Opinion
No. 3-536 / 02-1759
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Peter A. Keller, Judge.
Joel Heaberlin appeals the district court decision which reformed a warranty deed. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
H. Patrick Myers of Myers Myers, Pleasantville, and David Brown and Aaron Oliver of Hansen, McClintock Riley, Des Moines, for appellant.
James Fowler of Wilson, Fowler Fusco, Indianola, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Joel Heaberlin appeals the district court decision which reformed a warranty deed. He claims the court abused its discretion in concluding Helen Niblo's request for admissions should be deemed admitted. He also claims Niblo failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a mutual mistake regarding the property to be included in the deed. We reverse and remand.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Heaberlin owned two properties in Pleasantville, Iowa. He owned a residence at 310 North Washington Street, and a duplex at 312-314 North Washington Street. For several years he rented out these properties, and the tenants parked in a gravel lot on the east side of the residence at 310 North Washington.
In October 1999 Heaberlin sold the residence at 310 North Washington to Niblo. The parties did not discuss property lines. Niblo stated that she assumed she was purchasing property which included the gravel lot and some property to the east beyond that. In approximately February 2000 Niblo received the abstract and realized her lot line on the east is actually about fifteen feet from the house. Despite the fact Niblo knew she did not own the property, she planted a garden and erected a fence in the area to the east of the gravel lot.
In February 2002 Heaberlin informed Niblo he was moving to 314 North Washington and he intended to build a garage in the location of the gravel lot. Niblo filed the present suit, seeking a reformation of the deed. She alleged that at the time the deed was created, the parties were mutually mistaken concerning the property included in the deed. In the alternative, she sought an implied easement for parking purposes.
At the trial Niblo testified that when she was looking at the house, she remarked there was plenty of room for a garden in the back, and Heaberlin said, "yeah." Heaberlin had no memory of this conversation. Niblo asserts Heaberlin's statement meant he was selling her the gravel lot and some property beyond. Niblo also testified that she complained to Heaberlin because she "didn't have no place to park sometimes" in the gravel lot, and subsequently Heaberlin's tenants quit parking there. Kenneth Murrow, a tenant at 314 North Washington, testified Heaberlin told him "Helen had bought the house and that he'd appreciate it if we didn't park back there any more." Niblo testified Heaberlin told her she could include the property in question within her fence.
Heaberlin testified he did not intend to sell Niblo any more property than that contained in her deed. Heaberlin's attorney pointed out that the abstract showed the deed to Niblo contained the same property as that contained in previous transfers of 310 North Washington. Heaberlin stated that on request, he showed Niblo her north property line, and that on her own she extended the fence farther east to include the gravel lot and garden. Additionally, Murrow testified he discussed purchasing 312-314 North Washington from Heaberlin, and Heaberlin told him the area where Niblo's garden was located was part of the property for 312-314 North Washington.
The district court determined that because Heaberlin did not respond in a timely fashion to Niblo's request for admissions, the admissions were deemed admitted. The court went on to find:
It is clear that upon entering into the agreement the parties agreed that more land than was actually conveyed was subject to sale. There is no other credible explanation offered for [Heaberlin's] responses to [Niblo's] statement about having enough room to plant a garden in the backyard, [Niblo's] inquiry as to boundary lines and where she could construct the fence and to [Niblo's] complaint about the parking spaces being used by [Heaberlin's] tenants.
The court noted that Heaberlin did not have a problem with Niblo's garden or fence until he wanted to use the property himself. The court concluded the parties' warranty deed should be reformed to include the property in question. Heaberlin appealed.
II. Standard of Review
Our review in this equitable proceeding is de novo. See Kufer v. Carson, 230 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Iowa 1975). We have a duty to examine the whole record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented. We give weight to the factual findings of the trial court, but are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g).
III. Admissions
Trial in this case was scheduled for September 11, 2002. Niblo served Heaberlin with her request for admissions on August 6, 2002. Heaberlin did not respond until September 10, 2002, more than thirty days after the request. Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(2), if a party does not respond within thirty days to a request for admissions, the matter is admitted.
Heaberlin contends the district court abused its discretion in deeming the admissions admitted in this case. The right to file late responses to a request for admissions rests in the court's discretion. Double D Land Cattle Co. v. Brown, 541 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). The court should consider (1) whether the presentation of the merits would be subserved by a late filing, and (2) whether the party who obtained or requested the admissions failed to satisfy the court that he would be prejudiced by a late filing. Allied Gas Chem. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Iowa 1983).
Heaberlin argues Niblo was not prejudiced by his late response to the request for admissions because all of the same requests had been asked during Heaberlin's deposition. At trial Niblo's attorney admitted the same information was available from Heaberlin's deposition. We conclude there was no showing Niblo was prejudiced. We also conclude consideration of the late responses would advance the presentation of the case on the merits. We determine the district court abused its discretion by not permitting Heaberlin's late response to the request for admissions.
IV. Reformation of the Deed
Heaberlin claims Niblo failed to present sufficient evidence to support reformation of the warranty deed. He asserts Niblo did not show there had been a mutual mistake concerning the land covered by the deed. He states he always knew the parameters of Niblo's land and that he never implied to Niblo that she owned the land in question. He argues that the fact he permitted Niblo to plant a garden or use the parking spaces does not show he thought Niblo owned the land. He claims these "neighborly acts of kindness" should not affect a change in ownership of the property.
Reformation may be appropriate to correct a mistake in a deed. Kendall v. Lowther, 356 N.W.2d 181, 187 (Iowa 1984). A party who seeks reformation, claiming an instrument does not reflect the real agreement between the parties, has the burden of establishing this contention by clear, satisfactory, and convincing proof. Kufer v. Carson, 230 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Iowa 1975). Requiring a high standard of proof helps ensure that a court granting reformation is merely changing the terms of a written document to reflect the agreement of the parties and not making a new agreement for them. Poulson v. Russell, 300 N.W.2d 289, 299 (Iowa 1981).
Reformation may be granted if a deed does not reflect the true intent of the parties, either because of fraud or duress, mutual mistake of fact, mistake of law, or mistake of one party and fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the other. See Wellman Savs. Bank v. Adams, 454 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Iowa 1990). The right to reform a document (1) lies within the discretion of the equity court, and (2) depends upon whether the remedy is "essential to the ends of justice." Sun Valley Lake Ass'n v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 636 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Kufer, 230 N.W.2d at 504).
Niblo claimed the deed should be reformed due to a mutual mistake of the parties regarding the description of the land to be included in the deed. Niblo had the burden to show the mistake was both mutual and material. Westcott v. Westcott, 259 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Iowa Ct.App. 1977). A mistake by one party may be grounds for rescinding, but not for reformation of a contract. Id. In addition, the supreme court has stated:
If the mistake of the parties in the conveying or leasing of property is in the identity of the property itself, reformation cannot be had, for there has been no meeting of the minds of the parties. While reformation may often be had to correct mistakes in defining the boundary of lands conveyed so as to identify the lands intended, it may not be had to pass other lands from those intended to be bought and sold, notwithstanding a mistake in pointing out the lines, since reformation under these circumstances would be inequitable and unjust.Kendall, 356 N.W.2d at 188 (quoting 66 Am. Jur.2d Reformation of Instruments § 53, at 269-70 (1981) (footnotes omitted)).
On our de novo review, we determine Niblo has failed to present clear, satisfactory, and convincing proof that the parties were mutually mistaken concerning the amount of land which was included in the deed. Specifically, she has not shown Heaberlin was mistaken concerning the land which he sold to her. While Heaberlin assented to Niblo's remarks about the backyard being big enough for a garden, there was no discussion of the size or location of the proposed garden, and we do not believe this statement shows Heaberlin agreed to sell Niblo more land than included in the deed. Also, Niblo's complaints were that she did not have a place to park in the gravel lot, not that others were parking in the gravel lot, and Heaberlin acted so as to allow Niblo a parking place. Furthermore, there was insufficient evidence Heaberlin directed Niblo to extend the fence to the far eastern edge of the property she now claims.
Considering all of the evidence presented in this case, we determine Niblo has not shown the parties were mutually mistaken concerning the extent of the land which was sold. We conclude Niblo is not entitled to the equitable relief of reformation of the warranty deed in this case.
V. Easement by Implication
In the alternative, Niblo asks us to grant her an easement by implication to use the gravel lot to park her vehicle. Although this issue was raised below, it was not ruled upon by the district court. We determine the case should be remanded to allow the district court to address the issue of an easement by implication.
We reverse the decision of the district court and remand as outlined above. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Niblo.