We find that the trial court clearly acted within its discretion in awarding the 15% interest rate, thereby recognizing that the plaintiff was entitled to the prevailing rate at the time the action was instituted. See, Nichols v. T.I.M.E. — D.C., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.Okla. 1973). In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the trial court's judgment is hereby REVERSED for failure to direct a verdict or grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the appellant Mitchell and AFFIRMED on the remaining issues.

Oklahoma law is in accord with this rule. First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Exchange National Bank and Trust Co., 517 P.2d 805 (Okl.App. 1973); Nichols v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.Okl. 1973). For the reasons stated, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Additionally, such rules foster settlement of meritorious claims and stand as an attempt to relieve congestion in the court system. It is noted that prejudgment interest has been held constitutional under Oklahoma law, Nichols v. T.I.M.E. — D.C., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.Okla. 1973), as measured against tenets of the due process clause of the federal constitution. In addition, such statutes have been upheld in other jurisdictions when measured against the due process clause and the equal protection clause.