New York Central Railroad v. New England Merchants National Bank

16 Citing cases

  1. In re Sight Resource Corporation

    Case No. 04-14987, Adversary Case No. 04-1393 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2005)

    Under Massachusetts law, courts have discretion to interpret a contract in a way so as to give it effect as a rational business instrument and in a manner which will carry out the intention of the parties. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. New England Merchants Nat. Bank, Mass., 183 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Mass. 1962); McMahon v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 186 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Mass. 1962). Contract interpretation is guided by justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties.

  2. Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New England

    375 Mass. 644 (Mass. 1978)   Cited 49 times
    In Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 375 Mass. 644, 648 (1978), we examined the purpose of G.L.c. 231B, which creates and defines the right of contribution, and stated: "It is plain that the evil to be remedied was the unfairness of allowing a disproportionate share of the plaintiff's recovery to be borne by one of several joint tortfeasors, and the object to be accomplished was a more equitable distribution of that burden among those liable in tort for the same injury."

    Baker Transp., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 371 Mass, 872, 877 n. 11 (1977). To that end we examine the whole statute with attention to the language used, the evil to be remedied, and the object to be accomplished by enactment. New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 713 (1962). It is plain that the evil to be remedied was the unfairness of allowing a disproportionate share of the plaintiff's recovery to be borne by one of several joint tortfeasors, and the object to be accomplished was a more equitable distribution of that burden among those liable in tort for the same injury.

  3. Everett Town Taxi v. Board of Aldermen of Everett

    366 Mass. 534 (Mass. 1974)   Cited 27 times

    We are impelled to this conclusion by our obligation to construe a legislative act so as to effectuate fully the statutory purpose. Foley v. Lawrence, 336 Mass. 60, 65 (1957). New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchs. Natl. Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 713 (1962). United States Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 348 Mass. 378, 383 (1965).

  4. Canton v. Bruno

    361 Mass. 598 (Mass. 1972)   Cited 26 times
    In Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 606-610 (1972), the court ruled that a particular statute could operate retroactively, but only after it first determined that the Legislature intended the provision to be retrospective in operation.

    It is our duty in construing a statute to discern the intent of the Legislature on the basis of all pertinent evidence. See New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchants Natl. Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 713. As a general matter, "all statutes are prospective in their operation, unless an intention that they shall be retrospective appears by necessary implication from their words, context or objects when considered in the light of the subject matter, the pre-existing state of the law and the effect upon existent rights, remedies and obligations."

  5. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc. v. Reading

    236 N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1968)   Cited 14 times

    See Woods v. Newton, 349 Mass. 373, 376. In the light of well known principles governing statutory interpretation (see Sun Oil Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 340 Mass. 235, 236; McCarthy v. Woburn Housing Authy. 341 Mass. 539, 542; New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchs. Natl. Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 713), it is clear that the Land Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the petition. 2.

  6. Ucello v. Cosentino

    354 Mass. 48 (Mass. 1968)   Cited 24 times

    See Cleveland v. Tupper, 243 Mass. 163, 165. Any other interpretation would seem to negate the effect of the agreement as a rational business instrument and would produce a result unreasonable in the business context in which the parties acted. See Berkal v. M. De Matteo Constr. Co. 327 Mass. 329, 333; New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchs. Natl. Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 714-715; McMahon v. Monarch Life Ins. Co. 345 Mass. 261, 264. It follows that the plaintiff cannot prevail under the agreement. 2.

  7. Silk v. Everett National Bank

    345 Mass. 277 (Mass. 1963)

    The document "should be construed so as to give it effect as a rational business instrument and in a manner which will effectuate the intent of the parties." New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchants Natl. Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 714. McMahon v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., ante, 261, 264.

  8. McMahon v. Monarch Life Ins. Co.

    345 Mass. 261 (Mass. 1962)   Cited 59 times

    Another principle is that a contract should be construed so as to give it effect as a rational business instrument and in a manner which will carry out the intention of the parties. New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchants Natl. Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 714. The plain purpose of the provision under consideration is to relieve Monarch of the obligation to pay commissions to a former agent who at the same time is depriving Monarch of the policyholders whose premiums constitute the source of the agent's commissions.

  9. Sunrise Equip. & Excavation v. Constr. Mgmt. & Builders

    No. 23-P-594 (Mass. App. Ct. Sep. 5, 2024)

    Our job is to read the agreement as a whole, "so as to give it effect as a rational business instrument . . . in a manner which will effectuate the intent of the parties," Kingstown Corp. v. Black Cat Cranberry Corp., 65 Mass.App.Ct. 154, 158 (2005), quoting New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 714 (1962), and "to give reasonable effect to each provision." Kingstown Corp., supra.

  10. Cummings Props., LLC v. Calloway Labs., Inc.

    No. 18-P-507 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 21, 2019)

    See, e.g., Worcester Redev. Auth. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Hous. & Community Dev., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 529 (1999). See also Kingstown Corp. v. Black Cat Cranberry Corp., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 154, 158 (2005), quoting New York Cent. R.R. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 709, 714 (1962) (agreement "construed so as to give it effect as a rational business instrument and in a manner which will effectuate the intent of the parties"). Applying these factors, we once again agree with the position articulated by Calloway.