Newport Condo. Ass'n v. Blackhall Corp.

Full title: THE NEWPORT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and…

Court: APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT SECOND DIVISION

Date published: May 25, 2021

2021 IL App (1st) 200847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

Opinion

No. 1-20-0847

05-25-2021

THE NEWPORT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. BLACKHALL CORPORATION 401(K) PSP, JINCHAU WU a/k/a JINCHAI WU, and RALPH HODGES, Defendants, (Blackhall Corporation 401(K) PSP, Defendant-Appellee, and Jinchau Wu a/k/a Jinchai Wu, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee).

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court.

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 15 CH 17426 The Honorable Neil H. Cohen, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Cobbs concured in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Because caselaw and relevant statutory provisions did not support the plaintiff condominium association's argument that its lien for unpaid assessments could not be extinguished under section 9(g)(3) of the Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2016)) by the defendant's payment of assessments that accrued after he acquired title to the subject property because its lien was superior to the defendant's interest, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. ¶ 2 Plaintiff, The Newport Condominium Association ("Newport Condo"), appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Blackhall Corporation 401(K) PSP ("Blackhall") and Jinchau Wu a/k/a Jinchai Wu, on Newport Condo's complaint seeking declaratory judgment and on Wu's counterclaim. On appeal, Newport Condo argues that the trial court erred in denying it summary judgment and entering judgment for defendants because Newport Condo's superior lien for unpaid assessments on the property at issue could not be extinguished by Wu's payment of assessments that accrued after he acquired title to the property. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In February 2017, Newport Condo filed its first amended complaint against Blackhall, Wu, and defendant Ralph Hodges. In the first amended complaint, Newport Condo alleged that in October 2014, Blackhall was assigned the mortgage on a condominium unit located at 4800 S. Chicago Beach Drive, Unit 1303N, in Chicago ("Subject Property"). Shana Pearson owned the Subject Property at the time. The following day, Pearson quit claimed her interest in the Subject Property to Blackhall. Although not specifically alleged in the first amended complaint, it appears that Pearson owed unpaid assessments to Newport Condo at the time she transferred her interest to Blackhall and that Newport Condo believed those unpaid assessments constituted a lien on the unit. In March 2015, Blackhall granted Wu a mortgage on the Subject Property. In early 2017, Blackhall transferred its interest in the Subject Property to Wu pursuant to a special warranty deed in lieu of foreclosure. Prior to transferring its interest to Wu, Blackhall entered into Articles of Agreement for Deed with Hodges, which Newport Condo alleged constituted a short-term lease in violation of its rules. Newport Condo also alleged that there existed a dispute between it, Blackhall, Wu, and Hodges regarding who was the owner of the Subject Property and whether Wu's mortgage was valid. Count I of the first amended complaint sought a declaration that Blackhall and Wu had violated various rules and statutes by leasing the Subject Property to Hodges in a short-term lease. Count II sought a declaration against all the defendants that the mortgage held by Wu on the Subject Property was not valid and that, even if it was, the lien Newport Condo held against the Subject Property for unpaid assessments was superior to Wu's interest in the Subject Property. ¶ 5 Wu filed an answer and counterclaim to the first amended complaint. His counterclaim sought a declaration that he held title to the Subject Property, Newport Condo's lien for unpaid assessments had been extinguished, and he was entitled to possession of the Subject Property. Blackhall and Hodges also filed an answer to the first amended complaint, but no counterclaims. ¶ 6 In December 2018 Newport Condo filed a motion for summary judgment on its complaint, while Blackhall and Wu filed a joint motion for summary judgment on both Newport Condo's complaint and Wu's counterclaim. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Newport Condo argued that defendants admitted leasing the Subject Property for less than 12 months in violation of Newport Condo's rules and that Wu took title to the Subject Property (via the deed in lieu of foreclosure) subject to Newport Condo's lien for unpaid assessments, which had not been satisfied. Blackhall and Wu argued that they had not leased the Subject Property for a term less than 12 months and that Newport Condo's lien had been extinguished pursuant to section 9(g)(3) of the Condominium Property Act ("Act") (765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2016)) by Wu's payment of $1,000 for the assessments that came due after he acquired title to the Subject Property. ¶ 7 On February 27, 2019, after the cross-motions for summary judgment were fully briefed by the parties, the trial court entered an order granting Blackhall and Wu summary judgment on Newport Condo's complaint and Wu's counterclaim. In its written order, the trial court found the following relevant facts to be undisputed, admitted by the parties, or subject to judicial notice:

"On December 19, 2005, Shana Pearson became the owner of record of [the Subject Property]. The Subject Property is located within the bounds of the Newport Condominium Association.

Pearson's mortgage on the Subject Property was assigned several times, eventually being assigned to Blackhall on October 13, 2014. On October 14, 2014, Pearson executed a Quit Claim Deed, in lieu of foreclosure, to Blackhall. The Quit Claim Deed was not recorded until January 24, 2017.

In connection with its acquisition of the Subject Property, Blackhall executed a promissory note for $27,500 with Wu ("Promissory Note"). The Promissory Note is dated March 10, 2015. On the same date, Blackhall executed a mortgage on the Subject Property in favor of Wu ("Wu Mortgage"). The mortgage was recorded on January 15, 2016.

On April 20, 2015, Newport [Condo] filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Blackhall seeking possession of the Subject Property and a monetary judgment for unpaid assessments.

*** Newport [Condo] filed the instant suit on December 1, 2015.


***

On March 10, 2016, the court in the forcible entry and detainer action against Blackhall entered an order awarding possession of the Subject Property to Newport [Condo]. The order was stayed until May 10, 2016.

On January 12, 2017, Blackhall conveyed its interest in the subject property to Wu by Special Warranty Deed. The Special Warranty Deed states that it is a Deed in Lieu of

Foreclosure pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/15-1401. The Special Warranty Deed was recorded on January 13, 2017.

On February 3, 2017, Newport [Condo] received a letter dated January 25, 2017 from the Law Offices of Cambi L. Cann, P.C. The letter stated that Cann was tendering $1,000 for payment of association fees for the Subject Unit on behalf of her client Wu. Newport [Condo] has admitted that it received Check No. 308132 in the amount of $1,000 by Guaranty National Title Company."

The parties do not make any argument on appeal that the trial court's conclusion that the above facts were undisputed was erroneous.¹ ¶ 8 Based on these undisputed facts, the trial court concluded that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on count I of Newport Condo's first amended complaint, because Wu was never in possession of the Subject Property and because declaratory judgment was not the appropriate method of addressing Blackhall's alleged past conduct of leasing the Subject Unit. With respect to count II, the trial court concluded that although there was no dispute that Newport Condo had a lien on the Subject Property for unpaid assessments, section 9(g)(3) of the Act clearly provided a means by which Wu could extinguish that lien, and Wu did so by tendering payment of $1,000. Finally, as to Wu's counterclaim seeking a declaration that he was entitled to possession of the Subject Property, the trial court noted that the court in the forcible entry and detainer case had already awarded possession to Newport Condo and the trial court concluded that it was not in a position to reverse another court's order. ¶ 9 Newport Condo then filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. Newport Condo appealed, but we dismissed that appeal due to a lack of jurisdiction, as Newport Condo's claims against Hodges remained pending at the time. The Newport Condominium Assoc. v. Blackhall Corp. 401(K) PSP, 2020 IL App (1st) 191717-U. Thereafter, Newport Condo voluntarily dismissed its claims against Hodges and instituted this timely appeal.

1 We note that the record on appeal in this case does not provide a clear picture of the current status of the Subject Property. From what we can gather, it appears that Wu holds title to the Subject Property, but Newport Condo currently has possession of it, and there is no mortgage on it. The record also contains allusions to a possible tenant occupying the Subject Property. Although more solid information on these questions would help clarify the parties' respective positions, resolution of them is not essential to our disposition of this appeal.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, Newport Condo's sole argument² is that the trial court erred in concluding that section 9(g)(3) of the Act extinguished its lien on the Subject Property for unpaid assessments. According to Newport Condo, because its lien was superior to any interest Wu had in the Subject Property, Wu could not use section 9(g)(3) to extinguish the lien. We disagree that the fact that Newport Condo's lien was superior to Wu's interest in the Subject Property, by itself, means that Wu could not avail himself of section 9(g)(3). Therefore, we affirm. ¶ 12 Summary judgment is appropriate only where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016)). Although the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily establish the lack of an issue of material fact or obligate a court to render summary judgment, it does indicate that the parties agree that the case involves a question of law and that they invite the court to decide the issues based on the record. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. Our review of a trial court's summary judgment determination is de novo. Id. at ¶ 30. ¶ 13 The Act imposes a duty on condominium owners to pay their proportionate share of "common expenses." 765 ILCS 605/9(a) (West 2016). "Common expenses" are defined as "the proposed or actual expenses affecting the property, including reserves, if any, lawfully assessed by the Board of Managers of the Unit Owner's Association." 765 ILCS 605/2(m) (West 2016). The failure to pay such expenses results in a lien on the owner's property:

"If any unit owner shall fail or refuse to make any payment of the common expenses or the amount of any unpaid fine when due, the amount thereof together with any interest, late charges, reasonable attorney fees incurred enforcing the covenants of the condominium instruments, rules and regulations of the board of managers, or any applicable statute or ordinance, and costs of collections shall constitute a lien on the interest of the unit owner in the property prior to all other liens and encumbrances, recorded or unrecorded, except only (a) taxes, special assessments and special taxes theretofore or thereafter levied by any political subdivision or municipal corporation of this State and other State or federal taxes which by law are a lien on the interest of the unit owner prior to preexisting recorded encumbrances thereon and (b) encumbrances on the interest of the unit owner recorded prior to the date of such failure or refusal which by law would be a lien thereon prior to subsequently recorded encumbrances. Any action brought to extinguish the lien of the association shall include the association as a party."

765 ILCS 605/9(g)(1) (West 2016). The Act also provides the following regarding the extinguishment of the lien:

"The purchaser of a condominium unit at a judicial foreclosure sale, or a mortgagee who receives title to a unit by deed in lieu of foreclosure or judgment by common law strict foreclosure or otherwise takes possession pursuant to court order under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, shall have the duty to pay the unit's proportionate share of the common expenses for the unit assessed from and after the first day of the month after the date of the judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of the deed in lieu of foreclosure, entry of a judgment in common law strict foreclosure, or taking of possession pursuant to such court order. Such payment confirms the extinguishment of any lien created pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection (g) by virtue of the failure or refusal of a prior unit owner to make payment of common expenses, where the judicial foreclosure sale has been confirmed by order of the court, a deed in lieu thereof has been accepted by the lender, or a consent judgment has been entered by the court."

765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3). ¶ 14 Here, there is no dispute that Newport Condo held a lien against the Subject Property as a result of the unpaid assessments dating back to Pearson's ownership. In addition, despite the fact that Newport Condo spends much of its time on appeal arguing that its lien is superior to Wu's interest in the Subject Property and that Wu took the Subject Property subject to Newport Condo's lien, there is no true dispute over those facts either. The fact that Newport Condo held a superior lien against the Subject Property and that Wu took the Subject Property subject to that lien is supported by section (g)(1) of the Act, quoted above, and section 15-1401 of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law ("Foreclosure Law") (735 ILCS 5/15-1401 (West 2016)), which provides that a mortgagee may accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure "subject to any other claims or liens affecting the real estate." ¶ 15 The pivotal issue here is whether Newport Condo's lien on the Subject Property, superior as it may have been, was extinguished by Wu's payment of $1,000 under section 9(g)(3) of the Act. Newport Condo argues that it was not, because section 9(g)(3) applies only where the lien sought to be extinguished is inferior to the new owner's interest in the property. According to Newport Condo, when sections 9(g)(1) and 9(g)(3) of the Act are read together, they provide that only those mortgagees whose interests are superior to that of a lien created under section 9(g)(1) may use section 9(g)(3) to extinguish a lien created under section 9(g)(1). Newport Condo does not, however, explain why this is so. It does not provide any analysis of the language used in these sections or even identify the specific language in these sections that causes it to reach this conclusion. Rather, Newport Condo's argument in this respect consists solely of reciting the provisions of sections 9(g)(1) and 9(g)(3) and then stating in a conclusory fashion that, read together, these provisions only allow for the extinguishment of inferior liens. This alone is problematic, because Newport Condo, as the appellant, is required to state not only its contentions on appeal, but also the reasons for those contentions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); see also Sakellariadis v. Campbell, 391 Ill. App. 3d 795, 804 (2009) ("The failure to assert a well-reasoned argument supported by legal authority is a violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) [citation], resulting in waiver."); Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986) ("A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument presented. The appellate court is not a depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research."). ¶ 16 In any case, we see no language in sections 9(g)(1) or 9(g)(3) of the Act, whether read separately or together, that supports a conclusion that section 9(g)(3) applies only when a mortgagee's interest is superior to an association's lien created under section 9(g)(1). In fact, section 9(g)(3) specifically provides that payment under that section "confirms the extinguishment of any lien created pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection (g) by virtue of the failure or refusal of a prior unit owner to make payment of common expenses." 765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (emphasis added). The use of the phrase "any lien" directly refutes Newport Condo's contention that section 9(g)(3) was intended to apply only to superior liens. ¶ 17 We also do not find any support for Newport Condo's conclusory claim that reading 9(g)(3) to permit the extinguishment of superior liens renders section 9(g)(1) meaningless. Section 9(g)(1) provides for the creation of a lien and its superiority over most other encumbrances on a property, while section 9(g)(3), on the other hand, provides a means by which that superior lien may be extinguished. The fact that section 9(g)(3) permits a section 9(g)(1) lien to be extinguished under rather limited circumstances does not negate the purpose or effect of section 9(g)(1): the creation of a lien in favor of an association that would otherwise not exist and the provision for that lien's superiority over most other encumbrances unless and until the requirements of section 9(g)(3) are fulfilled. Likewise, despite Newport Condo's contention to the contrary, section 9(g)(3) does not conflict with the statement in section 15-1401 of the Foreclosure Law that a mortgagee may accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure "subject to any other claims or liens affecting the real estate." A mortgagee can take property subject to an association's lien for unpaid assessments by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure while also still being provided a means by which to extinguish that lien under section 9(g)(3) of the Act. These provisions are not mutually exclusive. ¶ 18 At its core, Newport Condo's argument appears to be based on a belief that a superior lien can never be extinguished by one who takes the property subject to that lien. Although Newport Condo is correct that the general rule is "first in time, first in right" when determining the priority of encumbrances on real property (see Aames Capital Corp. v. Interstate Bank of Oak Forest, 315 Ill. App. 700, 703 (2000)), the fact that a lien is prior or superior to other liens does not mean that it can never be extinguished. Moreover, it is well within our legislature's power to provide a means by which a lien, even if superior, can be extinguished, especially where the lien to be extinguished is itself a creature of statute. This appears to be exactly what our legislature intended to do when it enacted section 9(g)(3) of the Act, which specifically contemplates the extinguishment of liens resulting from the "prior unit owner['s]" (emphasis added) failure to pay assessments, i.e., liens that predate and are superior to the new mortgagee's interest. Accordingly, Newport Condo's belief that superior liens cannot be extinguished by those with inferior interests is without merit. ¶ 19 Newport Condo relies on our supreme court's decision in 1010 Lake Shore Association v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 IL 118372, to argue that (1) sections 9(g)(1) and 9(g)(3) of the Act must be read in conjunction with the Foreclosure law, and (2) if Wu wanted to extinguish Newport Condo's superior lien, he should not have accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure, but instead should have pursued foreclosure proceedings under the Foreclosure Law. Neither of these contentions warrant reversal. ¶ 20 In 1010 Lake Shore, the defendant bought the property at issue at a judicial foreclosure sale. Id. ¶ 3. The plaintiff, the condominium association of which the property was a part, demanded payment of unpaid assessments and then later filed suit seeking possession of the property and payment of those expenses. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. On summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that because the defendant had not made any payments for assessments accruing after its purchase of the property, the lien for the unpaid assessments that accrued prior to the defendant's purchase was not extinguished under section 9(g)(3) of the Act. Id. ¶ 5. In response, the defendant argued in part that the lien for unpaid assessments that accrued prior to its purchase was extinguished during the foreclosure proceeding, because the plaintiff had been joined as a party to that action. Id. ¶ 7. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and awarded it the full amount of unpaid assessments. Id. ¶ 21 On appeal, our supreme court rejected the defendant's contention that section 9(g)(3) of the Act provided an alternative means for foreclosure sale purchasers to extinguish a condominium association's lien where the association was not joined as a party to the foreclosure action. The court noted that the last sentence of section 9(g)(1) of the Act specifically provided that an action to extinguish a lien created under that section "shall include the association as a party." Id. ¶ 26. "Thus, section 9(g)(1) is very specific on the method for extinguishing an association's lien created by the prior unit owner's failure to pay assessments. *** The statute does not provide that a foreclosure sale purchaser may extinguish the lien by simply making postforeclosure sale assessment payments." Id. ¶ 22 The court went on to note that the second sentence of section 9(g)(3) stated that the payment of postforeclosure sale assessments "confirm[s]" the extinguishment of an association's lien. Accordingly, "[t]he plain language of section 9(g)(3) assumes that the lien has already been extinguished by including the association as a party to a foreclosure action. Section 9(g)(3) provides an additional step to confirm or formally approve the extinguishment by paying the postforeclosure sale assessments." Id. ¶ 27. ¶ 23 Finally, the court observed that its interpretation of sections 9(g)(1) and 9(g)(3) of the Act was consistent with section 15-1509(c) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1509(c) (West 2016)), which provided that the vesting of title in the foreclosure sale purchaser bars the claims of the parties to the foreclosure action. 1010 Lake Shore, 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 38. ¶ 24 Although we agree that 1010 Lake Shore indicates that the Act and the Foreclosure Law should be read consistently whenever possible (id. ¶ 37), Newport Condo does not cite any provision of the Foreclosure Law that it contends is inconsistent with the trial court's interpretation of section 9(g)(3) of the Act other than section 15-1401. For the reasons we have already discussed, the fact that a mortgagee who takes a property by way of deed in lieu of foreclosure does so subject to an association's lien for unpaid assessments is not inconsistent with the mortgagee's ability to later extinguish that lien upon fulfilling the requirements of section 9(g)(3). ¶ 25 With respect to Newport Condo's contention that Wu could only extinguish Newport Condo's superior lien on the Subject Property by seeking a judicial foreclosure and including Newport Condo as a party to that action, we do not read 1010 Lake Shore as imposing any such requirement. Although the holding in 1010 Lake Shore imposed specific requirements on those who take property by way of formal foreclosure proceedings, we see nothing in its holding that requires that formal foreclosure proceedings be pursued before a party may take advantage of section 9(g)(3) of the Act or that suggests superior association liens can only be extinguished through formal foreclosure proceedings. The court was not presented with the question of whether those who take a property by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure or other means aside from foreclosure sale must follow the same procedures as those who purchase property at a foreclosure sale. Likewise, the priority of the associations' lien in 1010 Lake Shore was not a determinative factor in the court's decision. We also observe that section 9(g)(3) of the Act, on its own terms, clearly encompasses mortgagees who take property by means other than foreclosure sales, such as by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Thus, we reject Newport Condo's contention that Wu could not terminate its superior lien because he took the Subject Property by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure instead of purchasing it at a foreclosure sale. ¶ 26 We note that the decision in 1010 Lake Shore states that a foreclosure sale purchaser cannot extinguish an association's lien merely by making payment of postforeclosure sale assessments under section 9(g)(3) of the Act. Instead, the association must be named as a party to the foreclosure action per section 9(g)(1) of the Act, and a payment under section 9(g)(3) only serves to confirm the extinguishment of the association's lien that occurs when title to the property is vested in the foreclosure purchaser under section 15-1509(c) of the Foreclosure Law. In other words, 1010 Lake Shore clarifies that for a foreclosure sale purchaser to extinguish an association's lien created under section 9(g)(1) of the Act, the association's lien must first be extinguished in the foreclosure action by naming the association as a party to the foreclosure action. Only then can the foreclosure sale purchaser "confirm" the extinguishment of the association's lien by making payment of the postforeclosure sale assessments under section 9(g)(3) of the Act. ¶ 27 This, of course, raises the question of whether payment of postdeed assessments under section 9(g)(3) alone is sufficient to extinguish an association's lien where a mortgagee takes the property by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The answer to this question is more complicated than the question posed in 1010 Lake Shore, given that foreclosure proceedings are not necessary to effectuate the transfer of property via a deed in lieu of foreclosure, and a mortgagee often accepts a deed in lieu of foreclosure as a means of avoiding foreclosure proceedings. In other words, there may not be foreclosure proceedings to which the association can be joined and by which separate extinguishment the association's lien can occur. Yet, section 9(g)(3) specifically contemplates the extinguishment of superior association liens by those who take property by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The decision in 1010 Lake Shore speaks specifically and only in terms of foreclosure sale purchasers and does not provide any insight into what effect, if any, its holding might have on those who take property by way of deeds in lieu of foreclosure. ¶ 28 In any case, we need not answer this ultimate question. Newport Condo's argument is that its superior lien could not be extinguished under 9(g)(3) if Wu took the subject property by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure instead of purchasing it at a foreclosure sale following foreclosure proceedings to which Newport Condo was a party. As discussed above, the decision in 1010 Lake Shore and the plain language of section 9(g)(3) does not support this proposition. On the other hand, Newport Condo does not make any argument that Wu, as a mortgagee who took the Subject Property by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, was required to institute some separate judicial proceeding to first extinguish Newport Condo's lien for unpaid assessments before availing himself of section 9(g)(3). Thus, we leave for another day the question of whether those who take a property by deed in lieu of foreclosure or one of the other means specified in section 9(g)(3) of the Act must first obtain formal judicial extinguishment of an association's lien prior to availing themselves of section 9(g)(3). ¶ 29 Finally, we note that Newport Condo cites to provision in its Declaration of Ownership that provide that unpaid assessments constitute a lien on the property and that such a lien is not affected by transfer of title. We do not dispute the validity of these provisions, but they also do not aid Newport Condo in its pursuits on appeal, as they have no bearing on the interpretation or application of section 9(g)(3) of the Act. ¶ 30 In sum, we conclude that Newport Condo is correct that its lien for unpaid assessments was superior to Wu's interest in the Subject Property and that Wu took the Subject Property subject to Newport Condo's lien. We do not agree, however, that these facts required the trial court to grant Newport Condo summary judgment or precluded the trial court from granting it to defendants. Accordingly, Newport Condo has failed to demonstrate that reversal is necessary.

2 We note that in their briefs, the parties engage in some debate over whether the mortgage between Blackhall and Wu was valid. Although that issue was raised in the trial court, Newport Condo does not raise it as an issue on appeal and it does not affect our decision, so we have no cause to address it. --------

¶ 31 CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed. ¶ 33 Affirmed.