Opinion
Civ. No. 99-2626, SECTION: "J" (3).
February 1, 2000.
On August 30, 1999, Newcourt Leasing Corporation ("Newcourt") filed this lawsuit against Regional Bio-Clinical Laboratory, Inc. ("Regional") and Dr. Chandra Subramaniam alleging that on August 15, 1996, Regional and Subramaniam entered into a lease agreement with ATT Capital Leasing Services, Inc. ("ATT"), Newcourt's predecessor, for medical equipment "sometimes identified as the ABBOTT CELL-DYN 3500." The complaint states that after the equipment was delivered, defendants made some monthly lease payments. However, plaintiff states that defendants eventually stopped making any payments. The complaint alleges that in February, 1999, defendants advised, "that they could not afford their obligations under the Lease and voluntarily surrendered the Equipment to Newcourt." It further alleges that "[a]lthough the Equipment has been returned, the Lease has never been canceled or terminated by either Defendants or Newcourt, and the consideration for the Lease remains due and outstanding."
ATT apparently assigned the lease to Newcourt.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 66.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 9.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 10.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 11.
On November 12, 1999, defendants filed a third party complaint against Abbott Laboratories, Inc. ("Abbott"). The third party complaint alleges that Abbott's activities with respect to the lease of the medical equipment at issue constitutes an unfair trade practice under La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1402, et seq. and that Abbott "is liable under tort theories and breach of contract."
Rec. Doc. No. 6, third party complaint.
Rec. Doc. No. 6, ¶¶ 10 and 11.
Before the Court is Abbott's motion for a more definite statement filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) in which Abbott argues that Regional's third party complaint is "impermissibly vague and ambiguous because it leaves Abbott unable to frame a response or denial without risking prejudice to the defense of its case." Regional opposed the motion and Abbott filed a reply.
Memorandum in support of third-party defendant's motion for a more definite statement, p. 1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides as follows: "If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading." A Rule 12(e) motion is disfavored.
See Burks v. Bogalusa City School Board, 1999 WL 64947, *3 (E.D.La.) (Clement, J.); see In re Triple Screw Marine Towing, Inc., as Owner of the M/v Blackbeard, 1994 WL 151101 *2 (E.D.La.) ( citing Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1959)).
"Whether to grant a motion for a more definite statement is 'a matter within the discretion of the trial court.'" "A motion for a more definite statement will not be granted where the moving party can reasonably respond to the non-movant's pleading, but wants the non-movant to plead additional information that could otherwise be later gained through discovery." "It is universally deemed appropriate only when the pleading addressed is so vague it cannot be responded to." "[I]f [a] pleading meets the requirements of Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and fairly notifies the opposing party of the nature of the claim, a motion for more definite statement will not be granted."
Medrehab, Inc. v. Evangeline of Natchitoches, Inc., 1998 WL 671287, *1 (E.D.La.) (Clement, J.) ( quoting 5A WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil 2d § 1376, p. 585 (1990)).
Id. ( quoting Brown v. Maxxam, Inc., 1991 WL 13918, *2 (E.D.La.)).
Guste v. Shell Oil Company, 161 F.R.D. 329, 331 (E.D.La. 1995) ( citing 5A Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1377 (1990)).
Brown v. Maxxam Inc., 1991 WL 13918 *2 (E.D.La) ( quoting 2A J. Moore, J. Lucas, G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 1218[1] (2d ed. 1990)).
"Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a plaintiff need only provide the defendant with a short and plain statement of its claim which gives the defendant 'notice as to what the plaintiff's claim is and upon which grounds it rests.'" "[A] complaint will be deemed inadequate only if it fails to (1) provide notice of circumstances which give rise to the claim, or (2) set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist." Abbott contends that Regional's third party complaint does not comply with Rule 8 as "Regional has failed to give Abbott any notice of what the bases are for their three claims"
Strong v. United States of America, 1998 WL 990581 *3 (W.D.La. 1994) ( quoting Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir. 1959) and Boudeloche v. Grow Chemical Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759, 761-762 (5th Cir. 1984)).
Shipp v. McMahon, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 589 *4 (5th Cir.).
Third party defendant's memorandum in support, p. 3.
In the third party complaint, third party plaintiffs state that on or about July 16, 1996, Abbott's representatives called upon them for the purpose of leasing a Cell Dyn 3500 to third party plaintiffs. When third party plaintiffs expressed concern that the unit would not serve their purpose, Abbott represented that third party plaintiffs would have the right to terminate the lease and it provided a copy of a lease agreement which included a right to terminate the lease. The third party complaint further states that on July 16, 1996, based on Abbott's representations, third party plaintiffs executed the release agreement tendered by Abbott which gave third party plaintiffs the right to terminate the lease. The third party plaintiffs allege that they "are exposed to liability as a result of the misrepresentations by Third-Party Defendant, Abbott, as to Defendants right to terminate the lease."
Rec. Doc. No. 6, ¶ 4.
Rec. Doc. No. 6, ¶ 5.
Rec. Doc. No. 6, ¶ 9.
The Court finds that the third party complaint is not so vague or ambiguous that Abbott cannot reasonably respond to Regional's claims. Abbott's contention that "Regional's statement that Abbott is liable under 'tort theories' does not afford Abbott fair notice of the factual basis, acts or circumstances that give rise to the 'tort theories' under which Abbott is allegedly liable" is not persuasive. "[A]ny attempt to use a motion for more a definite statement to tie the pleader down to a particular legal theory of his case will be rejected as contrary to the philosophy of the federal rules, which does not require the claimant to settle upon a theory of his case at the pleading stage." Abbott can learn more through the discovery process. Accordingly,
Third party defendant's memorandum in support, p. 3.
5A WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil 2d § 1377, p. 609 and n. 17 (1990); see also Brill v. Central States, Southeast, and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 1985 WL 1448 *3 (N.D.Ill) (there is no requirement that plaintiff allege his legal theory of recovery in the complaint); see Sopkin v. Missouri Nat. Life Ins Co., 222 F. Supp. 984, 985 (D.C.Mo. 1963) ("The failure to characterize a claim as in contract or tort is not such vagueness or ambiguity that the defendant cannot frame a responsive pleading").
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for more definite statement is DENIED.
MINUTE ENTRY DUVAL, J. FEBRUARY 1, 2000