Since the Superior Court judge's decision rests on a statement of agreed facts and governing principles of law, we may draw our own inferences and decide the case according to our judgment as to the questions of law. Newburyport Soc'y for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532-533 (1934). See Simon v. Weymouth Agricultural Indus. Soc'y, 389 Mass. 146, 148-149 (1983).

We are not bound by the judge's conclusions of law. Newburyport Soc'y for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532-533 (1934). We summarize the facts as follows: Weymouth is a corporation formed in 1945 for the purpose of organizing and producing the annual Weymouth Fair. Prior to July 8, 1970, the 1,600 outstanding shares of stock of Weymouth were held in the following percentages: Simon — 25%; Michelson — 25%; McIntyre — 25%; Richard Reidy — 8.3%; Mary Reidy — 8.3%; Rita Reidy — 8.3%.

Mansfield v. Wiles, 221 Mass. 75, 84. Bankers Trust Co. v. Dockham, 279 Mass. 199, 200. Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532-533. Bratt v. Cox, 290 Mass. 553, 557-558.

We are in as good a position to decide the issue as was the trial judge. Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532-533. Veazie v. Staples, 309 Mass. 123, 127.

In our opinion an inference that Michael Daly was the son of Kate Hogan Daly is not supported on the evidence. Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532. Vergnani v. Guidetti, 308 Mass. 450, 456.

Where, however, an ultimate finding rests upon inferences from facts admitted or found, since mere inferences do not involve the credibility of witnesses, we draw our own inferences without deference to those drawn by the trial judge. Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532-533. Bratt v. Cox, 290 Mass. 553, 557-558.

Inferences from the basic facts shown by such testimony, however, are open for our decision, and the inferences drawn by the trial judge are entitled to no weight in this court. Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532. Bratt v. Cox, 290 Mass. 553, 558.

We take at its face value all the direct testimony favorable to the petitioner and to the decree below, and assume to be established all the basic facts shown by that testimony. Even if the rule that the findings of a judge upon oral testimony will not be reversed unless he was plainly wrong ( Boston v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302, 331) can ever apply to inferences from basic facts found by the judge ( Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532; Bratt v. Cox, 290 Mass. 553, 558), it does not apply where, as will appear in this case, the judge decided the case without considering important evidence that should have been admitted. A valid ceremonial marriage may be inferred from circumstances occurring after the time of any possible ceremony.

This is not a case where the decision depends upon inferences to be drawn from facts not substantially in dispute. Compare Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532; Bratt v. Cox, 290 Mass. 553, 557-558. This is a case where the oral testimony of a party, as to alleged primary facts which are essential to the establishment of her contention, was not believed by the trial judge.

Harvey-Watts Co. v. Worcester Umbrella Co. 193 Mass. 138. Dickinson v. Todd, 172 Mass. 183. Bratt v. Cox, 290 Mass. 553. The case at bar is distinguishable from decisions like Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 532, where the oral evidence was not open to dispute as to its substance, and its weight did not depend upon inferences as to the credibility of the witnesses. 1. The allegations of the petition of Sherman H. Bowles for the removal were that Mr. Comstock was biased and prejudiced against him, that he had mismanaged the estate and charged excessive fees for services, had instituted litigation which was without merit and not brought in good faith for the benefit of the estate, and was wasting assets of the estate and was evidently unsuitable for the discharge of his trust.