DEVIN, J. The Lyon Swamp Drainage and Levee District came into being as a quasi-public corporation, by virtue of final decree in accordance with the provisions of the statutes then in force, 10 August, 1910. Sanderlin v. Luken, 152 N.C. 738, 68 S.E. 225. The District contains within its territorial boundaries a large body of land in Pender and Bladen Counties. Since its creation legal questions pertaining to this District have found their way to this Court, and decisions thereon will be found reported in In re Lyon Swamp Drainage District, 175 N.C. 270, 95 S.E. 485; Drainage Commissioners v. Bordeaux, 193 N.C. 627, 137 S.E. 716; and Newton v. Chason, 225 N.C. 204, 34 S.E.2d 70. The statutes authorizing the creation, maintenance and improvement of drainage districts provide flexible procedure which may be modified and molded by decrees from time to time to promote the beneficial objects sought by the creation of the district (Staton v. Staton, 148 N.C. 490, 62 S.E. 596; Adams v. Joyner, 147 N.C. 77, 60 S.E. 725), "subject, however, to the restriction that there should be no material change or any change that would throw additional costs upon the other landowners except to the extent of benefit to them."
And the correct procedure to secure additional authority for improvements and proper maintenance is by motion or petition in the original cause. Newton v. Chason, 225 N.C. 204, 34 S.E.2d 70."
If the suit is brought in the proper jurisdiction and in the correct venue, the plaintiff will have ample time and opportunity to appear, answer, and defend. Courts will not grant the equitable relief of injunction when there is an adequate remedy at law. Arey v. Lemons, 232 N.C. 531, 61 S.E.2d 596; Clinton v. Ross, 226 N.C. 682, 40 S.E.2d 593; Newton v. Chason, 225 N.C. 204, 34 S.E.2d 70. The defendant's motion to dissolve the restraining order and dismiss the action should have been allowed.
Jackson v. Jernigan, 216 N.C. 401, 5 S.E.2d 143; Young v. Pittman, 224 N.C. 175, 29 S.E.2d 551. But it will not lie when there is a full, complete, and adequate remedy at law. Whitford v. Bank, 207 N.C. 229, 176 S.E. 740; Newton v. Chason, 34 S.E.2d 70. Nor may a restraining order be used as an instrument to settle a dispute as to the possession of realty or to dispossess one for the benefit of another.
Affirmed. Cited: Spencer v. Wills, 179 N.C. 178; Ingram v. Hickory, 191 N.C. 53; O'Neal v. Mann, 193 N.C. 157; Drainage Comrs. v. Jarvis, 211 N.C. 692; Newton v. Chason, 225 N.C. 207.
Cited: Banks v. Lane, 171 N.C. 505 (Petition to rehear denied); Leary v. Comrs., 172 N.C. 274 (4f); Lumber Co. v. Comrs., 173 N.C. 119 (1l, 2l, 4l); Lumber Co. v. Comrs., 173 N.C. 121 (j); Comrs. v. Spencer, 174 N.C. 38 (p); Taylor v. Comrs., 176 N.C. 219, 225 (Same case on motion in the original cause. p); Pate v. Banks, 178 N.C. 140, 141 (2f); Farms Co. v. Comrs., 178 N.C. 667, 668 (1f, 2f); Caviness v. Hunt, 180 N.C. 386 (4f); O'Neal v. Mann, 193 N.C. 158 (4f); Drainage District v. Cahoon, 193 N.C. 330 (p); Spence v. Granger, 207 N.C. 21 (1l, 2l); Newton v. Chason, 225 N.C. 207 (4f). (18)
Affirmed. Cited: Lumber Co. v. Drainage Comrs., 174 N.C. 649; In re Drainage Districts, 175 N.C. 273; Farms Co. v. Comrs., 178 N.C. 668; Spencer v. Wills, 179 N.C. 178; Mitchem v. Drainage Com., 182 N.C. 517, 518; O'Neal v. Mann, 193 N.C. 157, 158; Newton v. Chason, 225 N.C. 207.