The law of the Virgin Islands recognizes that a "superficiary house" may be owned as personalty separate from the supporting land rather than as part of the realty. The owner of a superficiary house uses the land as a tenant or licensee for a term or at will, and enjoys the right to remove the house whenever his tenancy or permissive use of the land is terminated. Nicholson v. Altona Corp., 3d Cir. 1963, 320 F.2d 8, 10-11. Ordinarily, superficiary houses are small, easily movable wooden dwellings like the plaintiff's, and "[u]nder the law the element of removability of the dwelling house in question is a basic factor."
In re Deepwater Horizon , 785 F.3d at 989 ; Montez , 640 F.3d at 1129. Odyssey also relies on two of our decisions, Nicholson v. Altona Corp. , 320 F.2d 8, 12 (3d Cir. 1963), and Anderson v. White , 888 F.2d 985, 990–91 (3d Cir. 1989). Both are distinguishable, as neither involved a stipulation setting the process for resolving and ending the litigation.
See Farrar v. Nashville C. St. L. Ry., 162 Tenn. 313, 319, 36 S.W.2d 95, 97 (1931) citing 21 A.L.R. 1089 and 66 L.R.A. 42; Kenneally v. Standard Electronics Co., 364 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1966). A mobile home is the same thing recognized in some jurisdictions as a "superficiary house" removable and treated as personalty apart from real estate. Nicholson v. Altona Corp., 320 F.2d 8, 10 (3d Cir. 1963). Accordingly, mobile homes which are not permanently affixed to realty are determined to be tangible personal property within the meaning of 50 U.S.C. App. § 574 and are therefore exempt from local taxation.
These state law holdings are consistent with historic common law principles. Nicholson v. Altona Corp ., 320 F.2d 8, 10 (3rd Cir.1963). My review of the documentation entered into between Debtors and Defendant satisfies me that the parties intended the pole barn to be a trade fixture removable by the tenant at will.
And if such a building is not removed by the tenant at the expiration of his tenancy but is left standing on the land when the landlord re-enters it is to be regarded, in the absence of a contrary agreement, as the property of the landlord who, in that case, has no obligation to pay the former tenant its value.Nicholson v. Altona Corp., 320 F.2d 8, 10-11 (3d Cir. 1963) (footnotes omitted). Rutherford has not provided, nor have we found, any statutory provision in conflict with common law.