It is the fact of service which confers jurisdiction, and not the return, and the latter may be amended to speak the truth. Newsome v. Johnson, 305 Ga. App. 579, 583-84 (1) ( 699 SE2d 874) (2010) (punctuation omitted). Newsome v. Johnson, 305 Ga. App. 579, 583-84 (1) ( 699 SE2d 874) (2010) (punctuation omitted).

Newsome v. Johnson , 305 Ga. App. 579, 581 (1), 699 S.E.2d 874 (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted). Although Appellant argues that the proper standard of review on this issue is de novo because the question of whether a judgment is void or voidable is a question of law, that is not the issue presented here.

(Citations and emphasis omitted.) Newsome v. Johnson, 305 Ga.App. 579, 581 (1) (699 S.E.2d 874)

The process server's return of service can only be set aside upon evidence which is not only clear and convincing, but the strongest of which the nature of the case will admit. Newsome v. Johnson , 305 Ga. App. 579, 581 (1), 699 S.E.2d 874 (2010) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). In the instant case, the process server's affidavit of service provided that he served Newsome with copies of the summons and the petition by placing them at the feet of the occupant of Newsome's residence, who had refused to open the door of the residence.

Cf. Koby v. Koby, 277 Ga. 160, 160 (2) (587 S.E.2d 48) (2003) (affirming the trial court's denial of ex-wife's motion to set aside a divorce decree, in which she claimed she had reconciled with her ex-husband, and explaining that "the [trial] court specifically found that there was not a bona fide reconciliation, and there was ample evidence to support that conclusion" (emphasis supplied)); Newsome v. Johnson, 305 Ga.App. 579, 584 (1) (699 S.E.2d 874) (2010) ("Because some evidence supported the trial court's finding that personal service occurred, we affirm the trial court's order[ ], denying the motion to set aside default judgment . . . .").

Cf.Koby v. Koby , 277 Ga. 160, 161 (2), 587 S.E.2d 48 (2003) (affirming the trial court's denial of ex-wife's motion to set aside a divorce decree, in which she claimed she had reconciled with her ex-husband, and explaining that "the [trial] court specifically found that there was not a bona fide reconciliation, and there was ample evidence to support that conclusion " (emphasis supplied)); Newsome v. Johnson , 305 Ga. App. 579, 584 (1), 699 S.E.2d 874 (2010) ("Because some evidence supported the trial court's finding that personal service occurred, we affirm the trial court's order[ ], denying the motion to set aside default judgment ....").

See Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Friedenberg , 275 Ga. App. 236, 241 (2), 620 S.E.2d 463 (2005) (noting that an appellate court may look to transcripts for bench findings of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to award of attorney's fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 ).Woods , 315 Ga. App. at 97-98 (2), 726 S.E.2d 596 (holding that trial court's failure to make express findings of fact or conclusions of law as to the statutory basis for its award of attorney fees required vacating award and remanding to the trial court for further consideration); Newsome v. Johnson , 305 Ga. App. 579, 585 (3), 699 S.E.2d 874 (2010) (holding that trial court erred in awarding attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 without making findings of fact or conclusions of law or specifying applicable statutory subsection and, thus, vacating award and remanding case); Douglas Asphalt Co. , 295 Ga. App. at 424-25 (1), 671 S.E.2d 899 (vacating award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 because trial court failed to support award with written or oral findings of fact or conclusions of law and failed to even cite which subsection of statute was applicable). Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded.

When a defendant knows that a process server is physically present and attempting service, but the defendant still attempts to evade service, we have held that service may be accomplished by simply leaving the papers at the residence. See, e.g., Newsome v. Johnson, 305 Ga. App. 579 , 582-83 (1) (699 SE2d 874 ) (2010) (service proper where papers left outside of door after process server verified defendant’s identity through the door, but defendant refused to open the door); Tavakolian v. Agio Corp., 304 Ga. App. 660 , 665 (4) (697 SE2d 233 ) (2010) (service sufficient where person meeting the description of the defendant’s wife declared that she was not the defendant and then closed the garage door and process server dropped complaint and summons on the garage floor); Hickey v. Merrit, 128 Ga. App. 764 , 765 (197 SE2d 833 ) (1973) (service sufficient where papers left outside door after defendant talked to marshal through the door but refused to open it, and where defendant was seen through the window). The defendant attempting to evade service “cannot seek to benefit from her own refusal to cooperate.”

(Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Newsome v. Johnson, 305 Ga. App. 579, 581-582 (1) ( 699 SE2d 874) (2010). See also Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost, 291 Ga. App. 133, 140 (1) (b) ( 661 SE2d 185) (2008) ("Factual disputes regarding service are to be resolved by the trial court, and the court's findings will be upheld if there is any evidence to support them") (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted).