The rule of Donovan's Appeal applies even when the executor, the legal representative of the testatrix, has not received notice. New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 522, 199 A.2d 701 (1964). Since the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal even without notice to the executor, the motion to dismiss was improper.

In these proceedings, the court may permit the intervention of those not named as parties to the action who are found to have a proper interest in the outcome of the litigation. Bogert, op. cit. 441; 4 Scott, Trusts (3d Ed.) 391; see New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 521-22, 199 A.2d 701 (pursuant to General Statutes 3-125, the attorney general is a necessary party to all proceedings involving charitable gifts). In the present case, the minority trustees, by virtue of the granting of their motions to be made parties plaintiff, were properly deemed by the trial court to have a recognizable interest in this action.

Bogert, Trusts and Trustees sec. 411 (2d ed. 1964); see also Stoner Mfg. Co. v. Y.M.C.A., 13 Ill.2d 162; Kerner v.Thompson, 365 Ill. 149, 153; Stowell v. Prentiss, 323 Ill. 309, 321; Attorney General v. Newberry Library, 150 Ill. 229, 236. See also Leo v. Armington (1948), 74 R.I. 124, 59 A.2d 371; New York East Annual Conference of the Methodist Church v. Seymour (1964), 151 Conn. 517, 199 A.2d 701. A trust for the promotion of health is a charitable trust.

Where such funds are in issue, the attorney general is a necessary party. General Statutes 3-125; New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 522, 199 A.2d 701; Averill v. Lewis, 106 Conn. 582, 592-93, 138 A. 815. Where an action seeks a declaratory judgment, the failure to join or to give notice to necessary parties pursuant to Practice Book § 309(d) is a jurisdictional defect.

r which Oakwood, over a period of twenty years and one month, was to receive "the net income" of the Oakwood trust corpus. As already pointed out, provisions for withholding and accumulating income in the Connor trust were specifically made inapplicable to the Oakwood trust. As a charitable trust, the Oakwood trust is to be construed, so far as reasonably possible, so as to uphold it. Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter, 131 Conn. 206, 214, 38 A.2d 598; Ministers Benefit Board v. Meriden Trust Co., supra. That this is the Connecticut rule is reinforced, if any reinforcement could be considered necessary, by 45-79 of the General Statutes, requiring that any charitable trust "shall forever remain to the uses and purposes to which it has been granted according to the true intent and meaning of the grantor and to no other use"; Ministers Benefit Board v. Meriden Trust Co., supra; and by 3-125, requiring the attorney general to represent the public interest in protecting charitable dispositions. New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 521, 199 A.2d 701. The administrative powers to determine what is principal and what is gross and net income and to allocate charges to either income or principal or both are powers often conferred in wills and here were included in a number of other administrative powers grouped together generally in Article Sixteenth of the will. It certainly would constitute a violent and wholly unwarranted repudiation and reversal of heretofore settled Connecticut trust law to construe any or all of these administrative powers conferred on the trustees as powers which, separately or collectively, authorized the trustees to destroy or cripple a charitable bequest and turn Oakwood's income over, in whole or in part, to the Connor trust, thus in effect nullifying the whole charitable purpose of the second codicil and leaving the original will as though that codicil had never existed.

We there noted that the law favors the early vesting of estates. Howard v. Batchelder, 143 Conn. 328, 334, 122 A.2d 307; see New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 520, 199 A.2d 701. Consequently, in the absence of a contrary intent disclosed in the trust instrument, when a remainder given to a class is to be paid at the termination of a life estate, it is usually held to vest in interest upon the creation of the trust if a remainderman is then in existence, or, if none is then in existence, at the time when a member of the remainder class comes into existence.

The law favors the early vesting of estates. Howard v. Batchelder, 143 Conn. 328, 334, 122 A.2d 307; see New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 520, 199 A.2d 701. Consequently, when a legacy given to a class is to be paid at a future time, it is usually held to vest in interest at the date of the testator's death unless a contrary intent is disclosed in the will.

Others may also have standing to enforce charitable trusts, such as trustees, donors of gifts and heirs and executors of wills, which standing includes the right to bring actions or to intervene in actions brought to enforce provisions of trusts or wills. See Hartford v. Larrabee Fund Assn., 161 Conn. 312, 288 A.2d 71 (1971); New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 199 A.2d 701 (1964); Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Coles, 150 Conn. 569, 192 A.2d 202 (1963); Averill v. Lewis, supra, 106 Conn. 592-93; Healy v. Loomis Institute, 102 Conn. 410, 128 A.2d 774 (1925). We conclude that the attorney general does not have the exclusive right to enforces § 45a-533 (a).

However, they disagree as to whether the judgment should or should not terminate the Trust. The Attorney General is opposing the termination of the Trust in his role as the representative of the public interest in protecting charitable gifts and devises. That role is mandated by statute, Connecticut General Statutes § 3-125, and common law. New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 521, 199 A.2d 701 (1964). The Attorney General is a necessary party in any litigation involving a charitable trust or gift. Copp v. Barnum, 160 Conn. 557, 558, 276 A.2d 893 (1971); Lockwood v. Killian, 172 Conn. 496, 505, 375 A.2d 998 (1977), appeal after remand 179 Conn. 62 (1977).

According to General Statutes § 3-125, the attorney general "shall represent the public interest in the protection of any gifts, legacies or devises intended for public or charitable purposes." See New York East Annual Conference v. Seymour, 151 Conn. 517, 521-22, 199 A.2d 701 (1964); Lieberman v. Rogers, 40 Conn. Sup. 116, 117, 481 A.2d 1295 (1984); Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 318. CUMIFA, pursuant to which the plaintiff has brought this action, does not provide the plaintiff with the right to enforce restrictions contained in the "gift instrument," and therefore the plaintiff lacks standing.