Appellant contends that this description was ample and relies on Day v. Benesh, 104 Fla. 58, 139 So. 448, and Mitchell v. Moore, decided March 4, 1943, not yet reported and like cases to support his contention. Appellee contends on the other hand that the description is not sufficient and relies on Newsom v. Belle Mead Dev. Corp., 131 Fla. 143, 179 So. 160; Schouten v. Hunt, 146 Fla. 360, 200 So. 923, and like cases to support her contention. This Court early laid down the rule to be sufficient the description of land in a deed must be such that a surveyor could locate it without difficulty.
And in the case of Dixon v. City of Cocoa, 106 Fla. 855, 143 So. 748, the description contained in a bill to enforce a tax lien was merely this: "All of lot 6, Robert Dixon's Homestead, ex. to E. C. Johnson and Fairview Land Co." This description was held insufficient and void, and we think correctly so. The case of Newson v. Bellemeade Dev. Corp. 131 Fla. 143, 179 So. 160 dealt with another description in a tax deed which was inherently defective, and so much so that it could not be aided even when applied to extrinsic facts. The holding that the description in the tax deed was fatally insufficient was based upon a well considered opinion by the present Chief Justice.
Counsel for appellant, in reply to this contention, states that testimony aliunde can or may be adduced where the tax certificate is relied upon as evidence of a lien, but the rule is inapplicable to descriptions of land in tax deeds where the deed is relied upon as a muniment of title. The case of Newson v. Belle Mead Development Co., 131 Fla. 143, 179 So. 160, is cited. Independent of the questions posed for a decision and the legal sufficiency of the description of the land appearing in the tax deed here attacked and defended, pertinent and material facts are disclosed by the record, the weight of which can not easily be thrust aside in a court of equity.
I do not think the description of the property, as shown by the assessment roll, is legally sufficient. See Dixon v. City of Cocoa, 106 Fla. 855, 143 So. 748; Crawford v. Rehwinkle, 121 Fla. 449, 163 So. 851; Newsom v. Belle Meade Development Co., 131 Fla. 143, 179 So. 160; Gautier v. Town of Crescent City, 138 Fla. 573, 189 So. 842. Otherwise I concur in the opinion.
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the description of property in a tax deed must be certain in itself or at least capable of being made certain by matters referred to in the deed itself as relating to the description, and evidence aliunde not referred to in the deed cannot be used to ascertain the land intended to be conveyed." Newson v. Belle Mead Dev. Corp., et al., 131 Fla. 143, 179 So. 160."
See Jarrell v. McRainey, 65 Fla. 141 and 144, 61 So. 260; Dixon v. Cocoa, 106 Fla. 855, 145 So. 748." J.C. Newsom v. Belle Mead Development Corporation, et al., 131 Fla. 143, 179 So. 160. It is apparent from the description quoted above that the deed is void. The plaintiff's own evidence shows that to locate the land he would be required to refer to the plat in evidence.
The discrepancy lies in the addition of the prefix "re" to the word "subdivision." In Newsom v. Belle Meade Development Corp., et al., 131 Fla. 143, 179 So. 160, we find the following: "In volume 26, page 357 R. C. L., the text says: 'A description in an assessment which is inherently defective cannot be supported by extrinsic evidence.'