Nicholson v. Altona Corporation

5 Citing cases

  1. Myers v. Canton

    426 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1970)

    The law of the Virgin Islands recognizes that a "superficiary house" may be owned as personalty separate from the supporting land rather than as part of the realty. The owner of a superficiary house uses the land as a tenant or licensee for a term or at will, and enjoys the right to remove the house whenever his tenancy or permissive use of the land is terminated. Nicholson v. Altona Corp., 3d Cir. 1963, 320 F.2d 8, 10-11. Ordinarily, superficiary houses are small, easily movable wooden dwellings like the plaintiff's, and "[u]nder the law the element of removability of the dwelling house in question is a basic factor."

  2. L&L Painting Co. v. Odyssey Contracting Corp. (In re Odyssey Contracting Corp.)

    944 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2019)   Cited 7 times   2 Legal Analyses

    In re Deepwater Horizon , 785 F.3d at 989 ; Montez , 640 F.3d at 1129. Odyssey also relies on two of our decisions, Nicholson v. Altona Corp. , 320 F.2d 8, 12 (3d Cir. 1963), and Anderson v. White , 888 F.2d 985, 990–91 (3d Cir. 1989). Both are distinguishable, as neither involved a stipulation setting the process for resolving and ending the litigation.

  3. United States v. Shelby County, Tennessee

    385 F. Supp. 1187 (W.D. Tenn. 1974)   Cited 7 times

    See Farrar v. Nashville C. St. L. Ry., 162 Tenn. 313, 319, 36 S.W.2d 95, 97 (1931) citing 21 A.L.R. 1089 and 66 L.R.A. 42; Kenneally v. Standard Electronics Co., 364 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1966). A mobile home is the same thing recognized in some jurisdictions as a "superficiary house" removable and treated as personalty apart from real estate. Nicholson v. Altona Corp., 320 F.2d 8, 10 (3d Cir. 1963). Accordingly, mobile homes which are not permanently affixed to realty are determined to be tangible personal property within the meaning of 50 U.S.C. App. § 574 and are therefore exempt from local taxation.

  4. N. Cent. Pa. Reg'l Planning & Dev. Comm'n v. Eckert (In re Watson)

    555 B.R. 466 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2016)   Cited 1 times
    Noting that a tenant has the right to remove property that is a trade fixture "so long as it can be accomplished without material damage to the premises," and explaining that "'[t]his limitation is based upon the presumption that the parties would not have intended for the fixture to be removed if removal would materially damage the remaining estate.'"

    These state law holdings are consistent with historic common law principles. Nicholson v. Altona Corp ., 320 F.2d 8, 10 (3rd Cir.1963). My review of the documentation entered into between Debtors and Defendant satisfies me that the parties intended the pole barn to be a trade fixture removable by the tenant at will.

  5. Rutherford v. BNSF Railway Co.

    2009 N.D. 88 (N.D. 2009)   Cited 15 times
    Requiring a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability at the time the lease was entered

    And if such a building is not removed by the tenant at the expiration of his tenancy but is left standing on the land when the landlord re-enters it is to be regarded, in the absence of a contrary agreement, as the property of the landlord who, in that case, has no obligation to pay the former tenant its value.Nicholson v. Altona Corp., 320 F.2d 8, 10-11 (3d Cir. 1963) (footnotes omitted). Rutherford has not provided, nor have we found, any statutory provision in conflict with common law.