Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-2746
December 26, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, Patterson Services Inc. ("Patterson"), which alleges judicial estoppel. Plaintiffs, Newfield Exploration Company ("Newfield") and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London ("Underwriters"), oppose the motion. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
R. Doc. No. 15. Defendant, Applied Drilling Technology, Inc. ("ADTI"), has adopted Patterson's motion for summary judgment in toto. R. Doc. No. 14.
R. Doc. No. 29.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2000, Newfield filed a lawsuit against the F/V THAI HUNG, in rem, and Thai Hung, Inc., the owner of the vessel, in personam, for property damage arising out of an allison that occurred on September 13, 2000. Specifically, Newfield alleged that the F/V THAI HUNG allided with plaintiffs stationary oil well, causing extensive damage for which the vessel in rem and Thai Hung, Inc. were liable.Of significance to the issues in this case, Paragraph 3 of Newfield's verified complaint in its first lawsuit provided:
At all times hereinafter mentioned, [Newfield] was and still is the owner and operator of an oil well located in Ship Shoal Block No. 76 in the Gulf of Mexico, offshore of Terrebonne Parish, which, prior to tile allison hereinafter described, was in sound condition, and in all respects fully operational and properly maintained .
Id. at ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
Paragraph 9 of the complaint further alleged that the allison with the oil well, as well as the "subsequent damage to same, was not caused or occasioned by any fault on the part of [Newfield], but rather was caused and/or occasioned solely by the fault, carelessness, and negligence of defendant, Thai Hung, the owner and/or operator of the F/V THAI HUNG." Neither the M/V THAI HUNG nor her owner, Thai Hung, Inc., filed an answer to Newfield's complaint.
Id. at ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
R. Doc. No. 15, Memorandum, p. 4; R. Doc. No. 29, p. 4.
On February 8, 2001, United States District Judge Martin L.C. Feldman entered a default judgment against the F/V THAI HUNG in rem and in favor of Newfield and ordered that the vessel be sold to satisfy the default judgment. On March 1, 2001, the vessel was sold to Newfield pursuant to its credit bid of $385,000.00. Newfield also received policy limits of $92,631.68 from the vessel's PI insurer. Accordingly, Newfield received a total of $477,631.68 on behalf of the F/V THAI HUNG.
R. Doc. No. 15, Memorandum, p. 4, and Exhibit "C." As part of its judgment against the vessel, Newfield was authorized to bid any amount up to $13,644,500.00 without the need to make a deposit. Id.
R. Doc. No. 15, Memorandum, p. 4, and Exhibit "D."
R. Doc. No. 15, Memorandum, p. 4, and Exhibit "E."
On June 12, 2001, Newfield filed a motion for default judgment and supplementary proceedings against Thai Hung, Inc. The motion was subsequently referred to United States Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. who, on July 18, 2001, issued findings of fact and recommended that Newfield's motion for default judgment against Thai Hung, Inc. be granted. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson found that based upon the allegations in the complaint, the record, Newfield's submissions, and the applicable law, "Newfield [was] entitled to a default judgment in its favor and against Thai Hung, Inc. in the amount of $13,392,530.70." On August 28, 2001, Judge Feldman adopted Magistrate Judge Wilkinson's findings and recommendations and entered a final default judgment against Thai Hung, Inc., in personam, in the amount of $12,914,899.02.
Newfield Exploration Co. v. F/V Thai Hung, et al., No. 00-2965 (E.D.La.), R. Doc. No. 36.
R. Doc. No. 15, Exhibit "F," p. 8.
Under the general maritime law, "the allison between the F/V THAI HUNG and a stationary object is presumed to be the fault of Thai Hung, Inc." Id. at p. 6.
Id. at pp. 6-7.
In his findings and recommendations, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson pointed out that "[t]he well pleaded allegations of the complaint are accepted as true for purposes of a motion for default judgment and, once granted, a default judgment is unassailable on the merits so far as it is supported by well-pleaded allegations." Id. at p. 5. In reviewing Newfield's complaint, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson recited the following allegations upon which the motion for default judgment was based:
Newfield's Complaint avers the following facts. Thai Hung, Inc. is a Louisiana corporation with its principal place of business in Houma, Louisiana. It was the owner and operator of the F/V THAI HUNG on September 13, 2000, when the vessel negligently allided with a stationary oil well located in Ship Shoal Block No. 76 in the Gulf of Mexico offshore of Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana. Before the allison, the well was in sound condition, fully operational and properly maintained The allison knocked the well over and caused it to become submerged below water resulting in extensive damage and preventing it from being placed in production. Newfield alleged that it was without fault and that the allison was caused solely by the fault and negligence of the defendants.Id. at p. 5 (emphasis added).
R. Doc. No. 15, Exhibit "G." The amount of the default judgement took into consideration the sums Newfield received from the sale of the F/V THAI HUNG and the vessel's insurer. K. Doc. No. 15, Memorandum, p. 6. It is undisputed that "[t]he default judgment against Thai Hung, Inc. remains unexecuted." R. Doc. No. 29, p. 5.
Subsequently, on September 7, 2001, Newfield filed the present action against defendants, ADTI, Patterson, and Eagle Oilfield Inspection Services, Inc., also seeking to recover damages arising out of the September 13, 2000, allison of the F/V THAI HUNG with Newfield's well (the "second lawsuit"). In this second lawsuit, Newfield alleges three theories of recovery against the defendants: (1) breach of the turnkey contract regarding the fabrication and installation of the oil well, (2) negligence, and (3) breach of defendants' respective warranties of workmanlike performance. Newfield's allegations in this second lawsuit are based on the alleged inability of the well "to withstand the impact" of the allison with the F/V THAI HUNG, which caused the well to be "knocked over from its previous upright position and [become] submerged below the surface of the water." Newfield further avers that it was the alleged negligence of these defendants and the alleged breaches of their contract with Newfield which caused the damages to Newfield's well.
Eagle Oilfield Inspection Services, Inc. was subsequently dismissed from this lawsuit through summary judgment. K. Doc. Nos. 40 and 47.
R. Doc. No. 29, Plaintiffs' Kesponse to Patterson's Statement of Uncontested Facts, p. 14.
R. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 15. Specifically, Newfield alleges that the "defendants furnished the Well with a drive pipe of less than I" wall thickness in the areas of the joints of the constituent portions of the drive pipe" in contravention of the terms of the turnkey contract which obligated the defendants to "furnish the Well with a drive pipe of 1" wall thickness." Id. at ¶¶ 12 and 13.
Id. at ¶¶ 15, 17, 21.
Defendants, Patterson and ADTI, seek summary judgment, arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Newfield from claiming in this litigation that its damages were caused by alleged structural defects of the well, which well it previously asserted "was in sound condition, and in all respects fully operational and properly maintained." Defendants further argue that judicial estoppel also precludes Newfield from taking a position that is contrary to its earlier claim that the F/V THAI HUNG's allison was the sole cause of its damages. This Court agrees.
R. Doc. No. 15, Exhibit "A," ¶ 3, Memorandum, pp. 7-8.
R. Doc. No. 15, Memorandum, p. 13.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c). Once the moving party carries its burden of proving that there is no material factual dispute, the burden shifts to the nonmovant "to show that summary judgment should not lie."Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994). While the court must consider the evidence with all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Associates of North Texas, 1998 WL 175313, *2 (5th Cir. 1998). This requires the nonmoving party to do "more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Auguster v. Vermillion Parish School Board, 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001). In this case, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the Court finds that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
"The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party in a legal proceeding from asserting a position that is contrary to a position taken by that party in the same or a prior proceeding." Zapata Gulf Marine Corporation v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 731 F. Supp. 747, 749 (E.D.La. 1990); Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1998). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, pursuant to that doctrine, "a party cannot advance one argument and then, for convenience or gamesmanship after that argument has served its purpose, advance a different and inconsistent argument." Hotard v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 286 F.3d 814, 818 (5th Cir. 2002). The purpose of judicial estoppel is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process,' by `prevent[ing] parties from playing fast and loose with the courts to suit the exigencies of self interest."' In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Recently, the United States Supreme Court noted that "`[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation or principle."' New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1815, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (quoting Allen v. Zurich Insurance Company, 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated that are there are several factors which courts should consider when determining whether to apply judicial estoppel to a particular case. Id. "First, a party's later position must be `clearly inconsistent' with its earlier position." Id. (quoting In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 206 (5th Cir. 1999)). Second, the party must have "succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create `the perception that either the first or the second court was misled.'" Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982)). Third, the court should consider whether "the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped." Id. at 751, 121 S.Ct. at 1815, 149 L.Ed.2d 968.
With respect to this second factor, the Supreme Coutt noted that "[a]bsent success in a prior proceeding, a party's later inconsistent position introduces no `risk of inconsistent court determinations,' and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity." Id. at 751, 121 S.Ct. at 1815, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (quoting United States v. C.I.T. Constr. Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 1991)).
The Supreme Court went on to explain that that these factors are not exhaustive. The Court stated:
In enumerating these factors, we do not establish inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel. Additional considerations may inform the doctrine's application in specific factual contexts.Id.
With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that Newfield's allegations in the present lawsuit contradict the allegations in its previous lawsuit. In Newfield's first lawsuit, Newfield alleged that at all times prior to the allison, the well "was in sound condition, and in all respects fully operational and properly maintained." Newfield further alleged that the damages to the well were caused solely by the negligence and fault of Thai Hung, Inc. Based on those allegations, Newfield obtained a default judgment against Thai Hung, Inc. for the full amount of its damages.
R. Doc. No. 15, Exhibit "A," ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 9.
R. Doc. No. 15, Exhibit "F," pp. 6-7. In support of its claim for damages, Newfield submitted the declaration of James F. Eisterhold, Newfield's production engineer, who testified that Newfield expended a total of $13,392,530.70 to repair and replace the well.
In its second lawsuit, however, Newfield now claims that the well was not in sound condition as it had structural defects which made it unable to withstand the force of the allision. Newfield further claims that its damages were caused not by the sole fault of Thai Hung, Inc., as previously alleged, but by the negligence of Patterson and ADTI in failing to properly erect the well in accordance with the terms of the turnkey contract. Clearly, Newfield's position in this second lawsuit is inconsistent with its previous position.
R. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 15.
Id. at ¶¶ 12, 13, 15, 17, 21.
The second factor, i.e. reliance by a court on the party's previous position, is also met. In his findings and recommendations in Newfield' s first lawsuit, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson specifically noted Newfield's allegations that "the well was in sound condition, fully operational and properly maintained" and that Newfield's resulting damages were "caused solely by the fault and negligence of Thai Hung, Inc.]." Magistrate Wilkinson also indicated that the well-pleaded allegations of Newfield's complaint were to be accepted as true for purposes of the motion for default judgment. Finally, he stated that in making his findings and recommendations, he considered, in part, Newfield's complaint and submissions. Thereafter, Judge Feldman entered a final default judgment based on the record and Magistrate Judge Wilkinson's findings and recommendations. Therefore, it is undisputed that in Newfield's first lawsuit, this Court accepted and relied upon Newfield's previous position that its well was in sound condition at the time of the accident and that the negligence of Thai Hung, Inc. was the sole cause of the damages. Relying on that position, the Court granted Newfield's motion for default judgment and allowed plaintiff full recovery of its damages against Thai Hung, Inc. Accordingly, the second requirement for judicial estoppel — judicial acceptance of, and reliance on, Newfield's previous inconsistent position — is satisfied.
R. Doc. No. 15, Exhibit "F," p. 2.
Id. at p. 5.
Id. at p. 2.
With respect to the third factor, i.e. whether the party advancing the inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped, Newfield argues that there is joint and several liability between Thai Hung, Inc., the defendant in the first lawsuit, and Patterson and ADTI in the present lawsuit such that it has not "gained any advantage by making the allegations that are subject of defendants' affirmative defense of judicial estoppel." Specifically, Newfield argues that because there is joint and several liability between all the defendants, "the THAI HUNG Court could have cast Thai Hung, Inc. in judgment for 100 percent ofNewfield' s damages, regardless of whether F/V THAI HUNG and Thai Hung, Inc. were solely at fault or only 1 percent at fault for Newfield's loss."
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 875 (1979) defines joint and several liability as follows: Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm. Coats v. Penrod Drilling Exploration, 61 F.3d 1113, 1130 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1995).
R. Doc. No. 29, pp. 10-11.
R. Doc. No, 29, p. 10.
Newfield's reliance on the alleged joint and several liability between Thai Hung, Inc. and the defendants in this lawsuit, however, is disingenuous. In Newfield's first lawsuit, the Court found, as urged by Newfield, that Newfield's damages were caused by the sole fault or negligence of Thai Hung, Inc. In other words, Thai Hung, Inc. was found to be 100% at fault in causing Newfield's damages. As such, there is no other share of fault for this Court to apportion to any other p arty.
R. Doc. No. 15, Exhibit "F."
Joint and several liability necessarily requires more than one tortfeasor and it also requires that each tortfeasor's conduct have contributed to the casualty. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 301 n. 37 (5th Cir. 2001)("Under doctrine of `joint and several liability,' when two or more persons cause indivisible harm, each is subject to liability for entire harm"); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corporation, 61 F.3d 1113, 1125 (5th Cir. 1995).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Newfield contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not apply to this case because at the time it filed its first lawsuit and sought the default judgments, "all information and documents available to Newfield's counsel suggested that the Well was in sound condition prior to the allison and that the conduct of the F/V Thai Hung and/or Thai Hung, Inc. was the sole cause of the resulting damage and loss." Plaintiff further contends that it was not until the remnants of the drive pipe were recovered and examined in May, 2002, that there was any reason to suspect that the well was not, in fact, in sound condition prior to the allison or that the damage to the well was caused by anything other than the allision. Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 753, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1816, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001), Newfield argues that because it made a mistake as to the facts, it would be inappropriate to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Plaintiffs' argument and reliance on New Hampshire, however, is misplaced.
R. Doc. No. 29, p. 8.
Id.; R. Doc. No. 21, Declaration of W. Mark Buchler, ¶¶ 5-7.
R. Doc. No. 29, p. 8.
In New Hampshire v. Maine, the United States Supreme Court rejected New Hampshire's attempt to escape the application of judicial estoppel on the basis that it lacked adequate knowledge as to the underlying facts at the time it asserted its position in earlier litigation. Id. at 753, 121 S.Ct. at 1816, 149 L.Ed.2d 968. The Court held that where the information was available to New Hampshire at the time it asserted its earlier position, the defense of mistake was inapplicable and the doctrine of judicial estoppel was not precluded. Specifically, the Court stated:
New Hampshire also contends that the 1977 consent decree was entered without "a searching history inquiry into what the language [`Middle of the River'] meant.' According to New Hampshire, had it known then what it knows now about the relevant history, it would not have entered into the decree. We do not question that it may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel "when a party's prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.' We are unpersuaded, however, that New Hampshire's position in 1977 fairly may be regarded as a product of inadvertence or mistake.
* * *
In its present complaint, New Hampshire relies on historical materials — primarily official documents and events from the colonial and postcolonial periods — that were no less available 25 years ago than they are today. And New Hampshire had every reason to consult those materials . . .Id. at 753-54, 121 S.Ct. at 1816-17, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Czajkowski v. City of Chicago, 810 F. Supp. 1428, 1436-37 (N.D.Ill. 1992) (holding that although new information can be a basis for permitting a party to change its prior position, the defense is not available when the information or evidence was available to that party at the time it took the prior position).
Newfield in this case has conceded that it "suspected as early as February, 2001, that there may have been problems with the structural integrity of the well, i.e., the weld joint of the drive pipe which is the subject of this litigation." The declaration of Newfield's expert witness, W. Mark Buchler, further establishes Newfield's knowledge of this potential problem. Nevertheless, despite such knowledge, Newfield did not change its position, but rather filed a motion for default judgment against Thai Hung, Inc. and allowed a final default judgment to be taken against the corporation on the grounds that Newfield's well was in sound condition, fully operational and properly maintained, and that the sole cause of Newfield's damages was the allison of the F/V THAI HUNG.
R. Doc. No. 48.
Mr. Buchler testified that he attended an inspection of the drive pipe on February 28, 2001, at which time "it appeared to [him] that the weld joint had not been executed in such a manner as to produce a full-penetration weld." K. Doc. No. 21, Declaration of W. Mark Buchler, ¶¶ 4-5. Presumably, Newfield suspected that there may have been problems with the structural integrity of the well prior to February 28, 2001, as it retained Mr. Buehler's services to further investigate the matter.
Despite the information which was available to Newfield as early as February, 2001, at no time in Newfield's first lawsuit did Newfield advise the Court that there was any alleged issue with respect to the structural integrity of the well or that there were any other alleged causes of Newfield's damages. Accordingly, in compliance with the Supreme Court's holding in New Hampshire, this Court finds that Newfield's position in its first lawsuit was not a product of mistake or inadvertence and, therefore, such defense will not defeat the application of judicial estoppel in this case.
Newfield next argues that judicial estoppel does not apply because defendants, Patterson and ADTI, were neither parties to the prior proceeding against the F/V THAI HUNG and Thai Hung, Inc., nor were Patterson and ADTI alleged to be in privity with either F/V THAI HUNG or Thai Hung, Inc. In support of its contention, Newfield relies on Colonial Refrigerated Transportation, Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 550 (5th Cir. 1968), as cited in footnote 33 in Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995), wherein the Fifth Circuit noted language in Colonial Refrigerated Transportation, Inc., stating that "judicial estoppel may be invoked only by a party to the prior litigation or someone privy to a party."
R. Doc. No. 29, p. 11; R. Doc. No. 51, p. 1.
Other than the footnote in Nichols, Colonial Refrigerated Transportation, Inc., has not been cited for such a proposition by any other Court. It should be noted that contrary to Newfield's contention, the Court in Nichols did not take a definite stance regarding the applicability of judicial estoppel in cases where the parties before the court were not the same in both lawsuits. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that there appear to be two views:
There is considerable authority that judicial estoppel does not apply in favor of one who was not a party to the prior proceeding in which the inconsistent position was taken. . . There is also, however, authority that the party invoking the estoppel need not have been a party to the prior proceeding.Nichols, 69 F.3d at 1272, n. 33.
The more prevalent view in this and other circuits is that for judicial estoppel to apply, both parties need not be the same in the first and second proceedings. "`While privity and/or detrimental reliance are often present in judicial estoppel cases, they are not required."' In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 206 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 360 (3rd Cir. 1996)). Other courts are in agreement. See Allen v. Zurich Insurance Company, 667 F.2d 1162, 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1982) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs claim against defendant on the basis of judicial estoppel emanating from plaintiffs state court judgment against another defendant in previous lawsuit); Edwards v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)("[J]udicial estoppel may be applied even if detrimental reliance or privity does not exist"); Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying judicial estoppel against party taking inconsistent position in prior lawsuit even though defendant invoking the doctrine was not a party to the earlier lawsuit), Zapata Gulf Marine Corporation v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 731 F. Supp. 747, 750 (E.D.La. 1990) ("[J]udicial estoppel does not require privity, reliance, or prejudice. This is because judicial estoppel is not concerned with the relationship between the parties, but with the integrity of the judicial process, which may be injured by inconsistent positions regardless of privity, reliance, or prejudice."); Long v. Knox, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1956)("It has likewise been held that it is not necessary that the party invoking [the] doctrine should have been a party to the former proceeding").
Only the party taking the inconsistent position must be the same in each case. The reason for this view is that the doctrine of judicial estoppel "is intended to protect the judicial system, rather than the litigants." In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d at 205 (emphasis in original). As the Third Circuit explained in Ryan Operations v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 360-61 (3rd Cir. 1996) (quoting Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 121-22 (3rd Cir. 1992)):
See American Special Risk Insurance Company v. City of Centerline, 2002 WL 1480821, *7 (E.D.Mich. 6/24/02) ("The court's statement in Edwards that judicial estoppel may apply even if `privity does not exist' refers to the fact that there need not be privity between the parties against whom the inconsistent positions were taken. However, the party taking the inconsistent positions must be the same in each case."); McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 686 (6th Cir. 2000)("The doctrine of judicial estoppel forbids a party from taking a position inconsistent with the one successfully and unequivocally asserted by that same party in an earlier proceeding.")
[W]e note that the purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine militates against the imposition of a privity requirement. Judicial estoppel "is intended to protect the courts rather than the litigants."
* * *
There are many instances in which the assertion of inconsistent positions can work to the advantage of a party but where there is no identity or relationship between those against whom the claim (or defense) is asserted. Where the contentions are mutually exclusive, it is irrelevant that they are asserted against diverse parties for the purpose of determining judicial estoppel. The integrity of the court is affronted by the inconsistency notwithstanding the lack of identity of those against whom it is asserted.
The Ryan Operations court further observed, "Our conclusion that privity is not required for the application of judicial estoppel accords with the majority view." Id. at 360.
Newfield has asserted a position in this litigation which is contrary to the position it asserted in its previous lawsuit against the F/V THAI HUNG and Thai Hung, Inc. Newfield was a party to both lawsuits. Accordingly, Patterson and ADTI are not barred from seeking judicial estoppel because of the fact that they were not parties to Newfield's first lawsuit.
There being no genuine dispute as to any material fact, the Court finds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Court finds that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Newfield from asserting its claim in this lawsuit for alleged defects in the structural integrity of its well. Moreover, judicial estoppel also precludes Newfield from asserting that the cause of its damages was anything other than the allison of the F/V THAI HUNG.
Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of defendants, Patterson Services Inc. and Applied Drilling Technology, Inc., for summary judgment is GRANTED. All remaining motions in this case are DISMISSED AS MOOT.