We noted that we had previously held that “a claim for arrearage in temporary alimony which accrued prior to rendition of the final decree may be the subject of contempt proceedings initiated subsequent to the final decree.” Id. at 570 (citing Newton v. Newton, 238 Ga. 282 , 282 (232 SE2d 557 ) (1977); Moore v. Moore, 207 Ga. 335 , 335 (1) (61 SE2d 500 ) (1950)). We added that “[application of a similar rule is even more compelling in a situation such as this where temporary child support is implicated.

We noted that we had previously held that “a claim for arrearage in temporary alimony which accrued prior to rendition of the final decree may be the subject of contempt proceedings initiated subsequent to the final decree.” Id. at 570 (citing Newton v. Newton, 238 Ga. 282, 282 (232 SE2d 557) (1977); Moore v. Moore, 207 Ga. 335, 335 (1) (61 SE2d 500) (1950)). We added that “[application of a similar rule is even more compelling in a situation such as this where temporary child support is implicated.

Although we have no transcript of the proceedings below, it appears uncontested that by the time of the divorce trial, two of the parties' three children had attained the age of majority; therefore, the custody and support provisions of the final decree affected only one minor child. In Newton v. Newton, 238 Ga. 282 ( 232 SE2d 557) (1977), we held that a claim for arrearage in temporary alimony which accrued prior to rendition of the final decree may be the subject of contempt proceedings initiated subsequent to the final decree. See also Moore v. Moore, 207 Ga. 335 (1) ( 61 SE2d 500) (1950) (failure to apply for contempt of an order awarding temporary alimony during the pendency of the lawsuit cannot operate to deprive a party of the remedy after final verdict).

1. The former husband enumerates that the trial court erred in finding that his obligation to pay the unaccrued tax liability as temporary alimony was not extinguished by the final decree of divorce. In Newton v. Newton, 238 Ga. 282 ( 232 S.E.2d 557) (1977), we held: "Any arrearage which accrued under the temporary order prior to rendition of the final decree may properly be the subject of contempt proceedings initiated subsequent to the final decree." See also Moore v. Moore, 207 Ga. 335 (1) ( 61 S.E.2d 500) (1950); Kot v. Kot, 243 Ga. 604 ( 255 S.E.2d 717) (1979).

After a hearing on the contempt citation, the trial court found certain support expenses that were incurred and due prior to May 1, 1976 under the temporary order and awarded the appellee attorney fees. We find no abuse of discretion in the award of arrearage or attorney fees. Newton v. Newton, 238 Ga. 282 ( 232 S.E.2d 557) (1977); Savage v. Savage, 238 Ga. 16 ( 230 S.E.2d 851) (1976). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

The evidence authorized the trial court's finding as to the appellant's wilfulness in failing to pay child support. Newton v. Newton, 238 Ga. 282 ( 232 S.E.2d 557) (1977). "The contempt question, including any factual issues as to the former husband's ability to pay, is for the trial court to determine ( Mason v. Mason, 232 Ga. 336 (1) ( 206 S.E.2d 479) (1974)), and that court's adjudication will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion."

Some courts have held that accumulated arrearages under a temporary order are enforceable even after a final decree issues. See, e.g., Newton v. Newton, 238 Ga. 282, 232 S.E.2d 557, 558 (1977) (“Any arrearage which accrued under the temporary order prior to rendition of the final decree may properly be the subject of contempt proceedings initiated subsequent to the final decree.”); Lewis v. Lewis, 586 So.2d 740, 742 (Miss.1991) ( “[P]ayments that become due and payable under a temporary order may be reduced to judgment after entry of the final decree, despite the failure of that decree to expressly preserve them.”); Ex parte Shaver, 597 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex.App.1980) (“[R]endition of the final divorce decree does not in itself nullify the temporary order with respect to payments past due.