Opinion
C. A. 1:24-2639-RMG-SV
06-27-2024
Philip D. Newberry, Plaintiff, v. Alan Wilson and Kenneth Paxton, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
Philip D. Newberry (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is currently detained at the Chester County Jail. He filed this complaint alleging a violation of his constitutional rights by Alan Wilson and Kenneth Paxton (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(i)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed.
Alan Wilson and Kenneth Paxton are the Attorneys General for the States of South Carolina and Texas, respectively. Although Plaintiff lists the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., for their addresses, neither are federal employees.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges violations of his First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and various other statutes, asserting the same general allegations against each defendant. However, Plaintiff provides no factual allegations describing how Defendants violated his rights. In the space on the form complaint for Plaintiff to states facts, he states: “Without arguing law, I can describe what has/is happening only as ‘Lawfare,' deprivation of rights, intentional violations, ex-post facto law, civil rights conspiracy.” [ECF No. 1 at 5]. For relief, he requests his habeas corpus petition be granted and $500,000 in damages. [ECF No. 1 at 6].
Plaintiff filed a petition for habeas corpus that is currently pending. See Newberry v. South Carolina, C/A No. 1:24-1678-RMG. He previously brought many of the same arguments in Newberry v. Chester County, C/A No: 1:23-4772-RMG. A district court may take judicial notice of materials in the court's own files from prior proceedings. See United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (the district court had the right to take judicial notice of a prior related proceeding); see also Fletcher v. Bryan, 175 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1949).
On May 29, 2024, the undersigned issued orders (1) directing Plaintiff to submit documents necessary to bring this case into proper form and (2) advising Plaintiff of the deficiencies of his complaint and permitting him until June 18, 2024, to file an amended complaint. [ECF Nos. 4, 5]. Plaintiff has filed no responses.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting an alleged constitutional or statutory violation.
Plaintiff has not alleged any factual allegations against Defendants other than that they are “state attorneys general, elected officials, ‘top cop.'” [ECF No. 1 at 4]. The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). To the extent Plaintiff sues any defendant in their supervisory capacities, they are subject to summary dismissal.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed without further leave for amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).