But foreclosure is an equitable remedy in Florida, and Florida courts sitting in equity have "broad discretion in forming [their] decrees, in order to adapt the relief to the circumstances of particular cases." Nichols v. Bodenwein, 146 So. 86, 93 (Fla. 1932); see also id. ("[T]he power of a court of equity to grant relief is not circumscribed by any fact or technical rule. . . . The primary object of a decree is to reach the ends of justice, and equity procedure is usually elastic enough to accomplish this result."). Nero gives no legal support for his argument that his lack of a prayer for this specific relief should dictate whether his claim is precluded.
Even accepting defendants' testimony we must believe Mr. Ashby knew all about the contract, for Courrier said he talked with him about the news service for the radio station and Ashby did not state that he did not know about this contract for such news service for their proposed station. Under the whole record we conclude the contract was either directly or indirectly authorized or ratified by Ashby. Roberts Mfg. Co. v. Wright, supra; Rhodes v. Carter, 181 Ark. 370, 26 S.W.2d 63; Johnson v. Hulse, 83 Cal.App. 111, 256 P. 551; Frazier v. Southern Counties Gas Co., 66 Cal.App. 609, 226 P. 833; Nichols v. Bodenwein, 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 86; Vaughn v. Morris, Tex. Civ. App., 180 S.W. 954. [5] IV. There is no merit in the proposition urged by defendants that liability would not attach until the corporation was formed and it started broadcasting.
"Persons not speaking when interest commanded them to be silent cannot thereafter be heard to speak when equity and conscience require them to be quiet." Nichols v. Bodenwein, 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 86. See also Gray v. Gray, 91 Fla. 103, 107 So. 261. So it is that whether or not there was in fact a reconciliation between the parties at the time of the entry of the decree, supra, is a matter which neither may now question.
A court of equity has jurisdiction to render a personal decree for the payment of money, Billups v. Gilbert, 195 Ala. 518, 70 So.2d 145; and it has a broad discretion in forming decrees to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the particular case. Nichols v. Bodenwein, 107 Fla. 25, 146 So.2d 86. See also Burke v. Security Finance Co., 108 Fla. 570, 146 So.2d 669, 147 So.2d 270, where this Court approved entry of a money decree by a court of equity. The decree of the Chancellor below was proper in that it afforded complainant the only remedy available to it under the circumstances of this case, and the decree should be and is affirmed.
SeeDebaun v. State , 213 So. 3d 747, 751 (Fla. 2017). A "judgment" is a final adjudication of the merits of an action, seeMakar v. Invs. Real Est. Mgmt. , 553 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), and a "decree" is a judgment in an equitable action, seeNichols v. Bodenwein , 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 86, 93 (1932) ; see also Decree , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("The chief differences between decrees in equity and judgments at common law are as follows: The former are pronounced by courts of equity; the latter, by courts of law."). Giving the phrase "judgment or decree" its plain and ordinary meaning, section 83.48 requires an adjudication of the merits in favor of the party seeking fees.
Makar v. Inv'rs Real Estate Mgmt. , 553 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). A decree is a judgment in an equitable action. See Nichols v. Bodenwein , 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 86, 93 (1932). An order is a command, direction or instruction delivered by the trial court.
A decree is a judgment in an equitable action. See Nichols v. Bodenwein, 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 86, 93 (1932). An order is a command, direction or instruction delivered by the trial court.
Co. v. Laforet, 658 So.2d 55, 61-62 (Fla. 1995) (saying that the general rule is that a procedural or remedial statute is to operate retrospectively but refusing to apply the statute retrospectively where it is in substance a penalty); Arrow Air Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994) (noting that the statute was remedial and procedural but refusing to apply it retrospectively where vested rights would be affected); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 1994) ("Procedural or remedial statutes, on the other hand, are to be applied retrospectively and are to be applied to pending cases.").See e.g., Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So.2d 57, 59 (Fla. 1971) (saying that a type of statute that qualifies as a penal statute is contrasted to a remedial statute or rule of law authorizing an individual to recover for a private wrong); Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1969) (noting the old common law notion that a tort action was punitive rather than remedial); Nichols v. Bodenwein, 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 86, 92 (1933) ("the statute was neither remedial nor penal"); Cook v. J.I. Case Plow Works Co., 85 Fla. 421, 96 So. 292 (1923) ("The statute is neither remedial nor penal . . ."); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State, 73 Fla. 609, 74 So. 595 (1917) (noting that whether a statute is penal in the strict and primary sense, a test is whether the injury sought to be redressed affects the public; if redress is remedial to an individual and public is indirectly affected thereby, statute is not regarded as solely and strictly penal in nature) (quoting from State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 980 (1908)); see also DeBock v. State, 512 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1987) ("We note in passing that many remedial statutes, designed to benefit or protect the public, have `penal' aspects; this does not alter their basic purpose and transform them into penal measures."). All these variations on remedial rob the canon of any real interpretive weight.
; Thorpe v. McCaffrey, 157 A.D.2d 879, 549 N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. App. Div. 199 0) (Where non-resident member of joint venture clearly reached out to create continuing relationship and set of legal obligations with citizen of Virginia, minimum contacts requirements necessary for exercise of personal jurisdiction by Virginia court were met). See also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (Sufficient minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction exist where a defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state and thereby invokes the benefits and protections of the law of the forum state.). Furthermore, all members of a joint venture are bound by the actions of one of the members, provided that such member's actions relate to the joint venture and do not exceed the scope of his authority. Nichols v. Bodenwein, 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 86 (1932), reh'g den., 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 659 (1933); McKissick v. Bilger, 480 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Summers v. Hoffman, 69 N.W.2d 198 (Mich. 1955); Davidson v. State, 201 N.W.2d 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
In holding for appellees, the lower court relied primarily upon evidence disclosing that Williams — not a party to the appeal — represented to the law firm that he was speaking not only for himself, but also on behalf of the three appellants. The court, in finding the existence of a joint venture, relied upon Nichols v. Bodenwein, 107 Fla. 25, 146 So. 86 (1932), reh. den., 146 So. 659 (1933), holding that all joint adventurers are bound by the actions of one or more of the joint adventurers, provided that the contracting joint adventurer does not exceed the scope of his authority. See also Proctor v. Hearne, 100 Fla. 1180, 131 So. 173 (1930).