Newsome v. Town of Surfside Beach

2 Citing cases

  1. White v. County of Newberry, South Carolina

    985 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1993)   Cited 137 times
    Holding that, in order for state claim to be part of the same case or controversy as federal claim, "[t]he claims need only revolve around a central fact pattern."

    The rise in the road made plaintiff's property the lowest point on the roadway; therefore, any rains caused the plaintiff's property to flood. Newsome v. Town of Surfside Beach, 300 S.C. 14, 386 S.E.2d 274, 275 (1989). In this case, the central issue is whether the Whites must show that the County actually used and disposed of the hazardous substance TCE or whether they need show only that the County was most likely a user and disposer of the TCE contaminating the Whites' well. South Carolina law requires the showing of an actual municipal action, such as laying pipe or raising a roadbed, that damages the complaining landowner. For example, before the Town of Surfside Beach rebuilt the washed sections of the road, plaintiff's land had been subject to flooding.

  2. Cobb v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp

    365 S.C. 360 (S.C. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding the Act is applicable to the inverse condemnation right to a jury trial "[i]n light of the historical treatment of an inverse condemnation action as equivalent to an eminent domain case"

    Gilmer v. Hunnicutt, 57 S.C. 166, 35 S.E. 521 (1900). E.g., Cutchin v. South Carolina Dep't of Hwys. and Pub.Transp., 301 S.C. 35, 389 S.E.2d 646 (1990); Vick v. SouthCarolina Dep't of Transp., 347 S.C. 470, 556 S.E.2d 693 (Ct.App. 2001) (parties agreed to jury trial in compensation phase); Ravan v. Greenville County, 315 S.C. 447, 434 S.E.2d 296 (Ct.App. 1993); Gray v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp., 311 S.C. 144, 427 S.E.2d 899 (Ct.App. 1992); Newsome v. Town ofSurfside Beach, 300 S.C. 14, 386 S.E.2d 274 (Ct.App. 1989). This constitutional analysis applies with equal force in the analogous context of an inverse condemnation action.