Opinion
A3-00-143
March 14, 2001
ORDER
I. Introduction
Before the Court is plaintiff's motion asking the Court to recuse itself (doc. # 15), plaintiff's motion for an immediate stay of proceedings (doc. # 19), a motion to dismiss by the judicial defendants (doc. # 16), and a motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment by defendant Schieferdecker (doc. # 22). For the reasons set forth below, both of the plaintiff's motions are DENIED, and the defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
II. Analysis A. Plaintiff's motion for recusal
Plaintiff seeks recusal on two alternate grounds. First, he seeks disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455. That statute generally requires recusal of a judge "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," and it also lists a number of specific instances in which recusal is required, none of which is met here. Second, plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 144, which requires a judge to stop handling a case "[w]henever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party. . . ." Specifically, the affidavit must contain "the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists," and must "be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith."
While these requirements have not been met, the Court notes that plaintiff is acting pro se and so will not decide the issue on that basis.
The Court concludes that neither of these standards has been met. Plaintiff cites as support for his motion only the fact that this Court has ruled against him in a fashion he characterizes as an "arbitrary and capricious denial of plauintiff's [sic] motion for default judgment." He further characterizes this as creating a conflict of interest. The Court rejects the notion that deciding against a party — even incorrectly, though the Court believes its rulings have been correct — is a basis for recusal. Courts rule against parties all the time, and those parties often feel aggrieved. Clearly, the legal system would grind to a halt if contrary rulings always formed the basis for recusal. Therefore, the motion for recusal is DENIED (doc. # 15).
B. Plaintiff's motion for an immediate stay
Plaintiff has also made a "exparte (sic) request for immediate stay of proceedings but not limited to the signing and entry of any written order of judgment by default for plaintiff; notice or motions for (1) amending complaint; (2) the taking of evidence or testimony; (3) a status or scheduling conference." The motion then reiterates the allegations plaintiff makes in his complaint. Plaintiff cites no rule or case supporting his motion, and the Court is unaware of any. Therefore, the motion for an immediate stay is DENIED (doc. # 19).
C. Defendants' motions to dismiss
The defendant judges — Holter, Lange, Mondray, and Murphy — have moved for dismissal on several grounds. First, they point out the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from reviewing final state court decisions, as plaintiff essentially wishes. Second, they urge this Court to abstain from issuing any injunctions, as plaintiff requests, under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Third, they assert this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, as they are not subject to jurisdiction in North Dakota. Fourth, they argue the Eleventh Amendment prevents this Court from enjoining state officers from violating state law. Finally, they assert absolute judicial immunity from damages. Plaintiff has not responded to this motion, and the thirty-day period for doing so has elapsed. Local Rule 7.1(B).
The fact that plaintiff has not responded allows the Court to deem the motion well taken, justifying granting the motion in and of itself. Local Rule 7.1(C). More importantly, however, the Court is persuaded by each of the reasons proffered by these defendants. The Court is especially concerned by the conclusion — evident from the pleadings — that it does not have personal jurisdiction over these defendants. Therefore, the Court deems the motion well taken, and the judicial defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED (doc. # 16).
The Court is also persuaded by defendant Schieferdecker's motion to dismiss, a defense he asserted in his initial answer, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h) (doc. # 7). It is clear from the pleadings in this case that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over a Minnesota state official who lives in Minnesota and is sued for actions occurring entirely within the scope of his Minnesota employment and within the state of Minnesota. As defendant points out, the only connection between this case and North Dakota is that plaintiff lives in North Dakota; this is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over defendant. See generally Hust v. Northern Log, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 429 (N.D. 1980) (discussing standards for asserting personal jurisdiction in North Dakota). Therefore, the Court finds that it is without personal jurisdiction over defendant Schieferdecker, and the motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED (doc. # 22) . The Court thus need not consider the other arguments raised in his motion.
The motion requests both summary judgment and dismissal, and it contains arguments appropriate to both requests. However, because the Court chooses to resolve the motion on the basis of personal jurisdiction, it refers to the motion as one for dismissal.
In closing, the Court wishes to make clear its frustration with this kind of lawsuit. Plaintiff has presented claims, which can be at best described as frivolous, without doing any research to ensure he was filing them properly or in the proper court. He then confronted the Court with a series of motions best described as frivolous, including one challenging the Court's impartiality. He has thereby forced these defendants and the Court to expend valuable time and money dealing with him, when he had no basis for making these claims against these defendants in this court, if anywhere. The Court urges plaintiff to proceed with far more caution if he seeks to use this or any other court system again.
IT IS SO ORDERED.