” Ng v. Lahood, 952 F.Supp.2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that an adverse employment action must materially affect the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm” (cleaned up)).

may amount to an adverse employment action, a “temporary reduction [in work] is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action[,] . . . particularly where . . . the alleged reduction had no effect on [the plaintiff's] pay or benefits[,]” Ng v. Lahood, 952 F.Supp.2d 85, 96 (D.D.C. 2013) (emphasis added). In this case, the plaintiff's assignment in Norfolk, Virginia, was a lateral transfer, see supra note 6 (describing the fact that, when the plaintiff was transferred to Norfolk, Virginia, she was transferred at the same pay grade, i.e., laterally), and a temporary assignment, only lasting approximately four months from soon after June 30, 2012, to her retirement in October 2012.

"An adverse employment action is ‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.’ " Ng v. Lahood , 952 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Baird v. Gotbaum , 662 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C.Cir.2011) ). And for an adverse employment action to be taken "because of" the plaintiff's protected status, "discrimination must be a motivating factor in, but need not be the but-for cause of, [the] adverse employment action."

Pls.' Strike Reply at 6. "The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is vested in the trial judge's sound discretion," Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 384 F.Supp.2d 176, 180 (D.D.C. 2005), and "[t]he moving party ‘bears a heavy burden as courts generally disfavor motions to strike,’ " Ng v. Lahood, 952 F.Supp.2d 85, 92 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Canady, 384 F.Supp.2d at 180 ). However, Rule 37 provides that "[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless."

If the relevant evidentiary hurdles are cleared, it might then be necessary to consider whether the Nadel Declaration and its accompanying exhibit, submitted after the close of discovery, are or are not cognizable here. See generally Ngv. Lahood, 952 F.Supp.2d. 85, 93 (D.D.C, 2013) (arguably implying that post-discovery declarations may be relied upon); Fiumanov. Metro Diner Mgmt, LLC, 2022 WL 2541354, at *4 n.4 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2022) (same); Riemensnyderv. Paragon Sys, 2022 WL 1123187, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2022) (same); Scaliav. Elder Res. Mgmt., Inc., 2020 WL 7390871, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2020). so ORDERED.

(collecting cases and declining to strike declarations not submitted until the summary judgment filing because the complaining party had the opportunity to depose the declarants and did in fact depose one); see also Ng v. Lahood, 952 F.Supp.2d 85, 92 (D.D.C. 2013) (declining to strike a declaration submitted after the close of discovery because “the Federal Rules expressly contemplate declarations in support of summary judgment, regardless of when in the discovery process the motion is filed”). To the extent Defendants are attempting to argue that the sham affidavit doctrine is implicated here, the Court finds that it does not apply given the circumstances of this case.

As the defendant points out, it is well settled that, “the Federal Rules expressly contemplate declarations in support of summary judgment, regardless of when in the discovery process the motion is filed.” Ng v. Lahood, 952 F.Supp.2d 85, 92 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F.Supp.2d 336, 342 (D.D.C. 2011)). Indeed, Rule 56, which governs the procedure for summary judgment, dictates:

" ‘The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is vested in the trial judge's sound discretion,’ and ‘[t]he moving party bears a heavy burden as courts generally disfavor motions to strike.’ " Sacchetti v. Gallaudet Univ. , 344 F. Supp. 3d 233, 251 (D.D.C. 2018) (alteration in original) (first quoting Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH , 384 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180 (D.D.C. 2005) ; and then quoting Ng v. Lahood , 952 F. Supp. 2d 85, 92 (D.D.C. 2013) ); see also StabiliesiesrungsfondsFur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd. , 647 F.2d 200, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 815 F. Supp. 2d 148, 162 (D.D.C. 2011).

Circuit and other jurisdictions have consistently held that denial of a request to telework does not, on its own, amount to an adverse employment action, as it does not involve a significant change in employment status. See Redmon v. United States Capitol Police, 80 F. Supp. 3d 79, 87 (D.D.C. 2015) ("The Court agrees with the cited opinions that a denial of a request to telework, without more, does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action, as it does not involve 'hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits'") (collecting cases); McNair v. District of Columbia, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2019) ("[T]he denial of a request to work from home, in and of itself, is not an adverse action."); Pauling v. District of Columbia, 286 F. Supp. 3d 179, 203 (D.D.C. 2017); Brown v. Jewell, 134 F. Supp. 3d 170, 181 (D.D.C. 2015); Byrd v. Vilsack, 931 F. Supp. 2d 27, 41 (D.D.C. 2013); Ng v. Lahood, 952 F. Supp. 2d 85, 96 (D.D.C. 2013); Bright v. Copps, 828 F. Supp. 2d 130, 148-49 (D.D.C. 2011); Beckham v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 130, 149 (D.D.C. 2010); Kabakova v. Office of Architect of Capitol, No. CV 19-1276 (BAH), 2020 WL 1866003, at *15 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2020); see also Brockman v. Snow, 217 F. App'x. 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2007); Martinez-Santiago v. Zurich N. Am. Ins. Co., No. 07-cv-8676 (RJH), 2010 WL 184450, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010) (collecting cases); Homburg v. UPS, No. 05-cv-2144, 2006 WL 2092457, at *9 (D. Kan. July 27, 2006) (collecting cases); Cf. Weng v. Solis, 960 F. Supp. 2d 239, 249 (D.D.C. 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff's removal from a flexible work program caused a significant change in benefits). The Agency's decision to not grant Kirton her request for increased telework from a personally preferred off-site location does not involve a "significant change in benefits," Baird, 662 F.3d at 1248, or any other comparable harm.

Rather, both the Sieg and Stewart declarations are consistent with the requirements of Rule 56(c)(4), which "expressly contemplate[s] declarations in support of summary judgment regardless of when in the discovery process the motion is filed." Ng v. Lahood, 952 F. Supp. 2d 85, 92 (D.D.C. 2013). Accordingly, the Court concludes that sanctions are unwarranted under Rule 37.