See also State v. Theodore, 260 Iowa 1038, 1045, 150 N.W.2d 612, 616 (1972) (no value evidence in prosecution for larceny of meat; held jury could have based finding on common knowledge and experience in view of large quantity involved); Ross v. United States, 374 F.2d 97, 103 (8th Cir. 1967) (appellate court judicially noted social security checks were mailed first class, with returning instructions on envelope). Judicial notice has been applied by other appellate courts in resolving valuation issues. In Niagara Fire Insurance Company v. Pool, 31 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex.Civ.App. 1930), for example, the court held that market value of household goods need not be established and said "[n]or was it incumbent upon plaintiffs to show first that there was no market value of said property before they could prove intrinsic value. In the very nature of things, personal effects composing the furnishings of a family and household do not, for the most part, have an ascertainable market value. . . .

"From a preponderance of the testimony, what pecuniary loss or damage, if any, do you find was caused to the household furniture, wearing apparel and personal property of the plaintiff by reason of the fire * * *?' See also Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Pool, Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 850, writ dismissed; Standard National Ins. Co. v. Bayless, Tex.Civ.App., 338 S.W.2d 313, writ refused, n. r. e.; Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Coomer, Tex.Civ.App., 158 S.W.2d 355, no writ history; Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Redmon, supra; American General Ins. Co. v. Bell, Tex.Civ.App., 116 S.W.2d 877, no writ history. It has long been the rule generally in this state that to compensate for the loss of used household furniture and personal effects the measure of damages is the value of such goods to the owner, that is, the actual loss in money he has sustained by being deprived of articles which are especially adapted to the use of the individual and his family.

In the case of Carrillo v. State, 197 S.W. 998, an averment in the indictment similar to the one in the present instance was upheld by this court. The point made in the motion that the testimony of the Investigator from the Fire Marshal's Office should be disregarded, was, we think, correctly dealt with in the original opinion in holding that Article 4899, Revised Civil Statutes, 1925, does not apply to criminal but only to civil actions. On the subject, see Niagara Fire Insurance Company v. Pool et al., 31 S.W.2d 850. In his voluntary statement appellant admitted that he had employed another to burn his house.

We think the evidence was competent to show the proper amount of recovery under the terms of the policy. German Ins. Co. v. Everett, 36 S.W. 125; Southern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 319, 133 S.W. 286; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Pool, Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 850; Home Ins. Co. v. Ketchey, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 350; American General Ins. Co. v. Bell, Tex.Civ.App., 116 S.W.2d 877. In the Niagara case the court said [31 S.W.2d 852]: 'In the very nature of things personal effects composing the furnishings of a family and household do not, for the most part, have an ascertainable market value; and their value must of necessity be fixed by replacement cost, with due allowance for depreciation, or by their intrinsic value.'

We think her evidence was competent to sustain the several findings of the jury on the value issues and that the manner of the submission of such issues as a whole was not subject to the criticism urged. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Pool, Tex. Civ. App. 31 S.W.2d 850, error dismissed; Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Redmon, Tex. Civ. App. 109 S.W.2d 177; American General Ins. Co. v. Bell, Tex. Civ. App. 116 S.W.2d 877. We have examined all of appellant's assignments but in our opinion no reversible error is thereby shown, and consequently they are all overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This principle is recognized by the terms of the policy in its provisions that the amount should be determined by the cost of replacement, and that was proven, and the question submitted to the jury by the first special issue above quoted. In Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Pool, Tex. Civ. App. 31 S.W.2d 850, writ dismissed, it was said (page 852): "Nor was it incumbent upon plaintiffs to show first that there was no market value of said property before they could prove intrinsic value. In the very nature of things personal effects composing the furnishings of a family and household do not, for the most part, have an ascertainable market value; and their value must of necessity be fixed by replacement cost, with due allowance for depreciation, or by their intrinsic value.

In any event, from the evidence he appeared qualified to express an opinion as to the intrinsic value of the machine. Rogers Adams v. Lancaster (Tex.Com.App.) 248 S.W. 660; Bettis v. Bettis (Tex. Civ. App.) 83 S.W.2d 1076; Galveston, H. S. A. Ry. Co. v. Rheiner (Tex. Civ. App.) 25 S.W. 971; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Pool (Tex. Civ. App.) 31 S.W.2d 850; Southern Traction Co. v. Hulbert (Tex. Civ. App.) 177 S.W. 551; Ft. Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Hapgood (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S.W. 969. The evidence required the submission of the issue of "actual" or "intrinsic" value, rather than market value, since it was not shown that there was actual buying and selling of such machines on the Fort Stockton market.

It is well settled in Texas that a husband may procure a policy of fire insurance on community property in his own name without violating such a provision. East Texas Fire Ins. Co. v. Crawford (Tex.Sup.) 16 S.W. 1068; Warren v. Springfield Fire Marine Ins. Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 466, 35 S.W. 810; Sun Ins. Office v. Beneke (Tex.Civ.App.) 53 S.W. 98; Hoyle v. Republic Ins. Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 14 S.W.2d 816; British Gen. Ins. Co. v. Stamps (Tex.Civ.App.) 57 S.W.2d 638, par. 1; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Pool (Tex.Civ.App.) 31 S.W.2d 850, par. 7. If the husband can thus procure a policy on community property in his own name without violating such a provision, why cannot the wife do likewise? The rights of the husband and wife in community property are unified and equal and their title thereto and interest therein is the same.

The courts in this state hold that where the insured is the unconditional and sole owner of all the property covered by the policy except a small amount thereof, the value of which is trivial and wholly immaterial in determining the amount of recovery, the policy is valid and enforceable as to the value of the property actually owned, notwithstanding such stipulation. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Pool (Tex.Civ.App.) 31 S.W.2d 850, 852, pars. 4 to 6, inclusive (writ dismissed); Mecca Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilderspin (Tex.Civ.App.) 118 S.W. 1131, 1132, and authorities there cited; North British Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Freeman (Tex.Civ.App.) 33 S.W. 1091, 1092, and authorities there cited; Delaware Ins. Co. v. Harris, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 537, 64 S.W. 867, 872 (second column); German Ins. Co. v. Luckett, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 139, 34 S.W. 173, 175 (top second column); Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Brady (Tex.Civ.App.) 41 S.W. 513, 516; Phœnix Ins. Co. v. Lorenz (Ind.App.) 29 N.E. 604.

The condition is reasonable, material, valid, and enforceable. It is a contractual warranty which the law enforces. Crescent Ins. Co. v. Camp, 64 Tex. 521; Id., 71 Tex. 503, 9 S.W. 473; Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Carter (Tex.Com.App.) 257 S.W. 531; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Wilson (Tex.Com.App.) 284 S.W. 920; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Pool (Tex.Civ.App.) 31 S.W.2d 850, 852. As was said by our Supreme Court in the case first cited: "Whether the interest of the survivor is legal or equitable, or whether he is or not a trustee, can make no difference, since it seems indisputable that he is not the sole and unconditional owner, for his own use and benefit, upon any authority, or tested by any theory of law. The risk increases as the interest of the assured is lessened, and the condition that the actual interest, if less than that perfect proprietorship described in the policy, shall be stated in the policy, is sustained by greater reason than supports many material warranties in such contracts.