Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-03116-RBH-KDW
08-12-2020
Ryan Patrick Nicholson, Plaintiff, v. R.C. Rhyne, T.R.P.; Pageland Police Department; Chesterfield County Sheriff's Department; and South Carolina Highway Patrol, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs, appearing pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Defendants violated his Constitutional rights during the course of a traffic stop. ECF No. 1. Defendant Pageland Police Department ("PPD") filed an Answer to the Complaint on March 11, 2020. ECF No. 30. This matter is before the court on the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 29, filed the same day by Defendant Chesterfield County Sheriff's Department ("CCSD"), represented by the same counsel as PPD. This matter is also before the court on Defendant R.C. Rhyne (also referenced as "Defendant Rhyne" herein) and the South Carolina Highway Patrol's ("SCHP") Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36, filed on March 16, 2020. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) the court advised Plaintiff, on March 13, 2020, and March 17, 2020, of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' Motions. ECF Nos. 32, 38. Plaintiff filed several Responses to the Motions, see ECF Nos. 44, 45, 55, 56, and Defendant CCSD filed a Reply on April 16, 2020, ECF No. 46. Therefore, this matter is now ripe for review. This case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) and (f), D.S.C. Because these Motions are dispositive, a Report and Recommendation is entered for the court's review. The undersigned recommends granting Defendant CCSD's Motions to Dismiss, ECF No. 29, and granting Defendants R.C. Rhyne and the SCHP's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36.
I. Background
In his Complaint, Plaintiff maintains he is bringing causes of action for assault, battery, kidnapping and unlawful search and seizure in connection with a September 7, 2019 traffic stop. ECF No. 1 at 6; 1-2 at 14. Specifically, Plaintiff represents that on September 7, 2019, officers pulled his vehicle over although he did not commit a crime. ECF No. 1-2 at 14. Plaintiff contends he informed the officers he did not have a driver's license in his possession and the officers asked him to step out of the vehicle. Id. Plaintiff alleges that after he stepped out, the officers told him that they would be performing a field sobriety test. Id. Plaintiff claims he asked the officers if he could go home if he passed the test, but the officers said "no." Id. Further, Plaintiff alleges officers informed him he would also have to take a breathalyzer test when the state troopers arrived. Id.
He also maintains he is asserting causes of action for abduction, trespass, and suppressing evidence for decree by a jury. ECF No. 1-2 at 1.
At this point, Plaintiff maintains that he told the officers he would wait in his vehicle until the state trooper arrived, and he "would consider" taking the tests. Id. Plaintiff indicates he returned to his truck and sat down and a few seconds later the officers pulled him out of his vehicle. Id. Plaintiff claims the officers "jerked [his] door open, pulled [him] out, hit [him], and [he] fell to the ground motionless [while] they continued hitting [him] for some time then they dragged [him] across the highway on the ground. Id. Plaintiff states at this time officers placed him under arrest and locked him in the patrol car. Id.
Plaintiff claims the state trooper arrived and asked him to take a test and "wanted [him] to hold [his] legs together tightly which was very uncomfortable and hurt due to the fact [that] they had dragged [his] knees across the asphalt." ECF No. 1-2 at 14. Plaintiff represents he was placed under arrest again and taken in for further testing. Id. at 15. Plaintiff maintains he was in shock, confused, and suffering from brain injuries after being placed under arrest. Id. Further, he alleges he requested a lawyer three times while he was waiting to take a breathalyzer. Id. Plaintiff alleges the breathalyzer tested ".00, then [the officer] injected some liquid into the machine[,] and it tested .08 on its own." Id.
Thereafter, Plaintiff maintains he requested further testing of his blood, and the officer took him to the emergency room. Id. Plaintiff represents that while at the ER his injuries were not treated, and he was told "that would be at my own request and financial responsibility." Id. Plaintiff alleges that he heard an officer tell a hospital employee to "work their magic," and that he heard an officer tell someone he was speaking with on his cellphone that "he blew a .12." Id. Plaintiff claims that during this time frame he was unable to make proper decisions because of his head injury. Id.
Plaintiff does not name any individual officers in his Complaint, except Defendant Rhyne, whose name appears on the ticket issued to Plaintiff for driving under the influence. ECF No. 1-6. Further, as outlined in detail below, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Rhyne ultimately took Plaintiff into custody or "assumed responsibility" of him. ECF No. 1-5 at 5-6. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages of $7 million in the form of restitution and sanctions. ECF No. 1-2 at 9.
II. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This Court is "not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, "[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support [the legal conclusion]." Young v. City of Mount Rainier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). If matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, are considered by the court in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, then the motion to dismiss converts to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wilson-Cook Med., Inc. v. Wilson, 942 F.2d. 247, 251 (4th Cir. 1991).
While the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See Gore v. Thompson, No. C.A. 0:08-01850-RBH, 2009 WL 2972935, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2009); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
A. Defendant CCSD's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 29
Defendant CCSD argues this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit against it. ECF No. 29. It maintains Plaintiff's Complaint outlines various allegations against several Defendants, including CCSD "as a collective agency." Id. at 2. This Defendant argues that the claims against it should be dismissed because of Defendant CCSD's immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Id. Specifically, Defendant CCSD represented that in South Carolina any suit against a Sheriff's Department is a suit against the state of South Carolina for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 4. In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant CCSD has failed to demonstrate by contract or affidavit that it is a state agency. ECF No. 55 at 4.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). A state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to him because "he is not defined as a 'Citizen' of another State, nor a Citizen of any Foreign State, nor a 'citizen' nor 'subject' nor a 'person' but rather one of 'We the people', (creators) of the United States of America as a birthright left to posterity." ECF No. 55 at 2.
Defendant CCSO is not subject to suit under § 1983. In South Carolina, a sheriff's department is an agency of the state, not a department under the control of the county. Carroll v. Greenville Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 871 F.Supp. 844, 846 (D.S.C. 1994) (finding suit against the sheriff's office is suit against the state). As an agency of the state, CCSO is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Stewart v. Beaufort Cnty., 481 F. Supp. 2d. 483, 492 (D.S.C. 2007) ("[A] federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear a cause of action against a South Carolina Sheriff's Department, as such a suit is barred by state immunity."). The Eleventh Amendment divests this court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts, such as a state agency or department. See, e.g., Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Therefore, Defendant CCSO should be dismissed as a Defendant in this case based on Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (neither the state nor its agencies is a "person" within § 1983); Strickland v. Spartanburg Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 7-19-CV-00326-MGL-KFM, 2019 WL 5748583, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 7:19-00326-MGL, 2019 WL 5721661 (D.S.C. Nov. 4, 2019) (holding Defendant Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office is not a "person" as defined by § 1983, thus, it is entitled to summary dismissal).
B. Defendant R.C. Rhyne, T.R.P. and the South Carolina Highway Patrol's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36
1. Failure to State a Claim against Defendant Rhyne
Defendant Rhyne argues that Plaintiff failed to state a personal claim against him. ECF No. 36-1 at 1. Defendant Rhyne maintains that Plaintiff does not allege that Rhyne was involved in the alleged physical assault against Plaintiff. See id. Rather, according to Rhyne, Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant Rhyne "assumed responsibility" after the initial arrest. Id. at 1-2. This Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff alleges Rhyne "abducted" him but argues the alleged abduction occurred after the other officers allegedly violated his rights. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Rhyne is personally and publicly liable for crimes as alleged. ECF No. 56 at 2. Further, Plaintiff represents that the SCHP is hiding Defendant Rhyne's true identity, including names and contact information of all officers, troopers, and/or deputies involved in the incident. Id. at 3. Plaintiff argues that "[a]ssuming the responsibility of a detained man held captive against his will, continuing to keep him captive against his will and transporting him is called kidnapping." Id.
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff must only plead "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). In order for Plaintiff's Complaint to survive Defendant Rhyne's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff does not need to plead detailed factual allegations in his Complaint. See id. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's grounds for relief require more than just stating legal conclusions and elements of a cause of action. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (noting that, on a motion to dismiss, a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."). Plaintiff's complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that make a claim for relief plausible, not just possible. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. This court must accept Plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).
The Bell Atl. Corp. Court noted that defendants will not know how to respond to conclusory allegations, especially when "the pleadings mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies." 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. However, Bell Atl. Corp did not expressly hold that a Plaintiff must assert specific time, place, and persons involved in order to comply with Rule 8. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal Bell Atl. Corp citation omitted) ("As the Court held in Bell Atl. Corp, [] the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."); Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 325 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding the Bell Atl. Corp court noted, in dicta, that the pleadings there mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies and rejected defendants' argument that Bell Atl. Corp requires a plaintiff identify the specific time, place, or person related to each conspiracy allegation); Milliken & Co. v. CNA Holdings, Inc., 3:08-CV-578-RV, 2011 WL 3444013, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2011) (finding other courts have held a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss even though he fails to answer who, what, when and where).
Turning to the specific allegations contained in the Complaint, after Plaintiff identifies Defendant R.C. Rhyne and indicates he is a state trooper, see ECF No. 1-3 at 2, he mentions this Defendant by name and indicates he reserves the right to press criminal charges against Defendant Rhyne, see ECF No. 1-4 at 9. Additionally, Plaintiff indicates that Defendant Rhyne issued the written citation to him, which he marked as Exhibit 8 to his Complaint. Id. at 10; ECF No. 1-6. Without identifying specific actions of Defendant Rhyne, Plaintiff represents that he does not remember the faces of specific individuals "that participated in the violation against [him] except [Defendant] RC Rhyne TRP." ECF No. 1-5 at 5. Plaintiff then indicates:
RC RHYNE and THE SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL were personally involved in the wrongful actions as abductors who assumed responsibility for my abduction and beating when taking custody from the officers of the other departments who according to him were conducting a joint venture with the courtesy traffic stop. RC RHYNE TRP assumed liability for me through
my abduction by him. He has not made any report or account of the names or standing of the officers involved in the violations against me.Id. Plaintiff alleges: "They (other officers) beat [him] for a while then dragged [him] across the road and crammed [him] into the back of a car. [He] was held there for some time until RC Rhyne TRP abducted [him]." Id. at 6. Further, Plaintiff alleges "the only officer named was the only officer who reported on paper thus far as being the representative for this action." Id. Additionally, Plaintiff explains: "RC RHYNE TRP was the only officer thus far to make notice of his involvement in the abduction and violations. RC RHYNE is the officer who assumed responsibility." Id. Plaintiff alleges that the other officers' identities are being protected by their respective departments and for all these reasons "RC Rhyne TRP in his position as the officer who assumed custody in the violations against myself are named Respondent (sic)." Id.
At this time, the undersigned notes that Defendant Pageland Police Department is still an active party to this action who has not filed a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff, through discovery, may be able to determine identities of officers he alleged assaulted him.
It appears Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant Rhyne came to the scene after he was allegedly assaulted and arrested by other officers, and assumed custody of Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rhyne's role, in taking him into custody, amounts to an abduction. Thus, the question before the court is whether Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts under Rule 8 to allege a viable § 1983 cause of action against Defendant Rhyne.
To state a claim under § 1983, "a plaintiff must aver that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a constitutional right or a right conferred by a law of the United States." Wahi v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009); see Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 382-83 (2012); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 823 (2011); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997). The phrase "under color of state law" is an element that "is synonymous with the more familiar state-action requirement—and the analysis for each is identical." Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (referencing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982)). Section 1983 also requires a showing of personal fault based upon a defendant's own conduct. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that for an individual defendant to be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally to deprive the plaintiff of his rights). Thus, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); see also Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff's claims are directed at officers collectively, and the undersigned finds Plaintiff's Complaint does not contain the particularity required under Rule 8 to survive a 12(b)(6) Motion concerning Defendant Rhyne. Plaintiff gives a detailed account of the facts leading up to his arrest and detainment without stating or naming particular officers or officer's conduct. Notably, it appears that Defendant Rhyne was not present for the majority of the encounter with Plaintiff at the scene, and Plaintiff failed to allege Defendant Rhyne took part in the decision to arrest him. Furthermore, there are no allegations from Plaintiff indicating that Defendant Rhyne used force of any kind against him. Even liberally construing the Complaint, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege that this Defendant arrested or assaulted him in violation of his constitutional rights. Moreover, the undersigned cannot discern a plausible South Carolina state claim against Defendant Rhyne under the facts as alleged. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that Defendant Rhyne's Motion to Dismiss him as a party in his individual capacity be granted.
Concerning Plaintiff's suit against Defendant Rhyne in his official capacity, the undersigned agrees that Plaintiff's allegations that this Defendant "assumed responsibility" of him, is a claim against Defendant Rhyne in his official capacity. Defendant Rhyne argues that Plaintiff is essentially suing him in his official capacity only based on Plaintiff's allegations and use of the phrase "assumed responsibility." ECF No. 36-1 at 2-3. He argues that Plaintiff's Complaint lacks specific allegations of his personal involvement in the facts giving rise to the alleged violations against Plaintiff, even liberally construing the Complaint. Id. at 2. The Supreme Court has held that States and its officials acting in their official capacities are not persons for purposes of damages actions brought under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("[N]either a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983."). The undersigned agrees that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Rhyne in his official capacity should also be dismissed.
2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity as to Defendants Rhyne and the South Carolina Highway Patrol
Defendants Rhyne and the SCHP argue they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because Plaintiff only makes allegations against Defendant Rhyne in his official capacity and Defendant SCHP is a state agency. ECF No. 36-1 at 3-5. As an arm of the State, Defendant Rhyne, in his official capacity, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's purported claims against Defendant Rhyne in his official capacity be dismissed. Additionally, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's claims against SCHP should be dismissed under Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
Defendant SCHP is the law enforcement division of the South Carolina Department of Public Safety ("the Department"), which is an administrative agency of the government of the State of South Carolina. See S.C. Code Ann. §23-6-20—100. The Department is comprised of the SCHP, a South Carolina State Police Division, and a Division of Training and Continuing Education. See id. SCHP, as a division of the Department, functions as an arm of state government and is an alter ego of the State of South Carolina. U.S. v. State of S.C., 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1100 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026, (1978) ("The state agencies, by the nature of their responsibilities, function as an arm or 'alter ego' of the State and are, therefore, protected by the State's immunity); see also Simmons v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 195 F. Supp. 516 (D.S.C. 1961). Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the Plaintiff's action herein against SCHP is, in reality, a suit against the State of South Carolina. Additionally, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Defendant SCHP is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant Rhyne and SCHP's Motion to Dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
3. Failure to State a Claim of Vicarious Liability
Finally, Defendant Rhyne argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of vicarious liability against him. ECF No. 36-1 at 5-6. Plaintiff argues that he did not commit a crime, nor did any officer have a warrant, so he (Plaintiff) was seized in violation of law and abducted by Defendant Rhyne. ECF No. 56 at 6. Further, Plaintiff maintains that kidnapping is also a Fifth Amendment violation that deprived him of his liberty and right to travel. Id.
The Fourth Circuit has stated: "A supervisor can only be held liable for the failings of a subordinate under certain narrow circumstances." Green v. Beck, 539 F. App'x 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). In particular, to state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed 'a pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show 'deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,'; and (3) that there was an 'affirmative causal link' between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff." Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014). In other words, the liability of supervisory officials "is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on 'a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care." Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff does not meet Rule 8 pleading requirement to survive a Motion to Dismiss concerning a purported § 1983 supervisory claim against Defendant Rhyne. First, Plaintiff acknowledges that all purported violations against him, with the exception of his continued detainment, occurred prior to Defendant Rhyne's arrival at the scene. Moreover, Plaintiff does not state facts that satisfy any of the Shaw factors outlined above. The facts Plaintiff alleges do not indicate this Defendant had personal involvement in the alleged violations outside of what has been discussed above—Plaintiff's continued detainment. Moreover, it appears, based on the plain language of his Complaint, that Defendant Rhyne was not a supervisor of any of the officers initially involved in the alleged initial unlawful detention, arrest, and excessive force used against Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet Rule 8 pleading requirements concerning a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant Rhyne's motion and dismissing this purported cause of action against him.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendant CCSD's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 29, be granted and that Defendant R.C. Rhyne and the SCHP's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36. also be granted.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. August 12, 2020
Florence, South Carolina
/s/
Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge