Opinion
4041, 4041A.
Decided June 29, 2004.
Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J.), entered November 26, 2003, which granted motions by Chee Kong Tong Lodge, Bain Foo Lee, Shell M. Ng and Stephen Ng (the World defendants), and by defendant Sing Tao Daily, to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Miranda Sokoloff, LLP, Mineola (Steven Verveniotis of counsel), for appellants.
Thelen Reid Priest, New York (Paul A. Winick of counsel), for Chee Kong Tong Supreme Lodge Chinese Freemason of the World, Bain Foo Lee, Shell M. Ng and Stephen Ng, respondents.
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, New York (Peter Karanjia of counsel), for Sing Tao Daily, respondent.
Before: Nardelli, J.P., Mazzarelli, Sullivan, Lerner, Friedman, JJ.
This libel action arises from an organizational dispute between two chapters of the Chinese Freemasons, a civic organization, over whether plaintiff Woon Pang Ng engaged in "unauthorized and illegal" acts when he "illegally appointed himself a Grand Priest" of his local order. These statements were contained in three paid advertisements placed by the World defendants in the Sing Tao Daily publication. Sing Tao also published an article — the subject of additional claims in the amended complaint — written by a 20-year veteran staff reporter, regarding the instant action and press conferences held by plaintiff and the World defendants.
The newspaper is entitled to an absolute privilege; no civil action can be maintained to attack the publication of the "fair and true report of any judicial proceeding" (Civil Rights Law § 74) that is "substantially accurate" ( Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianity v. New York Times Co., 49 N.Y.2d 63, 67). Moreover, there is no indication that the advertised and reported statements with which plaintiffs took issue were false. In any event, these statements were clearly the opinion of the World defendants ( see Mercado v. Shustek, 309 A.D.2d 646), and no average reader would conclude otherwise. If words are not reasonably susceptible of defamatory meaning, they cannot be made actionable by resort to strained or artificial construction ( see Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 38).
We have considered plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.