject to supersedeas, 12 O.S. 1981 § 968[ 12-968] and Wilks v. Wilks, Okla., 632 P.2d 759 [1981], and (3) Carlile is free to invoke judicial process for carrying the trial court's decree into effect and to avail itself of the remedies prescribed by law for the enforcement and satisfaction of its judgment. I

85 O.S. 1981 §§ 41[ 85-41] and 42 [ 85-42]; Excise Board of Grady County v. Griggs, 192 Okla. 636, 138 P.2d 829 [1943] and Dooley v. Broce Const. Co., Okla., 358 P.2d 815 [1961].Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567 [1928] and In re Rettenmeyer's Estate, Okla., 345 P.2d 872 [1959]. The mandatory bond provision in § 3.6 clearly offends Art. 5 § 46, Okla. Const. It is indeed "special law" that alters the method for the enforcement of judgments for but a single class of adjudicated obligations.

An appeal to review a district court decision may be prosecuted in this court without posting an undertaking. Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567 and In re Rettenmeyer's Estate, Okla., 345 P.2d 872. The appellant's petition-in-error was timely to tender for review the November 23, 1981 summary judgment, and the appeal may proceed for corrective relief from that decision only.

State v. Wright, 193 Okla. 383, 143 P.2d 801; Wilder v. State, Okla., 310 P.2d 765. But where there is no willful default and no attempt to evade justice, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to set aside the bond forfeiture. Mahaney v. State, 106 Okla. 152, 233 P. 725; Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567. This case was originally set for trial on the jury docket in the District Court of Kay County on November 12, 1962.

Defendant calls our attention to several cases, with none of which do we disagree, tending to support the principle that an application by sureties on a bail bond to discharge or vacate an order of forfeiture of that bail bond is addressed to and invokes the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. See Mahaney et al. v. State, 106 Okla. 152, 233 P. 725, and Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567. Our attention is also directed to 22 O.S. 1961, Sec. 1108 [ 22-1108], supra, which provides in substance: "If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant neglects to appear according to the terms * * * of the * * * bond * * * (the same) shall be thereupon declared forfeited. But, if at any time before the final adjournment of court the defendant or his bail appear and satisfactorily excuse his neglect, the court may direct the forfeiture to be discharged * * *.

This court has on numerous occasions recognized the broad judicial discretion of lower courts to set aside appearance bond forfeitures, but no decision of this court has come to our attention in which we approved the vacation when there was present a wilful intent or design to avoid appearance. In Mahaney v. State, 106 Okla. 152, 233 P. 725, 726; State v. Wright, 193 Okla. 383, 143 P.2d 801, 804, 805; Wilder v. State, Okla., 310 P.2d 765, 767; and Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567, 568, we recognized the desirability of giving bail and the encouragement afforded vigilant and thrifty bondsmen. However, these cases base or condition our approval or direction of vacation of bond forfeitures, under the various circumstances presented in each case, upon the proposition that defendant's absence was without wilful intent or design.

We are of the opinion that a judgment for $150 is sufficient and proper in the case at bar. See the Hicks case, supra; Abrams v. Commonwealth, 254 Ky. 68, 70 S.W.2d 983; Nicholson v. State, 13, Okla. 298, 270 P. 567. With the indicated modification the judgment is affirmed.

This court has held no supersedeas bond is necessary in order to appeal from the district courts of this state to the Supreme Court. Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567; Cameron v. White, 128 Okla. 251, 262 P. 664. Judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

"It is the manifest intention of the statute to encourage the giving of bail bond in a proper case, and encouragement should be afforded vigilant and thrifty bondsmen in assisting in the administration of the law's penalties, and in proceedings for relief from an order forfeiting bail bond the court has a wide latitude for the exercise of its judgment." In the case of Nicholson v. State, 132 Okla. 298, 270 P. 567, 568, the defendant apparently was not aware of the date and hour of his trial, but later in the day did appear in court. The order of the trial court denying a motion to vacate the forfeiture on his appearance bond was reversed with the following statement: