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N.I. v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Feb 11, 2008
No. G039453 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2008)

Opinion


N.I., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et al., Real Parties in Interest. G039453 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Third Division February 11, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. DP012674 James P. Marion, Judge.

Law Offices of Arthur J. LaCilento and Arthur J. LaCilento for Petitioner.

Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, Senior Deputy County Counsel, and Julie J. Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency.

OPINION

SILLS, P. J.

N.I. seeks extraordinary relief from the order of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a permanent plan selection hearing in the dependency proceedings regarding her son, Anthony I. She claims there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that she received reasonable reunification services and that returning Anthony home would create a risk of detriment to him. We find no error and deny relief.

FACTS

In December 2005, three-year-old Anthony was detained by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA). Neighbors reported hearing the child scream for help, and police discovered him alone in his crib in the home he shared with his mother, N.I. The home was filthy: “flies and maggots on windows, ceilings and walls; black sludge rings . . . inside every sink and toilet; trash throughout the house . . . with flies crawling on it . . . . The kitchen counter [had] unidentifiable black stains, hairs, dust, dirt, and soap scum . . . . [P]olice officers noted a foul odor emitting from the entire home; . . . and a trashcan was overflowing with dirty diapers.” Anthony was also filthy, and a plastic bag large enough to fit over his head was in the crib with him. The mother did not return to the home for over six hours after the police arrived.

A dependency petition was sustained on Anthony’s behalf, and he was removed from the mother’s custody and placed in a foster home. The mother was offered reunification services, which required her to participate in therapy, which was to address parenting issues, and to be evaluated by a “mental health professional.” The court appointed Dr. Kenneth Fineman to perform an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation of the mother.

Dr. Fineman believed the mother had a propensity to neglect Anthony. He based that belief on her “‘denial concerning her role in her present circumstances’” and her tendency “‘to blame things on the child’s father and to minimize the extent to which the home cleanliness could cause a medical or physical problem to the child.’” He opined the neglect was not caused by mental illness but by “‘certain problematic personality characteristics.’” He recommended “assertiveness training, social skills training, insight oriented therapy and ‘behavioral therapy focused on reducing anxiety, depression and general tension,’ on a weekly basis for at least the next twelve months, a psychiatric consultation and compliance with medication if recommended; a minimum of thirty hours in a parent training workshop; and increased visitation assuming ‘that the child does have an appropriate and normal attachment to his mother.’”

The six-month review hearing, which was contested, was finally held in September 2006. The mother received therapy from February to June 2006 from Diane Calahan, who held a master’s degree in social work. Calahan referred the mother to Dr. Habeeb-Elzatat, a psychiatrist, who saw her monthly. Dr. Habeeb-Elzatat reported “there is ‘not much psychopathology or depression’ that he can determine, but he did prescribe Prozac (40mg) for the mother based on her self-report of ‘compulsive behavior’ and ‘doing things over and over.’” The mother apparently wanted to change therapy from Calahan to a “Ph.D. level therapist[],” and SSA provided three referrals. The mother opted to seek therapy with a psychologist of her choice, Dr. Leslie Drozd, in June 2006. Anthony was thriving in his foster home; however, he was glad to see his mother at visits. The court heard testimony from the social worker and the mother, then found the mother had received reasonable reunification services and it would be detrimental to return Anthony to his home. More reunification services were ordered, and the 12-month review hearing was set for December 2006.

The 12-month review hearing was repeatedly continued and ultimately combined with the 18-month review hearing, held in October 2007. The SSA reports during the intervening year showed that the mother’s visits with Anthony became more problematic as time went on. The mother endured verbal and physical abuse from Anthony, seeming unable to set limits and provide structure for him. At the suggestion of Drozd, the mother hired a parenting coach, Valerie Christopherson, who was a retired sheriff with “many years of monitoring experience.” Christopherson coached the mother about eight times during visits in November and December 2006 and January 2007; she reported the mother “has been open to suggestions and feedback and is trying to implement them, but is ‘not quite there yet.’” Christopherson reported her “biggest safety concern is the child’s tendency to run away from the mother.”

Unsatisfied by N.I.’s progress, the court decided to change the mother’s therapist in January 2007. “I just want to know that we have somebody that’s qualified in terms of their approach.” Dr. Fineman recommended Dr. Patricia Yglesias, who began seeing the mother in February. The mother continued to see Dr. Habeeb on a monthly basis. He prescribed medication “to treat symptoms of depression as well as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (ODC).”

Also in January 2007, the court ordered monitored visits in the mother’s home and in-home parenting services. Safety issues continued to crop up during visits. In March, Anthony and the mother were playing tennis on her balcony when their ball landed on a nearby roof. The mother pulled a chair up to the balcony wall adjoining the rooftop, then left Anthony there while she went inside to change her shoes. Anthony climbed up on the chair and had to be restrained by the monitor from going onto the roof, which had a steep drop to the street below. Another time, the mother allowed Anthony to swim with a flotation device in her apartment complex pool while she visited with a friend. According to the monitor, the mother was not focusing on the child while he was in the pool by himself. During an outing to Dave and Busters, a video game arcade that also houses a sports bar and caters to adults and teenagers, the mother allowed Anthony to go to the men’s bathroom by himself, despite signs that minors should be accompanied by an adult at all times.

Although the mother was able to implement many of the suggestions made by the service providers, she was often defensive and argumentative when confronted with her problematic behavior and “minimize[d] the reasons for the child’s detention and subsequent child welfare involvement.” She completed 12 sessions of an in-home parenting course, but failed to make significant progress in basic safety issues and nutrition. Dr. Yglesias reported slow progress because the mother was resistant to input.

Anthony’s behavior regressed after visits with the mother, to the point where his therapist recommended reduced contact. But the monitors reported Anthony “appear[ed] to enjoy visitation with his mother and easily ran to her and hugged and kissed her.” None of the monitors or therapists felt the mother could handle unmonitored visits, however, “due to safety concerns and her inability to control the child.”

At the hearing, the social worker testified he did not recommend returning Anthony to the mother. “The child . . . is extremely dysfunctional. He has poor boundaries. He becomes easily agitated, very controlling, and the mother allows him to completely take charge without asserting herself as a parental authority.” The social worker stated it was obvious that the mother loves Anthony and was trying “the best she can to establish a relationship with this child, but there seems to be a complete lack of understanding of what this child’s needs are. And the mother views this child as a normal child, and he . . . needs intense therapy. His behaviors are still not normal.”

Dr. Yglesias testified the mother’s “poor judgment can affect her ability to ensure her child is safe . . . .” The mother did not see Anthony as having the problems ascribed to him. “She sees him as a very active little boy.” Dr. Yglesias continued, “[T]herapy would need to be longer and . . . it’s a slow process. She’s made progress but it’s been slower than, I think, everyone was hoping that she would demonstrate.”

Christopherson testified she monitored additional visits in March and June 2007. The mother seemed to understand she needed to “be more aggressive in her parenting style” and “be in charge of the activities and disciplining,” but she had trouble implementing the suggestions. “[I]t seemed to be a process and a struggle, something that she just needs to keep working on.”

The court found the mother had received reasonable services, and that she had complied with her case plan. But it found there was a substantial risk to Anthony if he were returned to her. “[The] facts indicate there’s a serious lack of judgment. Over the last couple of years she’s tried. She’s tried very hard, but [the fact] remains . . . that it would be – I would be derelict in my duty as a judge if I sent Anthony back to her. . . . [I]f the purpose of reunification is to overcome what led to removal in the first place, she hasn’t done it.” The court terminated reunification services and set a permanent plan selection hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26).

All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

DISCUSSION

The mother argues the court abused its discretion by refusing to return Anthony to her care. She claims there is no substantial or credible evidence to support the court’s implied finding that she could not keep him safe, arguing that SSA blew out of proportion the various incidents reported by the visitation monitors. We do not reweigh the evidence, but look for any evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the trial court’s determination. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.)

At the 18-month review hearing, “[t]he court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) Completion of the reunification plan, while significant, does not ipso facto mean the parent has alleviated the problems causing the original removal. (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1139-1140.)

Although the mother had improved, more improvement was needed before Anthony could be safely returned home. She had received individual parenting coaching and instruction and almost two years of therapy, but improvement was blocked by her defensive and argumentative behaviors and her striking lack of judgment. The social worker, whom the court specifically found to be credible, testified Anthony would be at risk with the mother because she could not set limits or use common sense and judgment. None of the monitors felt she could even have unmonitored visits, let alone full-time custody. This constitutes substantial evidence to support the finding that return would create a substantial risk of detriment.

The mother next argues she did not receive reasonable reunification services because her reunification plan “was not narrowly tailored to resolve [her] psychological disabilities and mental health issues.” Specifically, she claims she did not receive services from a clinical psychologist until January 2007, causing her to go 13 months from detention without this service. The record belies this assertion. The mother was offered the services of three clinical psychologists in June 2006, but she chose to see Dr. Drozd, herself a clinical psychologist. In January 2007, the court changed the mother’s therapist to Dr. Yglesias, another clinical psychologist, because she was not progressing satisfactorily.

The mother claims her visitation was not reasonable because SSA did not give her unmonitored visits despite her efforts and progress; she also complains visits were cancelled. But the mother’s efforts, while commendable, were not successful in eliminating the safety concerns that necessitated a monitor. And while a few visits may have been cancelled, this is insignificant in light of almost two years of twice-weekly visits.

The mother’s final complaint is that the court refused to admit her proffered testimony of neighbors and videotapes of visits to show “some positive interaction with the mother acting . . . in a parental role playing age-appropriate games. Shows the bond and the extent of affection between the two [and] they kind of impeach . . . the monitor who was kind of negative in some respects about Mother . . . . They show the nature and quality of the mother’s parental skills which are at issue here.” The court found the information redundant because the monitors and others had reported a great deal of positive interaction between the mother and Anthony.

The court has discretion to exclude evidence it views as unduly time consuming and redundant. (Evid. Code, § 352.) In dependency proceedings, the court constantly balances the parent’s interest in regaining custody of the child against the state’s interest in expedient and controlled proceedings. (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 759-760.) Here, the court’s decision to exclude the evidence was not an abuse of discretion. (See In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1176.)

DISPOSITION

The order terminating reunification services and setting a permanent plan selection hearing was correct. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, J., ARONSON, J.


Summaries of

N.I. v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Feb 11, 2008
No. G039453 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2008)
Case details for

N.I. v. Superior Court

Case Details

Full title:N.I., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

Date published: Feb 11, 2008

Citations

No. G039453 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2008)

Citing Cases

In re A.I.

This court denied the petition. (N.I. v. Superior Court (Feb. 11, 2008, G039453) [nonpub. opn.].)…