The assumption made by these two cases is compatible with the view taken by other courts in the United States. Other courts interpreting the term "regular occupation" have held that term to be unambiguous and that disability benefits should be determined from the occupation of the insured at the time of injury or sickness, not the occupation stated in the insurance policy. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Foster, 67 F.2d 264, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1933) (concluding that "occupation" in the policy refers to the insured's usual occupation at the time of the disability); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Saunders, 236 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Ky. 1951) (stating that the case "should have been governed by the controlling occupation or occupations of the insured at the time his alleged disability began, and should not have been confined to his occupation at the time the policy was issued"); Hopkins v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 594 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Mo.Ct.App. 1980) (agreeing that "regular occupation" generally means insured's occupation at the time the disability occurs); Colaluca v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 226 A.2d 405, 410 (R.I. 1967) (holding that when "regular occupation" is not defined in the policy it becomes the work insured was doing at the time of his injury); 1C Appleman's Insurance Law and Practice ยง 671 (1981) (stating that the occupation referred to in the insurance policies is the occupation insured was carrying on at the time he was injured). Emerson v. Fireman's Fund, American Life Insurance Co., 524 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1981), relied upon by Minnesota Life, is compatible with this trend.
However, that case does not aid the defendant for that insured had clearly terminated his self-employment and become employed by another. A change in occupation was demonstrated in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Saunders, 314 Ky. 577, 236 S.W.2d 692 (1951) in which the insured had simultaneously engaged in the grocery business and automobile business, but at the time of disability had terminated the grocery business, leased the building, and continued in the automobile business for which he was not disabled. This case is similar to Benefit Ass'n of Railway Employees v. Secrest, 239 Ky. 400, 39 S.W.2d 682 (1931), in which the insured railroad employee who had sold insurance on the side, was on leave of absence for illness and entered into a contract to sell insurance for another company before the disability occurred. In that case the court made the following appropriate observations. "Under the general definition, `occupation' means one's regular business or employment.
At that time, Mattingly had not disclosed to the company that he had consulted Dr. Atherton two days after the accident. Citing United Insurance Company of America v. Brown, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 428; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Saunders, 314 Ky. 577, 236 S.W.2d 692; and Continental Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 314 Ky. 53, 234 S.W.2d 190, the appellant asserts that Mattingly has not suffered continuous total disability and continuous loss of time within the meaning of the policy. The principal basis for this argument is the fact that Mattingly's actual farm income increased somewhat in 1967 and 1968, despite his asserted disability.