In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the transcripts of his deposition testimony and that of the defendant. This evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, as the nonmoving party, failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant entered the intersection pursuant to a green light while the plaintiff was stopped facing a red light, and whether the plaintiff was thus required, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(a)(1), to yield the right-of-way to the defendant prior to entering the intersection when the red light turned green (seeDePass v. Beneduci, 207 A.D.3d 620, 621, 172 N.Y.S.3d 690 ; Yubin Ni v. Milio, 192 A.D.3d 816, 817, 139 N.Y.S.3d 866 ; Calderon–Scotti v. Rosenstein, 119 A.D.3d 722, 724, 989 N.Y.S.2d 514 ). Furthermore, the plaintiff similarly failed to eliminate triable issues of fact with respect to that branch of his motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the defendant's first through fourth and eighth affirmative defenses (seeYubin Ni v. Milio, 192 A.D.3d at 817, 139 N.Y.S.3d 866 ).
Here, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence, as the plaintiff failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to his freedom from comparative fault in the accident (see Yubin Ni v Milio, 192 AD3d 816). Triable issues of fact exist, inter alia, as to whether the plaintiff was attentive to the conditions of the road and whether he was comparatively at fault in causing the accident (see Russo v Pearson, 148 AD3d 1762).
iver must exercise reasonable care notwithstanding the invitation to proceed by the green light facing him [or her]" (Siegel v Sweeney, 266 A.D.2d 200, 201). Under the doctrine of comparative negligence (see CPLR 1411), a driver who lawfully enters an intersection with a green light "must exercise reasonable care and could still be found partially at fault for an accident if he or she fails to use reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle in the intersection" (Cox v Weil, 66 A.D.3d 634, 634-635; see Simmons v Canady, 95 A.D.3d 1201, 1202). Here, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence, as the plaintiff failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to his freedom from comparative fault in the accident (see Yubin Ni v Milio, 192 A.D.3d 816). Triable issues of fact exist, inter alia, as to whether the plaintiff was attentive to the conditions of the road and whether he was comparatively at fault in causing the accident (see Russo v Pearson, 148 A.D.3d 1762).
Here, as outlined above, the moving papers raise a triable issue of fact as to how the accident occurred and, as relevant to this branch of the motion, in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendants, as nonmovants, the plaintiff failed to eliminate all triable issues of material fact regarding her freedom from comparative fault in the happening of the accident (see Yubin Ni v. Milio, 192 A.D.3d 816, 817 [2d Dept 2021]; Chang-Hoon Lee v. Kew Gardens Sung Shin Refm. Church of NY., 84 A.D.3d 1299, 12991300 [2d Dept 2011]). In particular, the plaintiff failed to eliminate all triable issues of material fact as to whether she saw "that which through proper use of h[er] senses [s]he should have seen," and that she used reasonable care to avoid the collision with Newton's vehicle (Chang-Hoon Lee, 84 A.D.3d at 1300 [internal quotation marks omitted]).