In each of those cases, the court determined that a reasonable fee could be calculated by multiplying the firm's reasonable hourly rate by the amount of hours expended, and then tripling that amount. See, e.g., Enos, 2020 WL 6082127 at *3; Nichols v. Colvin, 2016 DNH 173 at 7-8; Beaulieu v. Colvin, No. 1:10-cv-454-GZS, 2016 WL 675646 at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 28, 2016), R. & R. adopted by 2016 WL 659685 (Feb. 18, 2016); Ezekiel, 853 F.Supp.2d at 181.
If the court were to award counsel the full $23,000 called for by the contingent fee agreement (at a de facto hourly rate in excess of $5,600), that would constitute compensation at an hourly rate that other courts in this circuit have thought to be a windfall. See, e.g., Nichols v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5374119, 2016 DNH 173 (D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2016); Enos v. Saul, 2020 WL 6082127, No. 19-10023-RGS (D. Mass. Oct. 15, 2020); Ezekiel, 853 F.Supp.2d at 179-80. See generally Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (“If the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is similarly in order.”)
" "Section 406(a) governs fees for representation before the Commissioner of Social Security, while § 406(b) . . . governs fees for representation before the court." Nichols v. Colvin, No. 14-382-LM, 2016 WL 5374119, at *3 n.2 (D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2016). I. BACKGROUND