Washburn v. Brown, No. 81 C 1475, slip op. at 3 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 23, 1987 (Kocoras, J.) [Available on WESTLAW, DCT database]; Carlstead v. Holiday Inns. Inc., No. 86 C 1927, slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 8, 1986) (Plunkett, J.) [Available on WESTLAW, DCT database]; Newman v. Wanland, 651 F. Supp. 20, 22 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Williams, J.); Griggs v. Robinson Securities, No. 84 C 4679, slip op. at 7 (N.D.Ill. May 9, 1985) (Grady, J.) [Available on WESTLAW, DCT database].
The investors urged the district court to follow the "last predicate act" rule. Under this rule, espoused primarily by the Third Circuit, Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1988), and by several district courts in this circuit, e.g. Norris v. Wirtz, 703 F. Supp. 1322, 1326 (N.D.Ill. 1989); Newman v. Wanland, 651 F. Supp. 20, 22 (N.D.Ill. 1986); County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 435 (N.D.Ill. 1986), the four-year statute of limitations begins to run "from the time when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the last injury or the last predicate act which is part of the same pattern of racketeering activity." Keystone, 863 F.2d at 1130.
Fiswick, therefore does not apply to a civil conspiracy action to recover damages. In Newman v. Wanland, 651 F. Supp. 20 (N.D.Ill. 1986), the court cited Baker in holding that "the limitations period begins to run from the last overt act of the conspiracy" in a RICO conspiracy claim. Id. at 22.
See id.; Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Streit, No. 84 C 7471, 1987 WL 9318 (N.D.Ill. April 3, 1987) (1987 WL 9318) (McGarr, J.); County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 433-35 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Kocoras, J.); Newman v. Wanland, 651 F. Supp. 20, 22 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Williams, J.). Under the second standard, the RICO claim accrues at the time the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that she sustained an injury from a RICO violation.
April 6, 1987) (1987 WL 9318) (McGarr, J.); Carlstead v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 86 C 1927 (N.D.Ill.March 26, 1987) (1987 WL 9024) (Plunkett, J.); County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 433-35 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Kocoras, J.); Griggs v. Robinson Securities, No. 84 C 4679 (N.D.Ill. May 9, 1985) (1985 WL 1163) (Grady, J.); Newman v. Wanland, 651 F. Supp. 20, 22 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Williams, J.). Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the statute begins to run when plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered that they sustained an injury from a RICO violation.
The first test — the "last predicate act" standard — holds that the limitations period commences to run on a RICO claim from the date of the last predicate act comprising the RICO pattern. Plaintiff herein urges the court to adopt this rule and points out that a substantial number of judges in this district have adopted the approach. See Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Streit, No. 84 C. 7471 (N.D.Ill. April 3, 1987) [1987 WL 9318] (McGarr, J.); Carlstead v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 86 C 1927 (N.D.Ill. March 26, 1987) [1987 WL 9024] (Plunkett, J.); County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 433-35 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Kocoras, J.); Griggs v. Robinson Securities, No. 84 C 4679 (N.D.Ill. May 9, 1985) [1985 WL 1163] (Grady, J.); Newman v. Wanland, 651 F. Supp. 20, 22 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Williams, J.) (We disagree with defendants that this case adopts a "discovery" rule). The other standard — the "discovery" rule — holds that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of her injury. The parties here cite several interpretations of the discovery rule.
Although differing views exist in this district as to the proper accrual date for civil RICO claims, this Court continues to favor the analysis expressed by the court in Field. Accord Newman v. Wanlund, 651 F. Supp. 20 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Judge Ann Williams applied the rule that the limitations period begins to run from the "last overt act" to an alleged civil RICO continuing conspiracy claim). See also Wabash Publishing, Co. v. Dermer, 650 F. Supp. 212 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner compares an alleged continuing conspiracy RICO claim to a continuing conspiracy antitrust claim.