Opinion
No. 53971-0-I
Filed: April 4, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No. 02-2-26883-8. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 02/17/2004. Judge signing: Hon. George T. Mattson.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Bardy Nguyen (Appearing Pro Se), 595 Newport Wy NW #b1, Issaquah, WA 98027.
Counsel for Respondent(s), John Joseph Hutson, Law Office of William J. O'Brien, 999 3rd Ave Ste 3300, Seattle, WA 98104-4002.
Bardy Nguyen appeals from a decision dismissing her claims against Good Chevrolet on collateral estoppel grounds. We affirm.
In July, 1999, Nguyen had her 1978 Chevrolet Camaro delivered to Good Chevrolet on a flatbed truck. Nguyen wanted Good Chevrolet to install a new engine. The car had not been maintained for some time and Good Chevrolet suggested additional work that it thought needed to be done. Nguyen eventually approved repairs costing approximately $6,100. Among other things, Good Chevrolet performed work on the vehicle's brakes. Good Chevrolet later performed additional work at no additional cost.
On September 19, 2000, Nguyen filed a complaint against Good Chevrolet alleging that it over billed her and supplied defective parts and labor.
On October 24, 2000, Nguyen's son was involved in an accident while driving the car.
Some time in 2001, Nguyen filed a second suit, alleging that Good Chevrolet's negligent repair work on the car's brake system caused the accident. This matter was dismissed on September 14, 2001, without prejudice. The record does not show why this suit was dismissed.
Nguyen's first suit went to trial on February 14, 2002. During the trial, she offered testimony and evidence in support of her claim that Good Chevrolet negligently repaired the brake system, and that a subsequent brake failure caused the October 24 accident. Among the damages she claimed were the costs to repair the car after the accident. The court found that Nguyen had not carried her burden of establishing negligent or defective repairs and entered judgment for Good Chevrolet. Nguyen appealed. This Court modified some of the findings but affirmed on March 31, 2003.
The accident occurred after Nguyen filed her complaint. It is not clear whether she amended the complaint or whether she simply added claims arising from the accident at the time of trial. In any event, it is clear that she claimed negligent brake repair and based her claim on her contention that brake failure caused the accident. Nguyen also suggested at trial that Good Chevrolet rigged the brakes so they would fail.
Nguyen v. Good Chevrolet, No. 50159-3-I. The Supreme Court denied Nguyen's petition for review on September 30, 2003.
On October 2, 2002, while her first appeal was pending, Nguyen filed a third action against Good Chevrolet. In this action, she claimed injuries stemming from the October 24, 2000 accident, although she was not in the car at the time. She alleged that the accident was caused by Good Chevrolet's negligent brake repair and that she suffered injuries from the stress of dealing with the repair claims and the aftermath of the accident. The trial court dismissed this action as barred by collateral estoppel and Nguyen has appealed.
The court also dismissed the emotional distress claims arising from the automobile accident on independent grounds. Nguyen has not challenged that portion of the trial court's decision.
Nguyen is proceeding pro se and her brief does not comply with the appellate rules. However, it incorporates portions of the response opposing the motion for summary judgment in the trial court, which was prepared by counsel. We do not condone the practice, but in the interest of addressing the merits of the case, as opposed to dismissing Nguyen's appeal for procedural infirmities, we have considered counsel's trial brief as if it were the brief on appeal.
Nguyen has attached her declaration to the brief as Exhibit C. To the extent it attempts to present evidence that was not before the trial court, we have not considered the declaration.
We review the decision to apply collateral estoppel de novo. The doctrine bars relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and necessarily and finally decided in a prior proceeding. It prevents a second litigation of issues between the parties, even if the claim or cause of action in the later suit is different. The party seeking to apply the doctrine must show that:
Christensen v. Grant County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wn.2d 299, 305, 96 P.3d 957 (2004).
Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 307.
Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 306.
(1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding was identical to the issue presented in the later proceeding; (2) the earlier proceeding ended in a judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding; and (4) application of collateral estoppel does not work an injustice on the party against whom it is applied.
Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 307.
In this case, the earlier proceeding ended in a judgment on the merits in favor of Good Chevrolet and Nguyen was a party. Factors 2 and 3 are therefore satisfied.
Nguyen contends, however, that the issue decided in the earlier proceeding, whether she was over billed for defective repair work, is not the same as the issue in the present case, whether she is entitled to personal injury damages as a result of the accident. She relies on footnote 1 in this court's opinion where we stated "Nguyen raised additional personal injury claims that were not litigated in this action."
We disagree. Collateral estoppel is concerned with issue preclusion. In the first case, one of the issues litigated was whether Good Chevrolet performed defective repair work on the brakes. In the second case, the issue was whether Good Chevrolet performed defective repair work on the brakes. Whether or not Nguyen claims different types of damages arising from this defective work is of no moment. As the trial court correctly noted, the core facts underlying the personal injury claim are the same core facts Nguyen litigated in her first suit, whether the brake work was defective.
Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 306.
Relying on Hadley v. Maxwell, Nguyen also contends that application of the doctrine will work an injustice. She asserts that her first claim was for negligent repair work and that her damages in that case were approximately the cost of the repairs, roughly $6,100. In the present suit, she claims damages of $875,000. Her implication is that it would be unfair to hold her bound by the judgment in such a small case when she seeks much greater damages in this case.
144 Wn.2d 306, 27 P.3d 600 (2001).
Most of this amount appears to be related to the emotional damages claim that the trial court dismissed on independent grounds.
In Hadley, the court held that collateral estoppel should not bar a litigant who lost a contest over a $95 fine for a lane change violation from later pursuing a personal injury claim. This case is far different. Nguyen had interests at stake that would call for a full and vigorous litigation effort. She knew about the accident by the time the matter was tried and presented evidence and testimony seeking to establish that the accident was attributable to brake failure. The fact that her personal injury damages were not at stake in the first proceeding is not enough to prevent collateral estoppel. There is no injustice in holding Nguyen to the result in the first suit.
Hadley, 144 Wn.2d at 312.
Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 317-18.
Nguyen makes passing reference to Good Chevrolet's refusal to participate in mediation. The point is not entirely clear but we presume the Nguyen believes the matter should have been mediated before the trial court heard Good Chevrolet's motion for summary judgment. However, there is nothing in the record showing that Good Chevrolet was obligated to mediate the matter and Nguyen offers no argument or authority in support of her reference. We therefore do not address any issue that Nguyen believes might be raised by the lack of mediation.
Affirmed.
ELLINGTON and AGID, JJ., Concur.